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iAbstract
The thesis starts by defining technological change,
productivity and safety. Different definitions are discussed and
their merits compared.
A brief history of coal mining, together with a description
of the state of the mining industry at present is given.
Technological innovations recently adopted by the industry are
discussed.
The concept of productivity in relation to the coal industry
of the U.K., and the deficiencies of the present measurement
technique, are fully explained.
Safety in the coal mining industry of the U.K. is investigated.
A brief history is given, together with a full discussion of the
consequences and costs of accidents.
The concept of technical productivity is introduced and its
relation to total productivity explained. The total productivity
concept is then applied to longwall coal faces. A multi-variable
non-linear model is devised which represents mean total productivity of
all longwall faces to an accuracy of about J7G. The model is tested and
a forecasting method suggested.
Total productivity components are analysed and values for the
productivity of various inputs during the period 1958-1980 given.
Similarly, a model for representing safety, based on costs, is
introduced, tested for accuracy and its components analysed.
ii
By applying marginal analysis to the total productivity
and safety models, the influence of technological change on
productivity and safety are quantified.
It is concluded that a new method for measuring productivity
should be adopted, in which case total productivity would be the most
realistic and comprehensive choice. The models introduced can serve
as useful tools in planning and forecasting, as well as being used to
measure productivity and safety. Since this work has been in progress,
work at the NCB has also led to consideration of improved measures of
productivity.
iii
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vIntroduction
The importance of the coal mining industry for the United
Kingdom cannot be over-estimated. Like any other large industry,
it has been subject to booms and recessions. After a few decades of
temporary recession, the role of coal as a reliable source of eriergy
for the continued growth of the U.K. industry is now, once again,
widely accepted to be vital. Forecasts anticipate the annual demand for
coal in years beyond 2000 may be above 200 million tonnes, although recent
economic effects cast doubt on this figure.
Having been involved in the mining industry in general for
many years, and in the coal mining industry of the U.K. in particular,
the writer's attention was drawn to the fact that despite numerous
technological innovations, no change had been applied to the concepts
of productivity and safety, and that methods used to measure both had
remained unchanged for centuries. It was also noticed that in spite
of claims of improved productivity, the financial state of the coal
industry did not seem to have improved and the size of the
government's deficit grants is increasing. The question then asked
was: Does the measure of productivity used in the coal industry
really measure productivity?
Since nationalization, and particularly since the late 1950's,
the speed of technological change in the coal mining industry seems to
have increased. A study which would measure the degree of the
effectiveness of these innovations, especially as regards productivity
and safety, should prove helpful in the appraisal of future invest-
ments.
vi
Since both the fraction of coal produced from mechanized
faces, and that of coal produced from longwall faces, have been
increasing to the extent that in 1980 these fractions were 92.2% and
98% respectively, it was obvious that these were the dominant areas
that needed emphasis. Further, to start at the most significant
place in the mine, it was decided that the study would be carried out
for the coal faces. The thesis is therefore about longwa1l
mechanized coal faces.
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1. DEFINITION OF TECHNOLCGICAL CHANGE, PRODUCTIVITY AND SAFETY
1.1 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
1.11 Introduction
"Innovation is uniquely a human quaIity and change, renewal
and rejuvenation are normal, healthy human tendencies."l
This presentation is concerned with technological change,
but since as a result of an innovation a change occurs, and these
two are interconnected, some attention is also given to innovation.
There is no doubt that innovation is a vast subject, meaning some-
thing new - a new idea, theory, method, machine or even a social
arrangement.
Mueller2 notices two characteristics of innovation. It is
deliberate and continuous. He also claims that an organisation
that does not confront change, or believes that it need not innovate,
stagnates, decays and dies. This specific, clear and straight-
forward statement indicates the need for innovation and emphasises
the significance of technological change for the continued
existence of an organisation.
Innovation and change are perhaps as old as the history of
mankind and they are not by any means confined to technology. One
difference today is that the time gap between changes has become
shorter. Napoleon said that a general would have to change his
tactics every ten years if he wished to maintain his superiority.
This time interval would certainly seem too long nowadays. One
example of this increase in the rate of change is that, in the late
1960's, 80% of the United States college graduates entered positions
2which did not exist when they were born. Another example is the
fact that in the United states in 1970, the volume of goods
- 2 -
produced was 2.5 times higher than its level in 1929, but the
3increase in manpower had only been 20%. These figures show that
technology advanced by3% per year of its level in 1929.
[( 15CP;6 - 2CP/c) -:- (1970 - 1929) = 3.19'U
Technological changes have taken place in many different ways.
4In a u.s. government study these have been grouped into nine
categories:
1. Computerization of data processing
2. Greater instrumentation and process control3. Trend towards increased mechanisation
4. Progress in communication
5. Advances in metalworking operations6. Development of energy and power
7. Advances in transportation
8. New materials, products and processes
9. Managerial and related techniques
These will be dealt with later as regards the particular industry
concerned here, coal mining; but it is evident that the coal mining
industry of the U.K. has improved along almost all these lines.
1.12 Definitions of Technological Change
To define technological change, technology must first be
defined. Mansfield 5 describes technology as "society's pool of
knowledge regarding the industrial arts." It consists of knowledge
used by industry regarding the principles of physical and social
phenomena, and knowledge regarding the day-to-day operations of
production. Technological change can then be defined as the advance
of technology, often taking the form of new methods of producing
existing products; new designs which enable the production of
products with important new characteristics; and new techniques of
organization, marketing and management.
- J -
Many different lines may be adopted to define technological
change. Economists often try to do this by the use of a production
function. Technological change may be defined directly or
indirectly in terms of its effects on productivities of inputs.
6Schumpeter defines technological change as synonymous with
innovation; he has also defined innovation indirectly in terms of
its effect on output requirements: "We will now define innovation
more rigorously by means of the production function - this function
represents the way in which quantity of products varies if quantity
of factors va:ry. If, instead of quantities of factors, we vary the
form of the function, we have an innovation."
7Solow employed essentially the sarneindirect definition of
technological change in his pioneering article: "I am using the
phrase 'technical change' as a shorthand expression for any kind of a
shift in the production function".
6 8 9Schumpeter ,Ruttan and Mansfield agree that many
innovations (that is, technological changes) are not derived directly
from predecessor inventions but occur with a frequency greatly
exceeding that of well publicized, major innovations that do depend
to some degree on predecessor inventions. 8Indeed Ruttan adopts an
extreme position by suggesting that it is pointless to separate
analytically inventions from innovations. Instead he believes that
inventions should be considered as a subset of innovations, and that
the latter could be defined both directly as "the entire range of
processes ••• by which new things emerge in science, technology and
art"; and indirectly: "technological change •.• designates changes
- 4 -
in the co-efficient of a function relating inputs to outputs resulting
from the practical application of innovations in technology and in
economic organization ..."
10Brown , by fully explaining production function and abstract
technology makes definition somewhat easier. He then defines
technological change simply as a shift in the production function.
He goes on by defining the two types of technology change, neutral and
non-neutral in terms of production function. A neutral technological
change is one which produces a variation in the production relation,
itself, but does not affect the marginal rate of substitution of
labour for capital. A non-neutral technological change, on the other
hand, alters the production function and can be either labour saving
or capital saving.
Hicks 11 also defines the two types of technological change in
12exactly the same way but Harrod provides a different approach.
Kennedy13 shows that Harrod's and Hick's definitions may well refer to
the same phenomenon at the economy level. Figure 1 illustrates
neutral and non-neutral technological change in terms of production
function. In figure 1(a), the two curves are roughly equidistant,
whereas in figure 1(b) they diverge significantly.
Capital Capital
2
Labour
A Neutral
Technological Change
(a)
Labour
A Non-Neutral
Technolo~ical Change
lb)
Figure 1
Two Types of Technological Change
- 5 -
The highest credit for definition should be given to SChmOOkler14,
who gives a good discussion, encompassing the ideas of all the other
economists that have been mentioned above, as well as his own.
1.13 General Analysis of Technological Change
Mansfield5 states: "Without question, technological change
is one of the most important determinants of the shape and evolution
of the American economy".
The upsurge in the attention given to technological change
began in 1956 with the appearance of an article by Abramowitz15•
There he found that almost the entire increase in net product per
capita was associated with something other than the inputs of the
physical capital stock and the services of labour,eg. improved machinery
Mansfield5 lists and explains the various influences that
technological change has had. Among these, the effect of
technological change on economic growth and productivity is most
important. Authors such as Fabricant16 and Solow7 have claimed
that about 90% of the long-term increase in output per capita in the
United States is attributable to technological change.
Denison17 in his more recent study concludes that "Advance of
Knowledge" contributed about 40% of the total increase in material
income per person employed during 1929 - 1957 in the United States.
The importance of technological change for productivity
- 6 -
improvements is justified by statistical evidence for the United
States as fully described by Mansfield5•
Much has been written about the new subject of technological
change, but it is apparent that some aspects of it have often been
either left untouched or treated superficially. For example,
measurement of technological change is one of these aspects. Some
analytical measurements have been done, but those who attempted to
do this took an econometric line of approach with its apparent short-
comings (see section 1.14). This may well be due to the fact that diff-
erent sectors of the economy at different stages of time have such different
characteristics that a single formula would not hold for them all.
Some criteria of technological change are, however, widely accepted
now.
Some business minded economists, such as Holland18, Larrabee
et al , quoted in Silk19and Keezer et al20 have explicitly stated that
the attractiveness of technological change is largely due to the
economic rewards that result. To justify the above mentioned state-
ment that this fact is widely accepted, some other economists sharing
similar views are mentioned here. Schmookler 21, Carter and Willia.m.s22
Brozem23, Sutherland24 and Nelson25 have similar opinions and
attribute a great significance to this reward.
Minasian 26 , having similar beliefs, gives a detailed
justification for his opinion with the help of statistical evidence.
Nelson25, Sutherland24 and Carter and Williams27 also consider other
motivations for technological advance to take place.
~ ~ ~Keynes , Andrews and Brunner and Hershay are of the
- 7 -
belief that motivations other than the economic rewards have been the
main cause for change. The perceived need for survival and
competition are particularly mentioned by them.
Gold 31,32 states that another criterion of technological
change widely accepted is that it increases productivity and as a
result yields progressively lower unit costs. It can be claimed
that this is part (perhaps the maj or part) of the economi c reward
gained through technological advance, as mentioned by other authors,
and that it has only been specified here.
A number of experts in the field of technological change
33 • 34 35 36including Schumpeter , Maclaunn ,Galbrai th and Machlup
claim that it is a criterion of technological change that major
technological innovations occur primarily by increasingly complex
and heavily financed research and development programs - with yields
roughly proportioned to the resources applied. These believe that
major innovations incorporate so much effort and take such a long
time that the random element inherent to research work is eliminated.
If this idea were absolutely true then measurement of the rate of
technological change would be easier than it is. A U.S. Government
study4 concludes that the rate of technological change is closely
related to the rate of investment, the level of economic activities
and the level of demand.
Opposing the views expressed in the previous paragraph are
Jewkes et al37, Kuznets38, Wiesner40 and particularly Heald39
Amongst these, Nelson25 gives an excellent general view of the
- 8 -
relationship between the amount of effort spent and benefits gained.
41 42Mansfield and Comanor have also tried to find a
relationship between expectation from the research and the effort
spent, using empirical data.
A further criterion can be deduced from the fact that
technological change yields increased productivity, being that it
41, 43increases profitability and results in economic growth. Mansfield
and Comanor42 agree with this and Gold31,32 asserts that this
criterion is now widely accepted. Many other economists, however,
notably Griliches44 and Sanders45 oppose this view, believing, in
b~ief, that there is no guarantee that technological change alone,
without other contributory factors and appropriate economic
circumstances, would result in economic growth.
If all the above criteria of technological change somehow
hold true, then a further one will complete the cycle, that is,
increased profitability and growth would create incentives for
further research. Although these criteria complete the cycle so
neatly, it is apparent from the literature that there is no strong
support for the general applicability of anyone of them.
Reviewing the relevant literature, it seems that certain
effects are expected by management and engineers to be gained from
technological innovations. Following are the most important ones:
1. Improved materials, reduced waste and the development
of byproducts should tend to lower material inputs per
unit of output, thereby reducing unit material cost
and their proport~gn of total unit costs - illustrated
best by Fabricant •
- 9 -
2. Task specialisation, method improvements and
mechanization should tend to reduce unit labour
requirement and hence both unit wage costs and the
ratio of wages to total cost - ca~imed and proved
on a theoretical basis by Jerome •
These together with some other minor expectations were examined by
their great admirer Gold31, applying them to six industries over
periods of 30 - 40 years. He concluded that, the results did not
support the expectations associated with technological innovations
and in two cases, the total materials cost even showed an
increase.
Since one of the main concerns here is productivity and its
relation to technological change, this matter should be examined
further. One type of productivity, namely labour productivity,
although by no means equivalent to total or real productivity, but
still of much importance because it can be related to a nation's
standard of living, has been used extensively. A rapid rate of
technological change is likely, other things being equal, to increase
labour productivity. Although labour productivity is a determinant
of the rate of technological change, it can not, in isolation, be
used to measure the rate of technological change with any degree of
accuracy since there are other factors influencing it. This method
has however frequently been used. other factors influencing labour
productivity include the extent to which capital is substituted for
labour in response to changes in relative input prices, and the extent
to which productive capacity is used. Also the rate of growth in
labour productivity is dependent upon the nature of technological
Some innovations, such as transport machinery in coal mines,
- 10 -
are labour saving; some , although few in number, are capital saving,
and some are neutral and have been adopted for other reasons, such as
power supports which are adopted mainly for safety purposes.
1.14 Measurement of Technological Charge
It was mentioned in Section 1.13 that the rate of growth of
labour productivity has often been, despite its inadequacies, used to
measure the rate of technological change. Taken one step further,
i.e. to total productivity, it becomes a slightly more reliable
measurement. Mansfield5 has stated this idea, but like other
economists has considered total input as being that of labour and
capital only. Domar48 introduces the formula for level of technology:
zl + vk
Where: q is output (as a percentage of output in some base period)
1 is labour input (as a percentage of labour input in some
base ratek is capital input (as a percentage of capital input in
some base period)z is labour's share of the value of output in the base period
v is capital's share of the value of outpu~ in the base period
provided v and z are unchanged
Substituting for q, 1 and k over a given period, the value of
productivity can be computed for that period.
Although this is more comprehensive than using labour input,
-only, it has the disadvantage of assuming that the marginal output is
altered only by technological change and that the output/input ratio
remains constant and independent of the ratios of the quantities of
- 11 -
the inputs.
From all economists who have used productivity ratios to
measure technological change, the work of AbramowitJ5 , Solow7 and
Salter49 is of particular significance. They take different views
and arrive at interesting conclusions.
Butcher50 used productivity measures to detect technological
change in agriculture. He measured the arithmetic total factor
productivity associated with the work of Kendrick51, and used labour
in terms of man-hour. other inputs, as well as labour and output
were considered in terms of deflated values. While he a.rri ved at a
numerical value for the rate of technological change, he also drew a
very interesting conclusion, viz that labour productivity growth, on
its own, overstates the effect of technological change.
used by Butcher50 is:
The eq ua tion
~ A [ Wo
L K2 l]= (~ ) + iO (-
~ ~ Kl
Where: Q1 is output in ith year
A is efficiency variable
Li is labour input in ith year
Ki is capital input in ith year
WO' iO are input prices in base year
As mentioned in Section 1.12 economists have tried to
analyse technological change by the use of a production function.
Therefore if the production function were readily observable, a
comparison of that at two points in time would provide the analyst
with a simple measure of the effect of technological change during
the intervening period.
- 12 -
the characteristics of the production function at a given date could
If there were constant returns to scale,
be captured fully by a single curve that would show the various
combinations of labour and capital inputs per unit of output that are
technically efficient.
Capital Input per
Unit of Output decreasing
technical
efficiency
2
Labour Input per Unit of Output
Figure 2 Use of Production Function to
Analyse Technological Change
A shift in the curve from position 1 to 2 represents a technological
change.
Economists have also tried to devise better measures of the
rate of movement of the production function. These measures rest on
somewhat different assumptions about the shape of the production
function. For example, Solow7 provided an estimate of the rate of
technological change for the non-farm economy of the United States
during 1909 and 1949. His assumptions were:
i) Constant returns to scale
ii) Capital and labour were paid their marginal products
iii) Technological change was neutral
- 13 -
Masse152 also carried out a similar analysis for the United
States manufacturing industry. His conclusion was that technological
change had taken place with a rate of 3% per annum (as compared with
Solow's result - 1.5%).
One of the first economists to measure technological progress
53by estimating a production function directly was Tinbergen, He
used the Gobb-Douglas production function of the form:
x = A Lo<. CA
Where X is production A is a scale parameter, and «; and./!are
CL)elastici ties of production with respect to labourt_and capital Le)
respectively.
His method had its limitations and more recently there have
been more elaborate attempts to estimate technological change in
Tinbergen's fashion.
Mansfield 54, in tackling the measurement problem states that
his results based on data regarding ten large chemical and petroleum
firms and ten manufacturing industries, are that the rate of
technological change is directly related to the rate of growth of
accumulated research and development expenditures made by the firm or
industry. He has also confessed that correlation does not prove
causation.
Denison55 measured technological change by quantifying all
its components, such as productivity benefits, design and product
innovations attributable to research, economies of scale,
- 14 -
improvements in the organization of markets such as removal
restrictions on the mobility and economic effectiveness of resources
and the managerial efficiency. The total of these represent techno-
logical progress, but the main problem would be quantification and
its reliability. Even this method, and in particular Denison's work
has been logically criticized by Abramowitzp6 •
Another very common measure of the effects of technological
change is to estimate the reduction in total unit cost. Both
Mansfield9 and Salter49 have asserted that this measure is of primary
interest, both ex ante and ex post, to the potential or actual adopter
of process innovations.
There are many ways of measuring technological change and
they are all claimed to be different, but when examined in depth the
principles of many of them seem to be the same, and only the
directions of view, in order to suit individual cases, are different.
1.15 Problems in Measuring Technological Chan~e
Most measurement methods tackle the problem by indirect means.
This is to measure technological change by measuring its consequences.
There is obviously an inherent deficiency in such methods. Also,
much emphasis has been put on the changes in output and since
technological change is not the only factor influencing output, its
isolation is a difficult task.
On the other hand technological change has a number of effects,
- 15 -
and only some of them can be easily quantified. Although
economists have attempted to quantify social and other non-physical
influences, their methods become so complicated that little accuracy
or realism can be expected from them.
There are difficulties, also, in measuring inputs, the
measurement of aggregate capital being a particularly nettlesome
problem. In addition it is difficult to adjust for quality changes
in inputs. Robinson57 gives a good account of these difficulties
and the degree of accuracy of measurement.
strigler58 describes another problem associated with
technological change measurement, namely that the measures often
assume that there are no economies of scale and technological change
is neutral. There are some obvious deficiencies associated with
these assumptions.
Further, when one compares a number of studies, there are
considerable differences in the estimated rate of technological
change in particular industries. Apparently the results are quite
sensitive to the detailed assumptions that are made and the data
that are used.
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1.2 PRODUCTIVITY IN GENERAL
1.21 Introduction
Producti vity has been an everyday word for the past few
decades, perhaps as a consequence of the full employment situation in
the post war years, to the extent that politicians and economists feel
that the nation's general economic health is dependent upon
productivity.
In spite of much talk of the concept, productivity remains as
one of the most elusive terms in the literature and it has only been
SPOKEN about in woolly terms. Indeed there has been more talk about
the subject than understanding. Productivity improvements have been
the declared aim of governments but there can be little certainty in
achieving this goal without a firm understanding of the concept.
Misunderstanding has led to abusing the word and there can be only a
few words more abused and more misapplied than productivity.
There is, however, no question that productivity improvements
are highly desirable and it is an area where government, management
and labour have strong mutuality of interest.
Gold59 states that productivity analysis enables management
to:
a) Appraise alternative means for changing productivity
b) Appraise managerial alternatives in the application
of such innovations, and
c) Determine the effect of past as well as prospective
innovations
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1.22 Definitions of Productivity
60Following quotations are from people met casually •
••• I think it is to do with producing more HARD things •••
(accountant's clerk)
It is the ratio of output to inputs of MEN and MATERIALS
(teacher)
It is to do with LABOUR and MATERIALS "COST" (man installing
building boiler)
It is the ratio of OUTPUTS to INPUTS (chargehand of first man).
The dictionary provides a starting point. Productivity can
be defined in a general sense as "the quality or state of being
producti ve" 6~ it is the possession or use of power to "cause or
bring about, make or manufacture" 62.
Given this type of definition, it is possible to include the
productivity of such varied subjects as a violinist, an apple tree,
an office or a coal mine. These definitions are useful, since they
imply that the use of productive power can be measured by the RESULT
of that use.
Productivity is generally interpreted as efficiency in
industrial production6~ to be measured by some relationship of output
64to input. It is also defined as the ratio of what is produced to
what is required to produce it.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th edition) says:
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Productivity - capacity to produce, quality or state of being
'productive; production per unit of effort;
effectiveness of productive effort, especially
in industry.
These are taken one by one.
1. 'capacity to produce' seems to imply having different kinds
of resources available; but surely productivity is more
than simply having resources available.
2. 'Quality or state of being productive', although a woolly
definition, seems to be getting closer to the true meaning
of the concept.
J. 'Production per unit of effort' is getting much nearer the
mark, although it is an absolute figure, however expressed:
an absolute figure may not always be helpful unless it can
be compared with another absolute figure; and what about
non-human facilities?
4. 'Effectiveness of productive effort' is a good definition,
although it does not differentiate between productivity
and efficiency.
A booklet published by ICMA65 defines productivity as "the
effectiveness of the expenditure of resources required for production
of goods and services".
The BIM thinks of productivity like this66: Productivity
denotes the effectiveness of labour and capital in the creation of
wealth.
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The ideas considered here seem to be that prod~ctivity can be
attributed to the use of resources. Labour, materials and capital
ha b t· d It" t t' 67ve een men ~one • ~s ~n eres ~ng to note from the OIDeD
definition that 'when used without qualifications, the productivity
of labour is understood.'. This idea was echoed in the Economic
Progress Report68, which suggested that increased productivity,
briefly and in summary, was a reduction in labour cost of producing
any amount of goods.
It is not easy to define productivity so that it would be
meaningful, comprehensive and useful in different cases and
generalization is often associated with many problems. For this
reason, any study of the concept, in a particular industry or firm at
a particular time, must first define it according to the special
requirements of the study and characteristics of the case under
consideration.
Go1d69 states that widely used concepts of productivity have
three serious shortcomings:
1. Output per man-hour does not measure productive efficiency
AS A WHOLE, or even the productive contribution of LABOUR.
2. Increase in output per man-hour mayor MAY NOT be desirable
and mayor MAY Nor reduce unit LABOUR COST.
J. Even if increases in output per man-hour are accompanied
by only proportionate increases in hourly wage rates,
production costs are more likely to INCREASE than to
remain unchanged in capital dominated industries.
Another problem associated with defining productivity lies in
the fact that different groups involved emphasize different
definitions. It is usually the case that an engineer is interested
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in labour productivity with no regard to even the unit cost of labour;
the economist takes a more comprehensive view by considering capital
CHARGES as well as labour; the accountant relates productivity directly
to profitability; management have different views to the concept
depending on the state of the industry or firm; the labour force is
now merely interested in labour productivity; governments concerned
with profitability also show interest in total production volume and
the nation as a whole takes an entirely comprehensive view to
productivity, involving all financial and physical factors as well as
intangible products and by-products. The analyst must therefore,
also, take a particular view of the concept, define it and draw
guidelines within which he can manoeuvre.
Eilon and Soesan70 notice this fact by stating that guidelines
as how to define and measure productivity may be obtained from an
analysis of why we should wish to measure it ••• which could be for
strategic, tactical, planning and other management purposes.
In this study productivity will be defined and guidelines
specified in a later chapter, so that the most relevant, realistic
and comprehensive approach in the particular area concerned here, will
be adopted.
1.23 Measurement of Productivity
Productivity is easier to discuss than it is to measure.
Talk about productivity and its improvements goes on in many quarters,
including the shop steward's office, the directors' board room and the
- 21 -
House of Commons. The degree of concern with the subject which
exists in the established industrial nations and the developing
countries, might result in the layman being surprised at a situation
in which the level of concern considerably exceeds the level of
effectiveness of the teChniques so far developed for analysing and
measuring productivity. Indeed productivity is a variable which to
date has not been analysed and measured with complete effectiveness.
It should be clear by now that an analysis of productivity
must be embedded in the cost and profitability structures. Also, as
stated earlier, to determine how productivity is to be measured in a
particular case, the question "why to measure it" should be asked.
Many lines of approach have been taken to measure productivity, but
although beginnings are similar, means and results are often
different. Following is a summary of the relevant literature.
1.2)1 Use of financial ratios
Most widely used by accountants and economists, but seldom
as a basis for productivity negotiations.
1.2)11 Input-Output Approach
A totally financial measure of profitability rather than
productivity has been used to measure the latter. Being
similar to the total productivity concept except for the non-
existence of physical factors, it simply measures the total
money value of all inputs and outputs and the ratio of output
to input is then taken as measure of productivity. It is
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more suitable for firms with many different outputs and
it solves the problem rooted in the heterogeneity of
physical outputs.
1.2312 Return on Investment Approach
A more complicated approach used for example by Risk71, who
suggests that by dividing assets between departments, the
respective ratios of outputs to assets can be used to
measure the productivity of different departments. This
again, being quite a simple method, is hardly a comprehensive
one.
1.2313 Profit on Investment Approach
This is used as an alternati ve measure to the return on
investment.
The work of the centre for interfirm comparison in Britain applying
this method uses the ratios in figure 3.
The three ratios mentioned above, by purporting to measure
productivity, illustrate different possible answers to the
question "why measure it": input-output approach, to measure
the overall monetary performance of an organization; return on
investment, to measure performance of divisions of an organization
or individual projects; and profit on investment, to measure
profitability of different departments of an organization.
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1.232 Value Added
This is simply the difference between the value of products
and their cost, is again a purely financial measure and incorporates
all the weaknesses of accounting systems. Its main followers such
as Ba1173, Morley 74 and Robertson75 have discussed the usefulness of
the tool in depth, but it is asserted even by them that it cannot be
a useful measure of PRODUCTIVITY. It is, however, arguably superior
to the rate of return on investment, since it is more responsive to
the product price.
1.233 Use of Production Function
This is a purely theoretical method and more useful for
efficiency rather than for productivity, was used by Farrell76 and
Sahgal77 who tried the method using eleven two input-single output
cases and his results were not satisfactory. In this method,
technical efficiency is used as a measure of productivity.
In figure 4, EE' is the locus of all points representing the moat
efficient ways of productioJ in the present state of technology.
Ratio .2! 'is then taken as a mea.sure of productivity, where A,
OA
E for example, represents
Input (1)
Input (2) Figure 4
the actual inputs required.
Use of Production Function to
Measure Technological Change
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Its disadvantages are its inability to be used in the case of multi
input-multi output; difficulties encountered in constructing EE';
and the fact that it does not measure productivity, are too serious
to grant the method credibility for practical work.
1.234 Qperational Research Methods
These methods can be used to measure productivity in small
enough production systems, where data can be obtained with a high
degree of accuracy. Different metnods of this kind all hav e the
characteristic of revealing reasons for low productivity. I·, i78Jlr ,
for example, starts with a number of desirable P,Oals, financial
and physical, and measures the extent to which these are missed.
Eilon79 also used operational research methods, but his method
had strict limitations since it would not suit complex production
processes.
These methods are useful tools but not suitable for
productivity measurement in large sectors of the economy.
1.235 Costing Approach
Another approach to measure productivity that was mainly
. l' d b Bah' , & Mart' 80, 81,82app ~e y ~r~ ~n • It takes the contribution of
different products as indicative of productivity. Being similar to
the ratio analysis, it incorporates the shortcoming that again it does
not differentiate between efficiency and productivity, and indeed it
is not a comprehensive measure.
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Tolkowsky83 gives a full description of the method, its
applications and merits.
Transfer prices have also been used to measure productivity,
84by Horngren for example. This method can only be used in
relatively simple production processes in which fixed costs and
distribution costs are not high.
1.236 Empirical Methods
This approach is often superior to all aforementioned methods,
as it can be defined, formulated, tested and analysed according to
the needs of a particular case. It is impossible to devise a
specific non-empirical method which would measure productivity in
all cases, in depth, comprehensively, from all points of view,
or for different purposes. Empirical methods can have the
advantage, in some circumstances, of practicability.
85Bowey & Lupton adopt several parameters such as the
employees' replacement period to measure labour productivity.
takes an entirely physical approach and argues that the ratio of actual
output to potential output is a good measure. British Ship Research
Association'37 and the shipbuilding industry of Japa.rl38have taken some
elaborate empirical approaches to measure labour productivity.
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1.24 Labour Productivity
This is by far the most commonly used measure of productivity,
mainly due to the simplicity inherent to the input measurement.
Another reason for its being so prominent is because of its effect on
wage negotiations.
The method is clearly open to the criticism that it relates
the changes due to all factors contributing to productivity,
to only one factor, labour. This has been the subject of much
discussion and economists have written a great number of books and
articles about the matter. Smith89, for example, seeks to prove
that this ~eC15L\re does not represent a practical method for ossessvog
total productivity. He also points out that in
productivity bargaining, in which improved utilization of labour is
the key part of the Clf'3ul"lleflt, interest should centre on the fact
that labour is an inseparable part of the total input to production,
and can not easily be isolated for analysis.
Gold 59 states that even casual examination of modern
industries demonstrates that labour productivity measures neither
the efficiency of production operations as a whole nor the efficiency
of labour's own efforts. Production usually involves integrating
the contributions of many kinds of materials and purchased supplies,
a variety of labour skills, numerous types of capital facilities and
equipment and a wide array of technical and managerial efforts in
order to fabricate a range of products. Appraisal of the
efficiency of this entire complex of activities must, to be r"ecAlistic.,
encompass all of the inputs and outputs. But labour productivity
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measures ignore all inputs but one, thereby encouraging gross errors
both in evaluating the effects of changes in this measure and, as of
particular interest in this study, in using it to appraise the
desirability of prospective innovations.
90Furst states: " output results from a contribution of
.•.•• it would be equally interestingALL the factors of production
to relate it (output) to any of the other factors."
A word in favour of labour produotivity would be that of
Easterfield 91. He argues that from the national standpoint and in
the long run, labour is the only scarce resource, and raw materials
and capital are produced, ultimately, by labour. Against this will
be the argument that even in the long run at the present time labour
does not seem to be the only scarce resource. Indeed today land,
fuel and minerals are of similar scarcity. Also the two qualifications,
over a wide enough economy and on a long enough time scale, are not
easily met, and productivity analysts are not often interested in it.
It seems probable that the particular concentration of the United
States on labour productivity derives from historical circumstances -
an economy with plentiful raw materials and a shortage of labour.
It can also be asserted that productivity can be defined as
labour productivity in some special cases and depending on what one
is considering. The case of a coal mine in the nineteenth century would
be one example where on the one hand labour costs represented a large
part of total input costs and on the other hand there was a general
shortage of manpower in the industry.
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At an industry level, labour productivity is rather difficult
to define and measure, due to the fact that its relationship with out-
put is obscured by other factors. In particular, increased labour
productivity may not reflect the utilization of all labour in that
industry and may be reflected in the productivity of other user
industries.
Smith89 asserts that basically there are two types of
definitions for productivity in exist~nce - the ideal type, concerned
with total productivity, and the partial and practical definition
limited to labour productivity. He further argues that although the
word 'ideal' has been used to describe total productivity, the truth
of the situation must be that the only meaningful definition of
productivity is one which admits the full complexity of the
production system and which is concerned with the relationship
between all outputs and, particularly, all inputs. With labour
productivity all other inputs are automatically ignored; their
influence on output and indeed on labour remains unknown. At the
same time these influences make labour productivity a somewhat
meaningless difinition, in that it is not known how far output is a
result of other factors.
Emphasis on labour productivity can therefore only mislead
the analyst into inaccurate assessment of the utilization of labour
and provides him with no assessment of the utilization of capital,
methods and organization.
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It is therefore concluded here that:
a) It is impossible to measure labour productivity due
to inseparability of one input from others, and
b) Even if it were possible, it would not REALLY
measure productivity.
1.25 Total Productivity
Indeed the most meaningful, useful and comprehensive method
to measure productivity. It is simply the ratio of total outputs to
total inputs and elaborations are made in accordance with particular
cases. It is therefore obvious that a single formula can not be
devised which would be applicable in different cases.
The main disadvantage of the method lies in the difficulties
encountered in evaluation of the two aggregate components.
Application of the concept to the case of longwall
coalmining is dealt with in detail in Chapters 4 and 6.
1.26 Problems in Measuring Productivity
The productivity of a nation is almost out of question to be
measured accurately, because so many interrelated variable factors
influence the end result. It is quite easy to say productivity is
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the ratio of output to input. But in the case of a nation what is
output? Whatever it is, its components could not be measured
in cornmon units, and the result is never guaranteed to be a
reliable one.
In the case of an industry such as coal mining where output
can be asserted to be easier to measure,due to the relative uniformity
of the product, difficulties arise when measuring input. In order to
produce something many things are needed for instance: people, capital,
land, facilities, machine tools, mineral deposits, energy resources,
ingenuity, creativity, climate, electric power, organization,
enthusiasm and national pride. How difficult these are to be
measured is obvious. The problem is eased to a good extent when
only changes of productivity are of interest,which is the case most
of the time • In this case most of the variables become constant
over the time,leaving those which are easier to measure.
Eilon and Soesan70 have listed four problems associated with
productivity measurement. These are:
1. Measuring output, especially in the face of changes with
time in the design, sizes and types of individual products
as well as in the proportions of different product lines.
2. Measuring inputs, and accounting for the great multiplicity
of types of materials, facilities and equipment usually
encountered, as well as the multiplicity of labour and
salaried skills to be encompassed in the face of changes
in the composition of each of these major input categories
over a period of time.
3. Determining which particular input-output comparisons are
most relevant in evaluating the performance of various
operations and units of concern to management.
4. Interpreting such findings with due regard to the need to
differentiate between the influence of internally
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controllable and externally imposed factors.
Gold59 states that some of the major problems of measuring
productivity are rooted in:
a) The nature of the phenomena to be encompassed,
b) The requirements of rigorous statistical treatment,
and
c) The need to interpret resulting data within the
context of the evaluative frameworks of management,
investors, trade unions and government bodies.
He too believes that difficulties in the first group arise
If
from: the multidimensionality of most inputs, outputs and other
elements of economic activities, the tendency for the characteristics
of such economic elements to change through time, the difficulty of
measuring some of these characteristics which seem important, and the
inevitable heterogeneity of the limited number of categories into
which the widely differentiated units must be gathered to facilitate
analysis. Such difficulties are intensified by the requirement of
statistical methodology for homogeneity within categories,
comparability of data through time, validity of samples and estimates
'1of the precision of measurements.
Economists such as Gold59• 92, Fabricant93 and Schmookler94
have listed and explained numerous problems associated with
productivity measurement and they have indicated, described and
prescribed remedies for ~ome minor and rare problems that are of
little practical value. The summary of their statements is that the
main problem one would encounter in measuring productivity is
measurement of total inputs and outputs: The rest are only
elaborations of these.
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1.3 SAFETY IN INDUSTRY IN GENERAL
1.31 Introduction
There is at least one thing that all of us engaged in industry
agree about, Lord Beeching95 wrote: we all wish to prevent accidents.
To function at full capacity man must preserve his health.
From an ethical standpoint man owes it to himself and those who depend
upon him to preserve himself in order to function at his best, and
owes it to all persons to be considerate of their lives, limbs and
possessions 96.
There are believed to be 900,000 accidents and cases of
industrial diseases at work every year in the U.K., costing £600 million
and involving 24 million man-days lost. There are 400,000 killed or
injured on the roads, 2,000,000 accidents in the home and 150,000
miscellaneous accidents. There are therefore, more than 3,000,000
accidents every year in this country which need medical treatment9~
1.32 A Psychological Approach to Safety
Statistical evidence over the past several years points to
the fact that approximately 20% of the people have most of the
accidents while the remaining 80% remain relatively free from
accidents 98. Another statistic generally accepted today is that
approximately 80% of accidents are caused by human error. As will
be seen later, this is of particular significance in coal mining, to
the extent that the higher the number of children a miner has the
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more liable he is to be involved in an accident.
The importance of psychology in the occurrence of accidents
is also proved by a study made by Hersey 99. In this study he
examined 440 industrial accidents. Approximately half of them
occurred when the workers were in a low emotional state. He also
found that about 20% of the observed accidents happened when the
workers were in an elated state. He further estimated that workers
are in a low emotional state not more than 20% of the time. This
indicates that a worker is four times as likely to have accidents in
a low emotional state as in normal state.
1.33 Definitions of Safety
The dictiona.ry63 meaning of 'safety' is: "being sure or
likely to bring no danger". It is obvious that this definition is
far from being comprehensive. First the word 'danger' is defined in
dictionary as "liability or exposure to harm". The combined
expression would still seem somewhat obscure, since virtually each
one of the words will have to be defined further.
Another appraoch would be to define 'accident' and postulate
that it is opposite to safety. The same source provides: "events
without apparent cause, unexpected, unintentional and chance mis-
fortune". This definition has many apparent shortcomings.
Crane100 wrote an article on various meanings of the word
'accident' which illustrates the confusion that often arises from its
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different uses.
Authors have attempted to define accidents, many of whom
associate them exclusively with injury or damage. This being a
fairly recent tendency, it would seem to one that it is perhaps a
spin-off from the Factories Act101• The Act itself only defines
notifiable accidents - not satisfactory for our purposes. One
difficulty with equating accident with injury or damage is, however,
that it leaves one to find another word for other unintentional
events.
Heinrich102 and Bird103 on their studies of accident
prevention define 'accident' as: "an unplanned event which has a
probability of causing injury or property damage". This definition
although is wider than the previous ones, but still excludes many
unintentional events.
In the review of literature regarding accidents, one
encounters widely different definitions. While for example, most
dictionaries define it as an unintentional event, Kafka 104 states that
"accidents exist only in our heads": His Royal Highness Prince Charle~05
said once: "there is enormous satisfaction in achieving something
which is potentially hazardous •..", and Nietzsche104 claims "a heart
full of cheerfulness and courage needs a little danger from time to
time, or the world gets unbeara.ble".
It is not really easy to define 'safety', or 'accident' as
its opposite, and in particular to outline what it involvE's. Safety
however, does invol\~ the conservation of human resources and materi~ls.
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A quotation from King and Magidl06 with some modifications
on the pavement.
and additions will clarify the matter - the example of a banana skin
Pedestrian (1)
Pedestrian (2)
Pedestrian (J)
Pedestrian (4)
Pedestrian (S)
Pedestrian (6)
sees the banana skin and does not step on it.
seeing the banana skin, reduces his speed and
steps over it carefully, so as not to collide
with other walkers.
steps on the banana skin, slips, but recovers
his balance and proceeds without collision,
damage or injury.
who was carrying a bottle of wine, steps on
the banana skir-, slips, drops the bottle
which breaks, but recovers his balance and
walks on uninjured.
steps on the banana skin, slips and falls,
cutting his hand slightly.
steps on the banana skir-, slips and falls,
breaking a wrist and tearing his trousers.
It is now possible to compare various definitions with
reference to the example easily. The Act's definition, for example,
would Ol'l~ycall the action of Pedestrian (6) an.accident. Some
people would say that Pedestrian 0) had a "near miss" accident, but
this is strictly incorrect. Accordir~ to a wide definition,
Pedestrians (J), (4), (S) and (6) were all involved in accident.
This would be compatible with the definition given by Heir.rictt02 and
Bird 103.
Safety then can be defined as: "the minimization of injury
and loss resulting from non-deliberate acts such as accidents and
calami ties" 107.
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1.34 An Historical Review
Efforts to protect man against injury from the tools he uses
are very old. A.-m-protecting plates, that is, plates protecting the
inside of the left wrist against the recoil of the bow string, seem
to have been used in Central Europe in the earlier stone age
(Paleolithic age).
Industrial safety as a subject on its own is relatively new.
Petersen l08draws a line at the year 1911, and olaims that progress
in industrial safety before then was practically non-existent.
Although in some countries such as the U.K. there were already some
regulations, it was really after 1911 that the law tended to protect
workers against industrial accidents. It can be claimed that as a
result of various acts enforced, which entitled workers to receive
payment follcwing acoidents, management found it financially sounder
to prevent accidents than pay for tneir occurrenoe.
In the early years efforts were almost entirely spent on
improving the working conditions and it was in 1931 that the
revolutionary book of Heir~ichl02 suggested that people cause more
aocident than unsafe conditions do. He provided a framework for
safety practice, brought all ideas together and defined some
excellent principles out of the previously unoert.ain practices. The
marked progress in safety after 1931 is asserted by some authors to
have been the result of his book.
From the early 1960's to mid 1970's the picture is somewhat
different and in many countries safety standards seem either to have
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remained stagnant or reduced. Figures for the United States, for
example, are given in Table 1.
Severity Rate
(number of accidents per
million worker hours)
(number of days lost per
million worker hours)
1961
5.99
1:.2Z!
13.10Frequency Rate
666 752
Table 1 - Safety Statistics in the United States
(from reference number 65)
As regards health, in 1912 there was held in Brussels a
meeting of the International Congress on Occupational Accidents and
Diseases. A question was asked about measures in force in the
United States to control industrial lead poisoning. The answer
giyen was: "••• but it is well known that there is no industrial
hygiene in the United States,,·lO~
It can not be denied that safety standards have improved
markedly in the twentieth century, nor can one ignore the fact that
U.K. compares favourably with other countries with regard to the
prevention of industrial ill-health and accidents, but as Sir
Bernard Braine M.pl06 stated in 1979, the toll of avoidable death
and injury is still far too high for complacency and in some
occupations it remains stubbornly and disgracefully high.
Teleky 109 gives a full description of the history of
industrial health and safety in Western Europe and the United States,
examining the effects of various actions which have admittedly tended
to improve safety, particularly those of research and legislation.
15
10
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(1) . (2)
5
5,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
(1) - Number of deaths
(2) - Rate of deaths per 100,000 population
o 0
1930 40 Year 50- 60 70
Figure (5) Accidents in the U.S.A.
Source: National Safety Council, U.S.A.
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1.35 Management of Safety
Safety has now become one of the most important goals of any
organization. Theories have evolved to discuss, and techniq_ues have
been devised to control and manage, safety. Petersen 108 discusses
the five principles of safety management in detail. These are out-
lined below:
1. An unsafe act, an unsafe condition, and an accident are all
symptoms of something wrong in the management system.
2. We can predict that certain sets of circumstances will
produce severe injuries. These circumstances can be
identified and controlled.
3. Safety should be managed like any other company function.
Management should direct the safety effort by setting
achievable goals and by planning, organising, and
controlling to achieve them.
4. The key to effective line safety performance is management
procedures that fix accountability.
5. The function of safety is to locate and define the
operational errors that allow accidents to occur. This
f'unctdon can be carried out in two ways:
(i) by asking why accidents happen - searching for
their root causes.
(ii) by asking whether certain known effective controls
are being utilized.
To manage safety, a safety policy should be devised for any
organisation in order to affirm long-range purposes, commit management
at all levels to reaffirm and reinforce this purpose in daily
decisions and to indicate the scope left for discretion and decision
by lower level management.
A safety policy today should include management's intent, the
scope of activities covered, responsibilities, accountability, staff
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safety. assistance, safety committees, authority and standards.
2. COAL MINING THE BACKGROUND
- 43 -
2.1 ~
2.11 Formation of Coal
Coal and peat are thought to be the remains of vegetation that
grew on wet land such as swamps, bogs and marshes. When the
vegetation died, it fell into the swampy environment and was trans-
formed under anaerobic conditions into peat. The transformation of
peat into coal proceeds by a sequence of geological processes. First
of all, the peat deposit becomes covered with sand and silt, thus
bringing to an end the biological processes of peat formation. Over
the course of time, the thickness of sediments increases by deposition
of further sand and silt and the peat is subjected to rising pressure.
Water and volatile components are expelled, and the remaining material
becomes relatively impoverished in oxygen and richer in carbon.
Hydrogen ceases to be combined with oxygen as water, and instead
becomes attached to carbon, forming hydrocarbons. This process
which may take millions of years, eventuallY transforming the spongey,
fibrous peat into hard and brittle coal.
2.12 Chemistry of Coal
The chemistry of coal can be summarized approximately by
describing it as a hydrocarbon material deficient in hydrogen. Such
description, however, is an oversimplification, and a fuller one is
illustrated in Table 2.
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As well as these major constituents of coal there are
numerous minor ones, which are often present in remarkably large
amounts. Table 3 shows the average amount of some elements in coal
ash, together with the average content in the Earth's crust.
Average content Average content Factor ofElement in coal as~ in Earth's c~st enrichrnef'\t(g tonne - ) (g tonne - )
B 600 10 60
Ge .500 1.5 330
As 500 1.8 280
Bi 20 0.2 100
Be 45 2.8 16
Co 300 25 12
Ni 700 75 9Cd 5 0.2 25
Pb 100 13 8
Ag 2 0.3 20
Se 60 22 3
Ga 100 15 7Mo 50 1.5 30
u 400 2.7 150
From B. Mason (1966).
Table 3 Minor Elements in Coal Ash
Looking at the table from a negative viewpoint, one would be
worried by the existence of such poisons as arsenic, mercury, cadmium
and lead, and the radioactive element of uranium. A more positive
viewpoint, on the other hand, would emphasize the mineral wealth to be
found in coal ash, and to wonder if extraction of such valuable
elements as germanium might be economically worthwhile.
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2.2 USES OF COAL
During the Nineteenth century, coal was the sole important
source of fuel for industrial processes in Great Britain, and of high
significance in many other countries. Figures 6 and 7 show the
pattern of fuel consumption in Great Britain and the United States
since 1850 •
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Although coal was challenged by oil in the twentieth cent1.JXY',it
by no means lost its important role as a source of energy. The uses
to which coal.is put have changed considerably over the years.
uses together with their variations are listed in Table 4.
These
The following conclusions can be drawn from the Table:
1. Electricity generation has now become by far the most
important use of coal and the tonnage increased steadily
until recently, despite competition from oil. This can
be explained by the fact that electricity is the most
convenient form of energy, while solid fuel is usually
the least.
2. Coal gasification reached a peak of consumption in the
mid 1950's and then decreased, as it was being replaced
by oil and natural gas. The North Sea gas fields are
expected to become exhausted much sooner than the
British coal reserves, and therefore it is possible
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that coal will be used for this purpose again.
3. Although the tonnage of coal used for coke ovens
shows a decline, this indicates high efficiency in
the use of coke rather than a decrease in steel
production.
4. Collieries which used their own coal for mining
operations have now replaced it mainly by electricity.
5. The use of coal for locomotives and marine bunkers has
ceased, replaced by oil and electricity.
Diversification of the uses of coal has been the subject of
much research, mostly, in the U.K., by the National Coal Board. In
8 . 111September 19 0, the spokesman of the Board announced that the
research work in turning coal into oil had been successfully
completed and tested, and by 1990, this type of oil will be in full
production. It is asserted that 50 gallons of petrol and 80 gallons
of other oil can be produced from each tonne of coal.
Skea112 has forecast in 1980, the amount of coal used for
different purposes in the future until after the year 2000.
Figure 8 shows his conclusions, with more tentative forecasts
beyond 2000 A.D. Recent economic effects, however, cast doubt
on his fieures~
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Table 4 Different Uses of Coal 1923-1972 (Million Tonnes)
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Demand for Coal
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2.3 HISTORY OF COAL MINING
The history of the modern industrial world is largely based
on coal. Man has mined and used coal for about 3000 years; the
Chinese are said to have used coal in 1000 B.C.llO•
There is evidence to prove that coal was worked during the
Roman occupation of Britain, but as there are few references to coal
in the writings of classical authors, this can not have been of great
importance in the economy of Roman Britain.
It can not be said whether coal was used or not during the
Dark Ages. If, however, it was, it must have been of little
importance again, since it is not mentioned in the Domesday Book.
There is no doubt nevertheless that coal was worked in many
places in the twelfth century. Coal became important in the six-
teenth century when the price of timber rose rapidly.
In the early stages of coal mining (if it can be called
'mining'), it was only worked on outcrops (coal was picked up where
it lay).
By the twelfth century, coal was being got in small quantities
and shallow ditches and in the thirteenth century, in addition to some
opencast methods, coal was being won from shallow drifts and bell pits.
Where seams lie deeper than about 20 feet, bell pits are
intolerably wasteful of labour. The practice therefore developed of
heading out into the seam for a short distance on each side of the
shaft. Between the headings the wide pillars of coal were usually
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strong enough to hold u~ the roof, although wooden props were no
doubt occasionally used.
Figure 9 - Bell ~its with windlass
(From reference number 114)
oS· to top
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Figure 10 - Bell ~its in Derbyshire
(from reference number 114)
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The room-and-pillar system of mining was established in the
fifteenth century or earlierll3• This system although ideal for
conditions of work at that time, was almost entirely replaced by
longwall methods later.
It is thought that the longwall method of working was first
used in the late seventeenth century in Shropshire and the system
became fairly general by the early eighteenth century, although the
shallow mines still employed room-and-pillar.
From the eighteenth century to the present, the longwall
method has been the one most popularly employed, although in
Northumberland and Durham, room-and-pillar system was still adopted
until weil after nationalization. It is claimed that the reason for
not changing to the new system was due more to reluctance to change
t t art· ul l' 1 dit' 114han 0 p ~c ar geo og~ca con ~ons .
- ;4 -
Figure 11 - Two systems of seventeenth and eighteenth
century coal working
(from reference number 114)
It is evident from the available literature that early room-
and-pillar method allowed for less than half of the coal to be
extracted despite the fact that seams were shallow. The extraction
rate increased and smaller pillars were left where possible. Later
the method so developed that pillars were no longer left permanently.
From the shaft bottom first the rooms were extracted leaving larger
pillars and coming back towards shaft, pillars were taken. This was
a great improvement in coal mining methods for no longer were valuable
reserves left unworked which would be almost impossible to be
- .5.5-
extracted in later years. Also it needed less capital expenditure.
Kirbyll.5 calls the period 1870 to 1914 the era of expansion of
coal mining. This is evident from Table .5.
Year Output in Exports in Number EnqlloyedMillion tons Million tons in Thousands of men
1870 110.4 11.2 3.50.9
1875 133.3 14.0 .53.5.8
1880 147.0 17.9 484.9
1885 160.8 22·7 520.6
1890 181.6 28.7 632.4
1895 189.7 31.7 700.3
1900 225.2 44.1 780.0
1905 236.1 47.5 850.4
1910 264.4 62.1 1,049.4
1913 287.4 73.4 1,127.9
Table 5 Output, Export and Employment in U.K. Coal Industry
1870-1913
Source: Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge 1962
furlng the period of World War I a growing pressure from the
miners on the government of the day for the state ownership of the
mines and mineral rights resulted in a Royal Commission being set up
in 1916 "to investigate and make recommendations on the future
operation of the mining industry". The report of the commission
recommended that the mineral rights should be taken into state
ownership.
From the early 1920'5 the so called "depression years" of the
mining industry began. Governments attempted to correct the
situation by many different actions.
On the other hand, the standards of safety were as Mr Justice
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Sankey said "so that one would have good reason to be ashamed". The
number and intensity of mining disasters convinced the government of
the day that urgent action was required to make the mines safer places
to work in. The Royal Commission of 1936 was set up with a
comprehensive reportl16 ~ving important recommendations in its 520
pages. This report also recommended the state ownership of mineral
rights and this was finally implemented in 1942 with compensation
being paid to former owners. Turnerl17 states that as a result of
this report some measures were introduced which led to a rapid
improvement in the mining environment and a slow-down in the incidence
of major disasters.
As the war progressed it became increasingly obvious that a
central control of mines was required and this function was carried
out by the Mines Department, until in 1943 a National Coal Board was
set up. This Board continued to operate until 1946 when a
Government committed to nationalization of the basic industries was
returned to power and as a result on first January, 1947, the
ownership of the mines passed to the state.
The industry became better organised, expert management
services were provided, and capital was readily available through the
Board's decisions. This resulted in the industry improving along
many different lines, particularly from the mechanisation point of
view, which will be dealt with later.
In the early 1960's, the mechanisation drive was continuing
unabated. Coal was plentiful but so was oil. Changes were taking
place in the affairs of other, nationalized, customers of the
- ~ -
National Coal Board. The British Railways dieselization and
electrification policy was being rapidly introduced, British Gas was
introducing new processes which produced gas more efficiently, and
the re-organization of British steel manufacturing processes
resulted in a severe falling off in home demand causing over-
production and heavy stocking at collieries.
As a result pit closures took place and a good number of
mines were closed down. The mass media had convinced themselves,
and much of the nation, that the coal industry was in rapid decline
and its total demise was just a matter of time. They had not however
taken into account the rapid changes in world events - neither the
changes in world energy demands, nor the events of the Middle East in
the early 1970's.
The intervention of external international events in the cost
and availability of fuels resulted in an advantageous reappraisal of
the role of the coal industry and once again expansion began in the
1970's, and after less than one decade the yeilds are now beginning
to be observed.
Modern collieries are now equipped with the most advanced
devices, and coal faces are highly capital intensive, resulting in
labour productivity and safety to be higher than ever before.
Longwall methods of working and the use of shearer loaders,
Armoured Flexible Conveyors, and powered supports are now predominant.
In face operations, automation and remote control are also in their
experimental stage.
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J. TECHNOLCGICAL CHANGE IN COAL MINING
- 59 -
3.1 GENERAL
There was little change in the technology of coal mining until
fairly recently, considering the age of the coal mining industry
itself. For as long as picks and shovels were used, and no other
technological change had taken place, coal mining could not operate
at any great depth or on a large scale.
The first means of supplying power was water, which was used
in 1680, and after that steam came into use in 1705. Application of
steam was diversified and rotary steam engines evolved in 1779. This
was a major technological advance in coal mining and hence enabled
shafts to become deeper. More collieries were opened so that in the
year 1800 coal production was about 10 million tonnes. Attempts
were being made to get the maximum use of the technology available at
the time (mainly that of steam), and as a result progress was made in
ventilation, pumping, winding and transport, thus increasing the
national output to 100 million tonnes in 1865.
So far there has been no mention of technological progress at
the coal face itself, which is the main topic with which this
presentation is concerned. The reason is that there was no
technological advance at the coal face until 1850. It is claimed
by Griffinl14, that, because so much coal could be won either by the
patchwork method or by drifts, there was no incentive and little
opportunity to master the latest techniques. The few deep mines in
existence by the mid-nineteenth century were therefore technologically
backward.
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It would perhaps be useful and interesting to mention
technological constraints tending to hinder the production of coal at
different times.
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries problems of
ventilation, drainage and winding limited the size of workings. These
remained as the limiting factors until in about the middle of the
eighteenth century when Newcomen engines for pumping were adopted,
and therefore drainage was removed from the list of constraints.
The ventilation problem was also eased in the second half of
the eighteenth century. At this time engines of sufficient power
had been adopted to drive fans to ventilate mines.
In about 1800, steam winding engines were chosen to increase
the shaft capacity. This objective was achieved, but not to remove
the constraint completely. The winding problem was not solved until
1840 when cages could be held steady in the shaft by guide rods.
Having removed these constraints, underground transport then
seemed to be the limiting factor. This problem was also becoming
increasingly important because faces were getting further from the
rpit bottom. The first choice at that time would c~tainly be steam
engines. Later compressed air engines, diesel engines and
eventually electricity was used to drive haulage engines underground.
The problem was, however, largely solved by the end of the nineteenth
century.
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It was only in the late years of the nineteenth century that
the limiting factor of coal production was found to be at the coal
face, rather than elsewhere underground. One should not, therefore,
expect to see much improvement before then on the coal face. Two
main reasons can explain this: firstly, the coal face had a higher
inherent potential; and secondly, it is conceivable that at the
same time as attempts were being made to remove other constraints,
work was also being carried out to improve the technology at the coal
face, so that this constraint was realised so late.
From the early twentieth century a great deal of effort has
been spent at the coal face to remove this constraint. Although
largely eased but it can be argued that it is still a limiting factor
today.
In the twentieth century a long list of constraints appeared
but none as severe as those of the earlier times. Lack of safety
was one, eased by legislation. Transport, once again, eased by the
adoption of belt conveyors, the Armoured Flexible Conveyor (AFC),
high speed manriding trains etc. Ventilation problems which tended
to slow the rate of face advance, were eliminated by the use of
efficient fans and methane drainage systems. The list is an endless
one. Regarding the coal face, after the development of powered
supports, modification of the shearer loader, and adoption of the
A.F.C., the rigid cycle production system was replaced by a
continuous one. Since 1970, coal faces are particularly highly
productive, and if no constraint were present, they would have
produced far more than they do. The limiting factor now, as it is
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claimed by mining engineers, is that of the coal face ends, slowing
the rate of advance and therefore the production rate.
Perhaps the greatest change in mining practice has been the
adoption of electriicty, but it has rarely been regarded as
technological change since its adoption took place gradually. This
is explained by the fact that it happened before nationalisation,
when colliery owners simply waited for others to try electricity to
observe the results and little experiments and research work by
colliery owners were being done.
Electricity as a source of power was first used in U.K. coal
mines during the l880·s, and in a few decades generated great
enthusiasm amongst mining engineers. Holliday118 in his paper
presented to the Institution of Mining Engineers in 1904 (when he
compared 3-phase and continuous-current electricity for mining
purposes) apologised for yet another paper about electricity,
commenting that not many years ago it was new to mining engin~ers,
but things had changed so much that the meetings of the mining
institution might be mistaken for meetings of the Institution of
Electrical Engineers:
The first use of electricity underground was probably at
Earnock colliery, Scotland, in 1881 when electrical lighting was
tried on a coal face, but the first application for underground
active power was at Trafalgar colliery, Forest of Dean, in 1882119, UD
when Sir Francis Brain installed a 3-Kw motor to drive an underground
pump. Several installations, principally for pumping and haulage,
quickly followed in the course of a few years, but it was not until
- 63 -
1910 that the first all electric colliery, the Brittania (Monmouth),
was opened 121. The adoption of electricity then became so rapid
that from 1912 to 1937 the total Kw used by collieries had been
quadrupled. From then most of the effort spent was to increase
power, to modify and diversify the equipment to cope with different
situations, to increase flexibility and to reduce the danger
associated with their use. It is now not uncommon for a modern face
to be equipped with machinery totalling over 1000 Kw and it is fairly
safe to assert that almost every apparatus used in a modern colliery
is somehow electrically powered.
Nationalisation of the U.K. coal industry was carried out in
1947, after which the picture of the industry has been somewhat
different. Since then virtually every aspect of the coal face has
received attention with a view to increasing efficiency and
productivity. Particular attention has been given to coal getting
and loading machinery and a wide diversity of machines have been
designed, installed, modified and in some cases rejected. other
operations at the coal face, such as transport and support systems,
have also been radically changed. Face conveyor design today is
based almost entirely on the A.F.e. whose use has made the system of
mining much more flexible and potentially highly productive, since it
enables coal production to be continuous as opposed to intermittent.
The main objectives of the Board from mechanisation of coal
.faces can be summarised as: to increase productivity, to increase or
maintain bulk output, to reduce total cost, to improve safety and
health and to reduce the hardness inherent to face work. From what
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has been explained in earlier chapters, it is apparent that the Board
has been successful only in achieving some of these objectives; and
in some cases such as the bulk output, the result has been opposite
to the aim.
Coal faces are now, once again, equipped with conventional
machinery and methods. The longwall system of mining is
predominant and the use of powered supports, the shearer loader and
the A.F.C. is almost certain at any coal face. Little technological
change has taken place since the early 1970's and improvements have
been confined to coal face environment and modification of pre-
existent equipment. For this reason, coal face productivity and
safety have not changed much. However, the more centralised and
sufficiently financed research efforts by the N.C.B. are so
objective orientated that the likelihood of invention and innovation
of a major technique or machinery is enhanced.
The N.C.B. seems to be well aware of this, as is apparent
from the statement made by Sir Derek Ezra, the then chairman of the
Board. In effect he said: "We know what we are aiming for at the
moment in terms of our research efforts, but mining will undoubtedly
change. How will it change towards the end of the century and
beyond? What new techniques and devices will be employed? If we
can guess at them now then we ought to be instituting immediately the
research that will bring them to fruition in due course". Sir Derek
Ezra emphasized that he was not thinking of "evolutionary" but of
"revolutionary" technologies. Evans 122, analysing these statements
asserts that technological change can be forecast in terms of known
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knowledge, but technological revolution is quite unpredictable, and
he goes on by saying that, if there is anything new, it is more
likely to be found outside the coal industry.
As a result of the above statement by Sir Derek Ezra a small
group of scientists and engineers was commissioned to study techniques
which might have relevance to coal mining into the period beyond A.D.
2000. A summary of the report submitted to the Board is given in
the paper by Evans~ which gives a full but brief account of the
probable future technological change in the mining industry.
To summarize the nature of technological change in the coal
industry after nationalisation, it has been divided into nine
categories that were listed in Chapter 1.11tP 2).
In 1974 the N.e.B. announced its intention to proceed with a
programme of Advanced Technology Mining to follow on from the
mechanization initiative first launched in the 1950's. In this
programme particular attention has been given to automation of the
coal face. The detailed programme is explained and justifications
produced with the help of actual examples by Bourn~23 •
From what has been said, it is safe to assert that two major
technological revolutions have occurred in the mining industry, the
first in the period of 1840 to 1860, and the second between 1950 and
1970.
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3.2 CONSEQUENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Technological change has undoubtedly had great influence, on
coal mining, as on other industries. Two effects, concerned here,
and perhaps the most important ones, are on productivity and safety.
It was indeed intended to do so, as one of the objectives of the
N.C.B. at the time of foundation was to provide means so that
technology would improve with particular attention to productivity
and safety.
It is evident that technological change has had the greatest
influence on safety, by invention of new machinerJ ,techniques and
methods.
Technology also tends to improve morale, as has been proved
statistically by Harper and KaltoJ24 , where they concluded that
morale is dependent upon the degree of mechanisation, among other things.
Morale itself, although being a part of health and safety, further
tends to improve the actual physical safety (this has been discussed
earlier). A disagreement with this by Revan125 shows that morale
and the size of an organisation move in opposite directions, and in
the U.K. it is usually the case that larger mines are also more
mechanised too.
The significance of technological change in improving both
productivity and safety has been noted and documented by many authors
including Gold 126, Rosenberg1Z7, 128, Taylor 129, Mansfield13:l, 131 and
Thomas and Cooper 132 who showed this by a few statistics. They
divided the coal faces into three groups in order of the degree of
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mechanisation as follows.
Accidents per Accidents per
Method of Working \00, 000 \Ob Tonne S of
Manshifts Worked Coal Mined
Hand filled, hand set supports 1.60 2.70
Power loaded, hand set supports 1.45 2.00
Power loaded, powered supports 0.84 0·50
Table 6 Classification of Accidents According to Technology
(from reference 132)
Christenson and Andrewsl33 used the model:
I = f (T, s, R)
Where I is the injury rate
T is the technology adopted
S is the typical size of mine
R is the government regulatory activity,
to study safety in coa1 mines. They expanded the model1tested it by
actual data from the United States, and concluded that in the period
since World War II, technology has brought about a lower risk of
accidental injury in underground coal mines. Before this period,
however, they comment that the opposite could have been the case.
Trege1lesl34 attributes the recent improvements in safety to
technological change. His conclusions are illustrated in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Fa.tal and Serious Accidents at the Coal Face
(from reference 134)
From what was explained fully in earlier cha~ters, the
influence of technological change on ~roductivity is obvious. It was
seen that economists have frequently tried to quantify the ra.te of
technological change by ~roducti vity improvements, implying that
technological change has directly affected ~roducti vity (,ee ~ectiof\ \.\I~).
Overall output per man :rear in the U.K. coal mines increased
from 266 tonnes in 1947 to 469 tonnes in 1979135• A major part of
this improvement should be attributed to technological developments.
Unfortunately statistics regarding coa.l face productivity have only
been produced since 1979/80 and since for any examination statistical
information is required, this is ~ostponed to later cha~ters where
a.ttempts will be made to extra.ct the information required.
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3.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AT THE COAL FACE
3.31 Coal Cutter/Loaders
As already mentioned almost no attention was given to coal
face mechanisation until about 1850. At this time the first
technological advance occurred at the coal face, this being the
introduction of compressed air. In 1853 the first compressed air
coal cutter was taken to the face. Several different and some
similar machines were invented after this time, many of them
rejected. In 1856 a bar machine was introduced and in 1861 a type of
disc machine was first put into trial. So far these machines had no
significant success, but led to the invention of the Gartsherrie
chain cutter used in a Scottish colliery in 1864.
The developments were relatively rapid so that as early as
1905 the report of the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies and
Resources stated: "There seems to be no doubt-that coal cutting
machines are now firmly established".
In the early years of the twentieth century, attention was
also being given to face conveyors, but it was apparent that it could
not be developed as fast as the cutting machines. Also in these
years, electricity was being increasingly used instead of compressed
air and steam. The first cutter known to have been powered by
electricity was used in 1885, and many other machines were introduced
after this time. Early electrical cutters were both troublesome and
dangerous, but from the early stages, the potential was realised and
gradually they became firmly established.
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From the mining methods point of view also, these years saw a
change, so that longwall methods became more attractive, and in
particular, the advancing longwall method was rapidly replacing the
room-and-pillar method.
From the year 1864 until about 1920 a great number of new
machines were invented, some of them did not even get away from the
drawing table, some were put into trial, some were rejected, and some
of them were modified or accepted for use. It was also at this time
that coal cutters were spread over all districts. Although these
cutters varied greatly from each other, they were almost all
compressed air powered.
It was in the late nineteenth century that the potential for
very high output and productivity, as tons per manshift, was
realised; but although by the end of the century mining engineers
had known this for a few decades, and so many machines had been
invented, the innovation of these took such a long time that only
about 1.5% of the national output was mechanically cut. This grew
so rapidly that it increased to about ?% in 1910.
The great number of machines invented by 1920 had to be
rationalised, and this is almost the only thing that happened between
then and the second World War. There was no revolutionary type of
machine, as occurred earlier, but the existing machines were
modified and expanded. The output achieved by mechanised faces
increased rapidly in this period, and by 1940 more than 140 million
tonnes of coal WaS being mechanically cut and conveyed each year.
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All these are apparent from the graphs in Figure 13.
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It was only after 1940 that continuous coal getting was
considered. For this to be achieved, a type of flexible face
conveyor, together with suitable supports and a more continuous
cutting machine, was required. Until 1947 when coal mines of the
U.K. were nationalised the variety of machines and methods used in
different parts of the country and in different mines was such that
it would be outside the scope of this presentation to mention them
all.
At the sarne time as these technological advances were carried
out in the U.K., other countries also improved coal face machines
according to their own needs due to the different geological situations
present. Of the 21 different disc cutting machines invented until
about 1947, only J originated from the United states and the rest came
from Western Europe. On the other hand, of the 15 rotary cutting
machines invented, only 4 originated from Western Europe and the rest
from the United States. This reflected the suitability of a disc
type cutting machine for the coal seams in the Western Europe. Also,
as a matt~r of interest, fourteen plough type cutting machines were
invented, and 10 of them in West Germany, 3 in Great Britain and 1 in
Austria. On the whole Britain seems to have kept pace with other
countries until 1947 and of the total of 50 different cutting machines
invented and innovated 13 (including the shearer loader which is now
universally used) came from the U.K.l36
Since 1947 much attention has been given to coal face
mechanisation. It can be asserted that at that time coal face
output with the existing technology had achieved its potential, and
- 73 -
perhaps some major innovations were felt to be required.
In 1947 the coal industry was in a poor shape due mainly to
the second World War, and total output fell from 227 million tonnes
in 1938 to 184 million tonnes in 1945. The state of the coal
industry of the U.K. is clearly shown and its inferiority as
compared with other major European countries just after the second
World War is well indicated in the Euhr Reportl37 of 1974.
The perceived need for greater output, and therefore new
mechanisation on the one hand and availability of capital brought
about mainly by nationalisation of the coal industry on the other
hand, yielded results within only a decade. Mechanisation of the
coal face once again showed a marked improvement and a great number
of machines were invented, put into trial and in many cases were
innovated. Shepherd and Withersl36 claim that no visitor to the
Essen exhibitions of 1950, 1954 and 1958 could fail to be impressed
by the variety of new and experimental machines designed for
specific operating conditions. This technological change resulted
nnnu~
in the coal output being increased from 187 million tonnes/in 1947
~o~~~
to 210 million tonnes/in only a decade. This level of production
was, however, reduced subsequently, but for reasons other than
technological capabilities, such as pit closures, etc.
As a result of improved coal face mechanisation, the percent-
age of coal mechanically cut increased still further to 86% in 1955.
Table 7 illustrates the great number of machines which were
in use in 1950's and 1960's. It is noticed that the types have
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narrowed down to only four and particularly in the case of the
shearer loader it can be claimed that it dominates the picture today.
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1957 127 18 188 302 0 0 5 12
1958 115 15 181 294 0 0 6 11
1959 104 11 137 311 2 0 3 8
1960 102 9 112 326 10 1 3 10
1961 82 2 101 467 18 9 3 11
1962 42 0 84 565 12 30 2 9
1963 33 87 611 4 89 1 4
1965 10 79 723 0 110 1 2
1966 5 67 693 132 0 1
1967 0 '0 706 122 0
1968 698 110
1969 608 74
1970 565 45
1971 595 24
1972 610 21
1973 577 19
1974 563 16
1975 575 9
1976 566 4
1977 567 0
Table 7 Different Face Cutting/Loading Uachines
Used After Nationalization
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1957 15 30 31 17 48 8
1958 24 72 50 15 33 28
1959 33 116 82 21 42 59
1960 32 175 142 23 38 51
1961 30 229 184 20 33 67
1962 20 245 179 15 37 57
1963 19 286 191 7 31 35
1965 16 288 168 2 41 15
1966 15 294 158 4 39 10
1967 12 280 134 0 0 0
1968 ,7 265 104
1969 5 197 80
1970 2 196 67
1971 1 175 .58
1972 0 164 54
1973 133 49
1974 122 44
1975 130 40
1976 116 34
1977 113 29
Table 7 Continued
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3.311 Anderton Shearer Loader
The shearer loader invented in 1952 by James Anderton, the
N.C.B. mining engineer in Lancashire, has been one of the most
important inventions in the coal industry since the World War II.
It was this machine that made possible the integrated mechanisation
of cutting, loading and conveying of the coal. In 1976, 75% of all
British coal was cut and loaded by shearer loaders. It is indeed
the biggest single royalty earning innovation for the N.C.B.
Although it was first invented as a revolutionary piece of
equipment, it has been subject since then to extensive evolutionary
modifications and improvements. Nowadays, although the principle of
the machine has not changed, it hardly looks similar to the one
invented in 1952.
Shearer loaders have now evolved into a family of machines,
the major different types being: uni-directional; bi-directional;
single ended ranging drum shearer; and double ended ranging drum
shearer, suitable for virtually any condition. Its virtues are:
reliability, flexibility under varying conditions, simplicity and
cheapness.
3.32 Coal Face Conveyors
Coal cutters introduced in the late nineteenth century
increased the production of each face and this increase in the output
of the face was regarded as "in the mine output". This coal
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had then to be conveyed, and hand conveying and ponies could no
longer cope with moving this output along the face. This was
realised in the early twentieth century, but as there had already
occurred a technological gap between coal cutters and conveyors, the
number of conveyors used were always less than the number of cutters.
In 1902 the first face conveyor was invented which consisted
of a trough running along the face. The second type of conveyor was
a train of trays joined together, invented in 1908. In 1920 a form
of shaker conveyor, and in 1930 the belt conveyor, came into action.
The above mentioned gap between coal cutters and conveyors,
although initially a marked one, tended to narrow so that by 1940
almost all faces equipped with coal cutters also had a form of
conveyor installed. In other words in 1939 61% of the total
production was cut mechanically and 58% conveyed in this way. In
1940, 63.7% of the total production was cut and conveyed mechanically
and in 1950, a higher percentage was conveyed mechanically than cut.
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(from reference number 116)
Dominating the picture today is the Armoured Flexible Conveyor.
Its potential is as high as that for the shearer loader, as it is
easily pushed forward by the powered supports to keep close to the
cutting machine. As it can be bent in the form of a IIsnake", it
would suit any method of working at the coal face.
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3.33 Supports
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wooden props
and bars were almost universally used. Rigid iron props and bars
were introduced into many mines during the second World War. Since
1945, rigid props and bars have been largely replaced by hydraulic
supports. The earliest of these were hydraulic props which operate
similar to hydraulic jacks. These props would resist pressures of
up to 20 tons without yielding.
From these props, hydraulic chocks were developed. A
hydraulic chock consists of a number of hydraulic props having
canopies which are steel cantilever beams, the whole being mounted on
a steel platform to form one unit. A ram, also operated hydraulically,
is attached to the platform to move the face conveyor.
It was only during the 1960's that self advancing high
capacity powered supports became available. This enhanced the use of
the longwall system of mining which was being restricted because
reliable supporting equipment was not available. Since then longwall
mining has become the predominant underground coal mining method in
Europe. Experience has indicated that longwall is the most reliable
and economical method for uniform, flat coal seams lying more than
500 metres below the surface. It has been successfully used under
various geological conditions and for steeply inclined seams at
depths up to 1300 metres.
The powered supports not only hold up the roof, push a
conveyor or spill plates, and move forward themselves, but also
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provide a safe 'space for all necessary mining activities and
contribute greatly to the success of longwall mining.
There are four main types of powered supports available now,
namely: frames, chocks, shields and chock shields.
Powered supports have rapidly grown into many different types
with different capacities (up to 800 tonnes or more at yield),
dimensions (up to 4 or 5 metres in height) and design, SO that they
can now be adopted for virtually any seam conditions.
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(from reference number 138)
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Powered supports are now firmly established universally, where-
ever the 10ngwa11 method is being practiced. Comparing with other
European countries, the s~eed of adoption has been faster in the U.K.
so that in 1976, 96.5% of coal produced in the U.K. was from faces
equipped with powered su~ports. The average for Europe is 87.4%.
In France this figure was only 41% and in Belgium 56%139. The higher
standard of safety at British coal faces as com~ared with other
European countries, can be attributed to the higher number of
powered su~ports in use.
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3.4 USE OF QUANTIFICATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Technological change in general was discussed fully in
Chapter 1.13, where it was mentioned that it is a desirable
phenomenon for its consequences, e.g. productivity improvements, and
that it is claimed by Fabricant 16 and Solow 7 that about 90% of the
increase in output per capita in the United States is attributable to
technological change, and Denison17 concludes that about 40% of the
increase in material income per person employed during 1929 - 1957 in
the United States was due to "Advance of Knowledge".
Technological change measurement would provide the analyst
with an indication of the efficiency of the research work associated
with particular innovations, provide management with an idea of the
effectiveness of past investments and highlight the efficiency of
different investment areas, all of which are of great significance in
order to ensure efficient technological changes. Further, since
technological change is not always the only cause of productivity
improvements, the analyst, in his measurement procedure, will
inevitably measure the effectiveness of other influencing factors
which will also assist management in future planning.
In the present work the rate of technological change has
been quantified in the sum of the effects of three variables T R,
and exp(-R-) - see page 201.
F
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4. PRODUCTI VITY IN COAL MINING
The main ideas for this chapter have been dealt with before
by Stainerl40. In Section 2 of his thesis under the heading
"producti vity and its measurement in underground coal mining"
(pp 45-80), he gives a full description of the available
Iiterature and explains the shortcomings of the present
method of measurement in such detail that little extra
material is required in this chapter. The following is
therefore only a brief description of the present ideas and
methods.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Productivity has been the primary goal of high level manage-
ment of the coal industry in the U.K. for the past few decades.
Until the late 1960's it was felt that technological developments were
causing productivity improvements, but about then technology at the
coal face tended to become "conventional" once again and there was
little or no improvement in productivity expected from this source.
Management, being well aware of the need for greater productivity,
established an incentive scheme based on productivity. The basic
idea of this scheme is logical, but the criterion by which
productivity is judged is examined here.
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4.2 O.M.S.
The only measure of productivity actually used in the coal
industry, perhaps since mining began, has been the ratio of output to
the number of manshifts required to produce it. The only improvements
in the measure have been trivial, for example, by changing the unit of
output from cwt to tonnes.
OMS is thought to be the measure of labour productivity, that
is, how hard people work, although it is misleading to assume that it
is possible to separate labour from other inputs. OMS for the coal
faces of the U.K. increased from 2.97 to 8.53 from 1947 to 1978.
Would one be correct in concluding that miners worked 2.9 times harder
in 1978 than they did in 1947? In American coal mines CJt1Sis
substantially higher than in the U.K. Does this mean that American
miners work substantially harder than British miners? It is
obvious that many other factors, such as technological change,
geological conditions and capacity utilization influence OMS greatly.
It can, however, be asserted that OMS is a useful tool for some
other purposes, such as for measurement of technological change, but
it does not measure productivity.
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4.3 PRODUCTIVITY OR PROFITABILITY?
It was concluded in Chapter 1.23 that an analysis of
productivity must be embedded in the cost and profitability
structures. It is intended here, to evaluate the profitability of
the N.C.B. as a whole and compare its movements with those of the
dubious measure of productivity, O.M.S. The important question here
is, what is the profitability of the N.C.B. and how can it be
determined. Remembering that the N.C.B. does not have a complete
monopolistic power, due to the existence of some privately owned coal
mines, alternative energy sources such as natural gas, nuclear power,
oil etc., and the possibility of coal being imported, and the fact that
government grants have been available to the N.C.B. for the provision
of exceptional social services, it is not hard to imagine that the
market price of coal should, ",f\ t~e \ong r I.kn , be the real value
of the product. It has, therefore, been decided here that
profitability of the N.C.B. should be calculated by the amount of
profit made before interest and after government subsidies.
Profit Mining Activities Profit + Interest - All Grants
Assets = Fixed Assets + Net Current Assets - Deferred Liabilities
Notes:
(1) Assuming that government grants are paid to adjust for the
high value of services provided by the N.C.B. to the work-
men, and to the nation as a whole, grants are considered
as revenue.
(2) Arguably, deferred liabilities have been deducted from
total assets. This is a part of total assets mainly
used for activities which are not commercially viable,
such as cost of restoration of opencast sites, and
therefore do not result in financial returns.
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Table 8 shows net profit, total assets and the indexed value
of the ratio of these, together with that of the overall OMS. Graphs
of Figure 21 show that there is negligible correlation between the
last two measures, indicating that OMS is not embedded in the
profitability structure.
Year Total Profit Profit Overallended Profit total total
March assets a.ssets assets OMS
£M £M foage Index Index
.58 19.6 721.4 2.72 100 100
59 17.6 829.8 2.12 78 10460 14.9 894.1 1.67 61 109
61 22.3 901.0 2.48 91 113
62 32.9 877.7 3.75 138 118
63 48.7 878.2 5.55 204 127
64 43.7 881.6 4.96 182 134
65 36.1 909.3 3.97 146 13966 - 4.3 796.0 - 0•.54 - 20 144
67 25.2 783.0 3.22 118 14668 29.0 733.6 3.95 145 156
69 17.4 738.2 2.36 87 170
70 - 4.5 653.0 - 0.69 - 25 17371 21.9 650.6 3.37 124 176
72 -117.5 551.4 -21.31 - 783 168
73 - 49.3 317.8 -15·51 - 570 18374 -126.9 367.3 -34.55 -1270 169
75 3.5 489.9 0.71 26 180
76 24.6 723.6 3.40 125 180
77 88.2 987.1 8.94 329 174
78 79.2 1309.7 6.05 222 172
79 93.4 1441.1 6.48 238 17680 1.4 1814.9 0.10 4 179
Table 8 OMS versus Profitability
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4.4 TarAL PRODUCTI VITY
Enough has been said in the literature in support of the
concept of total productivity, that one is convinced easily of its
superiori ty to any other measure. The difficult task is then its
application. sta1ner140, the pioneer of this area of study, applied
the total productivity concept to the coal mining industries of seven
European countries. Although his measurement technique is valuable
and by far superior to others, the highest credit should be given to
his comparison process. He concludes that total productivity of the
U.K. coal mines decreased by 13% despite an increase of 61% in O.M.S.
from 1960 to 1976.
In this study, total productivity is adopted as being the
most realistic and comprehensive measure, and the exact method of
measurement is described in full detail in Chapter 6.
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5. SA.FEI'Y IN COAL MINING
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
Mr Justice Sankey in his first report dated 20 March 1919,
used the phrase "stands condemned" to describe safety in mines and
141Haldane confessed in 1920 that "this is something of which we have
good reason to be ashamed".
If the safety is thought of in terms of the number of
fatalities, then mining safety would seem to be of greater importance
than an average person assumes. Duckhams142, reviewing the history
of pit disasters explains its importance comprehensively. He states:
"Ask a man to think of disasters in British history and he will, likely
as not, tell you the Glen Coe, the collapse of the Tay Bridge, or the
Titanic".
Underground coal mining, being under the ground, has special
characteristics, as do working on the sea or in the air, and tends
naturally to be dangerous. The dangers associated with coal mining
include almost all those of working above ground, plus some risks due
to the conditions of working under the ground, such as darkness and
space confinement. The risk to the life of coal miners is therefore
a good deal greater than in the case of those working in ordinary
conditions, and hence makes the study and research of coal mining
safety of greater significance. Statistical evidence also proves
that both accidents and occupational diseases have always been more
frequent in coal mining than in other occupations.
A great amount of effort has been spent in improving safety
in coal mines. New methods, new machinery and the imposition of
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protective regulations are all claimed to have gained this objective,
but on the other hand the conditions of working, so far as depth is
concerned, have become worse, countering to some extent the effects
of technological improvements.
The findings of a piece of research studyl24 are interesting,
stressing the difficulties with which one would encounter when
measuring safety or attempting to assess the effectiveness of a
certain safety scheme. This survey concludes that the accident rate
amongst divorced or separated men is substantially higher than for
others. Also, the more children a miner had, the more accidents he
had had. These results, together with others stated in the report,
suggest the importance of the psychological state of coal miners in
the occurrence of accidents. This is obviously to a great extent
outside management control. The coal miners themselves also agreed
with this fact. 62% of those interviewed thought this was the main
factor contributing to accidents.
Robaye, Hubert, and DecrOlyl43 showed that men with greater
mental stress were more succeptible to acc.idents than others. The
results of Koehegyi and Bedil44 were somewhat similar.
Considering other causes such as geological difficulties,
poor organization, etc., it would seem that only a small number of
accidents occur due to the deficiencies associated with technology,
implying that technological change has had a significant influence
on safety until the present time. In the aforementioned survey124
it is shown that only about 5.6% of accidents were due to poor
equipment or lack of equipment.
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This view was also shared by an N.C.B. safety official
(Western area chief safety engineer). He suggested (in a private
conversation on October 31, 1980) that regarding safety, technology
has advanced more rapidly than the men could cope with it, and the
most important task is now to induce them to make the best use of
these improvements.
It is now appropriate to examine here the current safety
situation in coal mines and also the progress made since
nationalisation. Fortunately the mining industry for over a
century has produced fairly comprehensive statistics of accidents.
Table 9 gives the accident rates per 100,000 manshifts worked at each
five year point since 1940 in respect of main categories.
Unfortunately the N.C.B. have not classified accidents in
accordance with the place of work, such as the coal face, but it can
be claimed that the category "falls of ground" relates directly to the
coal face accidents.
It should be noted that the rate of accidents shown is
related to the total number of manshifts worked underground, and that
if data were available for the number of accidents per number of man-
shifts worked at the coal face, these would be considerably higher.
It is frightening to imagine how dangerous it was in 1940 to work at
the coal face. This will not seem to be true if one remembers that
the number of men at the coal face has gradually decreased while that
of other places underground has not (relatively). A statistic would
be more meaningful if it showed the rate of accidents per number of
manshifts worked at particular places.
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.Haulage
Total
Year Falls of and Explosions, Shafts Others
Total Surface U/ground
Ground Transport Fires, etc. U/ground andSurface
D EAT H RAT E S
1940 0.33 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.04 0·53 0.16 0.43
1945 0.23 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.38 0.09 0.30
1950 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.04 0·34 0.10 0.27
1955 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.14 0.24
1960 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.23
1965 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.20
1970 0.06 0.09 - - 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.14
1975 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.12
S E RIO U S INJURY RAT E S
1940 0.95 0.53 0.04 0.02 0·30 1.84 0.65 1.52
1945 e.ri 0.43 0.04 0.03 0.35 1.62 0.43 1.30
1950 0·55 0.40 0.03 0.02 0·39 1.39 0.42 1.13
1955 0·50 0.32 0.03 0.02 0.39 1.26 0.44 1.06
1960 0.61 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.27 1.32 0.57 1.14
1965 0·52 0·44 0.01 0.02 0·33 1.32 0.47 1.11
1970 0.36 0.46 - 0.01 0.37 1.20 0.46 1.00
1975 0·34 0.49 - 0.02 0.45 1.30 0.62 1.08
D EAT H ..:UL!l I N J U R Y RAT E S (Over Three Davs)---
1940 33·66 22.00 0.09 0.18 28.93 84.86 26.52 69.48
1945 43·03 30·55 0.08 0.19 49.78 123.63
.,., "'., 100.47..:I, ._-
1950 46.78 33.72 84.09 164.59 5Z.08 134·4Z
1955 39.31 22.67 84.49 146.47 47.81 122·34
1960 41.73 22.03 104.00 167.76 53.92 140.59
1965 51.09 24.86 163.28 239.23 76.49 198.88
1970 33·20 14.26 126.68 174.14 54.02 141.94
1975 19·15 8.33 92.81 120.28 38.43 99.44
Table 9 - Death and Injury rates per 100,000 manshifts
worked at Coal Mines
(From N.C.B. Statistics)
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The table, nevertheless, shows that some improvements have
taken place to render mines safer, but there can be no complacency
where 486 people were killed or seriously injured in 1980135• The
pace of safety improvements must therefore not slow down, so that
further reductions in the number of accidents are gained.
Legislation has helped in the past to increase safety, but the main
disadvantage with this is that it tends to decrease productivity.
On the other hand, the law can be said to have played its part so
far, and there is little space for it to expand further at present.
If it does, it is probable that it will reduce risk rather than the
number of accidents. Technology also has improved vastly tending to
make the coal face safer. It is widely accepted now that improve-
ments in safety results have not been as fast as that made possible
by law and technology. The blame is therefore put upon the
individual workers and the fact that, since 1974 the responsibility
for one's safety is put on the miner himself shows this. Since 1970
relatively little technological advance has taken place at the coal
face and the officials have only attempted to improve safety by
programs such as safety propaganda etc. These have shown only a
slight, if any, improvement and the rate of accidents reduction has
decreased.
Most of the research work being carried out today regarding
coal face safety, is concentrated on pwoered supports and coal face
environmental control such as dust, heat and humidity. These areas
of research, if they have not already reached full potential, will
soon do so, and the situation of 1940's and early 1950's will occur,
and indeed to some extent has already occurred. Coal faces are once
- 99 -
again equipped with "conventional" machineries (although these are
different from those used in 1940's and 1950's) and almost all the
work carried out in the past ten years or so has been concentrated
on mere modification and development of these conventional systems.
A revolutionary idea and action seems to be required to improve
safety any further and by a worthwhile amount. Automation of the
coal face seems to be the answer. Safety officials of the N.e.B.
are particularly in favour of this and they would like to see nobody
working at the coal face, since with no man working on the coal face,
there could be no accident there.
The six major elements contributing to healthier and safer
coal mines have been identified by eollinson145 as to be:
legislation, research, training, campaigning, technology and organized
safety efforts. From the list, two, namely research and technology,
relate directly to technological development. It is expected to
find that technological change has been the main cause for improved
safety. Mining engineers together with safety officials of the
N.e.B. believe that about 80% of the improvements in safety have been
brought about by technology. However, for technology to be
developed along a desired line, research is required.
It would perhaps be of some interest to show the degree of
danger present in coal mines, comparing with other industries by
statistics. Table 10 gives a comparison, placing mining in the
context of some heavy industries.
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Industry Fatal accidengs frequency rate(per 10 hours)
Shipbuilding 7
Construction 10
U.K. Manufacturing Industry 2
U.K. Coal Mining (overall) 16
Accidents in Heavy Industries
Table 10: Source: H.M. Inspectorate of Factories 1972-73
and N.C.B. Statistics
It is evident from the Table that mining remains about twice
as dangerous as other heavy industries in the U.K. If, however, a
comparison is made between safety in the U.K. coal mining industry and
that of other European countries, it will be shown that Britain has
about half the European rate of accidents both in terms of hours
worked and tonnage mined.
8 8Period Rate per 10 hours worked U/G Rate per 10 tons mined
U.K. Germany France U.S.A. U.K. E.C.S.C. U.S.A.
1960-64- 32 78 36 106 119 236 5+
196.5-69 27 56 40 103 80 153 44
1970-74- 20 4-1 50 88 50 104 J8
Mining Accidents in Different Countries
Table 11: Reproduced from the symposium of Health,
Safety and Progress, Hai'rogate 1976
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5.2 HISTORICAL REVIEW CF SAFETY IN COAL MINING
In the early days of mining (thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth century), the major cause of accidents, was falls of
ground. Gas and water were added in larger measures in the six-
teenth, seventeenth, and the first half of the eighteenth century.
The first stage of technological development, that of steam engines
eased the problems caused by the existence of water in mines which
in turn resulted in drier conditions of working. As a result the
problems of gas and dust were accentuated, due on the one hand to
drier conditions, and on the other hand to inadequate ventilation
arrangements, which brought about the great hazard of explosions.
Although statistics were not compiled before 1850, it seems likely
that during the first half of the nineteenth century deaths resulting
from explosions exceeded those from falls of ground. Also at about
this time accidents frequently occurred in shafts, and according to
Hudsonl46 in the period of 1851 - 1853, the annual number of deaths
from explosions, falls of ground and shafts were 267, J48 and 221
respectively.
Further technological change took place leading to the
provision of safety lamps, and more efficient and regular
ventilation systems. As a result of these developments, although
the number of disastrous occurrences was reduced, their magnitude
increased with the size of the mines, resulting in no improvement
overall from the safety point of view - the greatest mining disaster
of British mining happened in 1913 when 439 lives were lost. Table
12 illustrates these facts statistically.
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Number of Number of Number of
Period. !'fumberof Explosions Persons PersonsExplosions KilledPer Year Killed Per Year
1835-1850 643 40.2 Nor RECORDED
1851-1900 2,223 44.5 10,079 202
1901-1920 317 15.8 2,301 115
1921-1935 188 12.5 985 66
1936-1953 139 7.7 856 48
Fatalities due to Explosions 1R35-1953
Table 12: Reproduced from reference number 146
In the period. from 1920 to 1950, these major causes of
accidents were eliminated to a large extent, mainly through the
influence of legislation and technological developments. By this
time, although the number of accidents due to falls of ground had
reduced considerably, it was still, together with haulage, a major
cause of accidents underground, so that for example in 1954 these
two were the cause of about half of the fatalities underground in
Britain.
Table 13 gives in full the available statistics for safety
since 1850.
After nationalisation the trend for both the number and the
rate (number per 100,000 manshifts worked) of accidents show a decline,
but the more important one, the latter, shows a slower improvement.
In the JatE 1960's, and particularly during the 1970's, the trends
are almost horizontal lines, and recent statistics show only
fluctuations without a marked trend.
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One of the major objectives of nationalisation of the coal
industry was to improve safety and it is left to individuals here to
assess the Board's success.
Table 13 : Average Number of Persons Killed and Injured per Year
f I ~ ~ I f ~ ~0("t~ I:Il IloIYears 1-" S. (!) ~
~ (JQ
KILLED
1851-53 174,OCO 267 348 221 45 975
1874-76 420,952 183 440 152 126 71 100 1,078
1~1~ 591,452 42 454 71 170 90 119 946
1924 & 25 934,m 32 )J7 46 261 141 111 1,168
1949-51 545,766 36 198 15 92 77 42 ~
1953 553,~ 4 174 22 91 26 47 364
REPORT ABLY INJURED
1898-19:0 Zff7 1,718 131 933 725 494 4,2CB
1924 & 25 133 1,772 96 1,219 8<)) 543 4,572
1949-51 34 759 17 472 55) 218 2,0~
1953 28 716 11 445 513 194 1,907
ALL INJURED (COMPENSABLE)11~1863,512 185 ~,522 633 44,275 ~,660 12,341 166,616
days 1923 979,785 101 7O,CX'f/ 932 54,]00 68,967 17,889 212,256
ave; !g14J 116 62,'/BR 1,1,38 46,351 00,670 15,677 186,741
3 1925
days 1947 551,841 73 51,179 256 33,483 61,OS5 16,468 162,544
1949-. 103 61,m 103 'J},929 1~,366 23,512 234,7841951
_1953 51 ~,J)'3 131 35,537 U6,OSl 22,244 232,352
Nctel: Nurbers for the years up to and incl~ 1947 are taken f'rc:m the Inspectors'
returns.
Note 2: Nurbers for the years 1949 and later are taken fran the N.C.B. returns.
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In the 1960's with the introduction of powered supports, one
of the important problems causing fatalities due to falls of ground,
was eased, and if the total number of accidents from this source is
considered, then a good improvement will be noticed, but if the rate
of accidents is thought of, then the improvement will not be as great
due to the reduced number of men working .lotthe coalface. This
implies that the risk to the life of individual miners was not
reduced markedly.
Falls of ground is still nevertheless one of the majo= sources
of accidents, but it has been exceeded by haulage and transport, and
still these two are the cause of more than half of all fatalities and
injuries underground.
Figure 22 shows the number and rate of accidents since
0.00 .20
(1) - Fatalities per
lCO, (XJJ Marlshifts
O.EO .15
(2) - Seria..s Injuries per
0.40
lCO, (XJJ Marlshifts
nationalisation.
(1)
0.20
1947 19:0 1955 19:0 1£65 1970
YEAR
Figure 22: Safety Since Nationalization
Source: Health and Safety Executive Reports -
Mines and Quarries
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5.3 HEALTH OF COAL MINERS
Mining engineering has been said to be the art of providing
an environment underground in which men can work with safety and
without damage to their health. Although some of the health hazards of
mining, notably those affecting the lungs, have been known since
mining began, it was naturally to accidents that mining engineers
first turned their attention. On the health side it is only within
the last fifty years or so that scientists and physicians began to
have the expertise to identify with accuracy those diseases that
arise from the mining environment, and to be able to suggest means of
controlling them.
The importance of health in mines, compared with that of
safety, is realised when mentioning some figures. Many coal miners
suffer from simple pneumoconiosis which, without pulmonary disease,
causes little disability and has no effect on expectation of life.
But men with simple pneumonocomiosis have a substantial risk of
developing Progressive Massive Fibrosis, which causes distinct
disability and reduces life expectancy. About 1500 miners now
147working in mines have Progressive Massive Fibrosis • Also, roughly
half of the 39,000 men who are at present (1976) alive and compensated
for pneumoconiosis will develop Progressive Massive Fibrosis before
they die, and many of these will die from itl47.
In contradistinction to accidental imjuries, diseases of
mining generally have a long time span between the first causal
stimulus and the development of a recognizable disease. Often
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causation does not arise from a single factor, but from several,
inside and outside the working environment; and, particularly, in
respiratory disease the effects can be complicated by non-mining
diseases (as expressed by A. Azadmand, a specialist in chest radio-
graphy). It is, therefore, not surprising that a detailed study of
the health problems of miners was rather later on the scene than
that of safety.
Until the last two or three decades medical effort was mainly
spent on the identification of mining diseases. Certainly the
respiratory risk in mining had long been recognized, but the medical
equipment available was limited, and it was in the early 20th century
that X-ray examination in particular began to allow accurate diagnosis
of chest disease during life.
Improvements from the health point of view have taken place
and once again, technological change has played a major role.
Improvemen~s in illumination have eliminated diseases related to the
vision of miners. Mechanised transport has caused the disappearance
of ponies, which, coupled with rat control, has caused the
disappearance of rat-borne disease; and great improvements in
ventilation have done much to reduce dust exposure and its effects.
Dust, however, still remains the major hazard to the health of coal
miners, and is the subject of much research at present.
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5.31 Pneumoconiosis
The term pneumoconiosis literally means "dust in ltmg": a
general term applied to all those diseases caused by inhalation of
"any kind of dust". The expression "any kind" originates from the
report produced by a group of researchers from the Industrial
Pulmonary Disease Committee of the Medical Research Council, which
began in 1936148• Prior to this report, it was thought that coal
dust was harmless, and that only rock dust produced lung diseases.
For example, in 1927 Ha.ldane149 expressed his view as: "The
inhalation of coal dust causes no danger to life, but on the contrary
gives even protection against the development of tuberculosis."
Most of the dust inhaled is either exhaled or otherwise
eliminated by the same breath or in the next 24 - 48 hours. Some of
the small particles are however deposited in the terminal air
passages from where they are carried into the lung tissues and if a
sufficient amount of these are retained, then eventually pneumoconiosis
will be produced, which causes partial or total disability and finally
death.
McLintock147 claims that there have been marked improvements
in the industry regarding pneumoconiosis, but since inevitably a
relatively long period must elapse between such remedial actions as
regular medical examination and dust control, and the beneficial
result, there is not enough statistical evidence to prove this.
However a slight improvement is shown by the few statistics
available.
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Table 14 shows the number of new cases of pneumoconiosis
diagnosed by the medical panel of the De~artment of Health and Social
Security from 1945 to 1975.
6,000
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Ul
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0c 3,000OD
t13....
'0
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0
~ 2,000
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:l
Z 1,000
Year No. of diagnose.s
1945 5,821
1950 4,376
1955 4,997
1960 3,279
1965 1,007
1970 773
1971 623
1972 626
1973 515
1974 539
1975 683
Number of Pneumoconiosis cases 1945-1975
Table 14 - Reproduced from reference number 150
o
1945 1950 1960 1965 1970 19751955
YEA R
Figure 23 Number of Pneumoconiosis Cases
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Since the disease was recognized (just before the period in
question), there was a steady reduction in certifications, but there
has been no significant change recently. A great deal of effort has
~ ~t oncontrolling the dust level, to examine miners medically on
a regular basis, etc., but the end result is not satisfactory and in
this respect too, a major technological change seems to be called for.
Interest has been shown in pneumoconiosis by people and
institutions other than those related to mining. Notably, the
publication of "The Medical Press" can be mentioned, which in its
1.51 . 152 153early years, by the articles of McLintock ,MeikleJohn ,Doig
and some others, explained the nature of the disease, its diagnosis
and medical means for its prevention.
5.32 other Diseases
other diseases associated with coal mining, which to a large
extent have been minimised are: beat diseases, dermatitis, miners'
nystagmus, Weil's disease, epidermophytosisl54. Treatments are
relatively simple although in the case of Dermatitis to which there is
a psychological element attached, it becomes more complicated155, 156•
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5.4 COSTS ASSOOIATED WITH HEALTH AND SAFEI'Y
Much has been written about effects, both social and economic,
of lack of safety. Tregelles & Hartleyl57 stated that, occurrance of
accidents is unacceptable both from social and humanitarian point of
view and their effect on productivity. Duckhams142 by examining the
past statistics gives a full account of these social effects. As a
result of various Acts, imposed to protect the health of miners, those
suffering from pneumoconiosis were compensated and forced to leave the
industry (as "certified men"). It was concluded by social surveys
carried out that in many cases certification produced considerable
mental depression. Many men said that they had not wanted to leave
the mines; that their accustomed way of life had been broken up;
and that they feared the loss of income and insecurity of their
futurel58• The National Joint Pneumoconiosis Committee's working
partyl59 gave similar conclusions.
In the above surveyl58, it is claimed that many of the
certified men were severely frightened by their diagnosis. Almost
all had seen friends or relatives die of the disease and naturally
they tended to assume that the same fate awaited them.
would obviously further increase disabilities.
These fears
From the economics point of view it can be mentioned that,
between 1940 and 1947, as many as 18,000 skilled men were certifiedl58
and hence left the industry, which should certainly be considered as
a waste of economic resources of the community as a whole.
Between 1944 and 1946, about £3 million was paid as
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compensation to coal miners of South Walesl5B• The cost of providing
compensation in 1945 and 1946 for South Wales coal miners only, was
£5.5 million, equivalent to 3s per ton of coal produced.
In 1975, the total number of shifts lost due to accidents was
1,170,862. This with an O.M.S. of 44.8 cwt and the price of coal at
£18 per ton, would give a loss of £46.366 million160•
Christenson & Andrews161, 162, have well noted the great
current interest in, and concern with achieving, improvement of
safety and health in the coal mines' labour force, both from the
economic and social points of view.
It is undeniable that accidents cost money, and although some
figures have been produced above, they are by no means indicative of
the real cost of accidents. It is extremely difficult to give
reliable estimates of the cost of accidents, but some attempts have
been made to do this.
COllinson163, for example, has attempted to give a
comprehensive list of all different types of costs associated with
accidents, so that he could give an estimate of the financial cost of
accidents, but he did not even mention the social costs. He finally
arrived at the figure of £50 million to be the cost of accidents per
year (1979 prices). On the other hand, this type of calculation
measures the cost only from the N.C.B.'s point of view, and any cost
to others such as the public is ignored.
Collinson further tries to measure the cost effectiveness of
further accident prevention effort and he concludes that investment on
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safety would still give a good rate of return. Obviously such a
conclusion cannot be expected to be of any degree of reliability,
until a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, considering all social
and economic factors, is carried out.
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5.5 EVOLUTION OF IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH AND SAFETY IN
COAL MINES
Varying efforts and divers techniques have been employed in
different industries to improve health and safety. In the mining
industry the effort has been intense. Early interest in the
improvement of working conditions manifested itself in the pressure
from the work-force for legislation, backed by social pressure, and
there was perhaps the inevitable resistance to the regulatory
approach by the influential coal owners and landlords who foresaw
heavy expenditure being incurred in creating safer and healthier
164operations • There was little realization that safety improvements
had literally to be purchased.
Early legislation was more concerned with social matters,
such as hours of work and child employment; but it was a start, and
ultimately the first mines' inspectors were appointed in 1850 and
there began a period of increasing legislation and increasingly
relevant and specific mining law.
Much of the early safety effort was based on past experience,
and to a large extent this remedial effort has continued, bitter
experience usually generating remedies through sponsored research, or
calling for the application of known remedies.
Hitherto" then, much effort was ad hoc s an accident, which was
not always unforeseeable, occurred; investigation followed, and
remedies were either suggested or required statutorily. R . d165 .e1 1n
his paper in 1938 states that: There was some professional effort
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prior to nationalization by a few enlightened colliery companies, and
safety specialists appeared in management structures in the 1930's,
when a few intensive campaigning operations were commenced.
After this period, considerable change was encountered -
nationalization in 1947. The opportunity was taken to consider
health and safety as an entity, and to begin the management of it.
Increased effort could be mounted; resources could be made available
through Board decisions; there was at last the opportunity for
country-wide application of safety expertise, and training for safety
could be firmly and professionally based. Large scale campaigning
could be initiated, and 1962 became the first national safety year.
It is claimed by Collinson166 that since about 1965,
determined effort no longer lagged behind legislation, and the attack
on air borne dust arose through the industry's resolve: the recent
legislation was only the seal.
145Collinson ,somewhere else, looking ahead of the present
time, by giving interesting examples states that if the hazardous
nature of a cause of accidents is removed, then automatically the risk
is eliminated. He exemplifies this with reference to the accidents
due to chain breakage on the face, and now that chainless haulage has
been introduced, the hazard has vanished. He fails to mention however
that new systems are bound to introduce new hazards.
These explanations by Collinson are given mainly as
justification for his famous idea of "Zero Accidents Potential".
Theoretically, zero accidents means zero cause, and since COllinson167
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himself has stated somewhere else that workers themselves contribute
to the existence of hazard, would this not imply that zero accidents
means no person working? He could mean total automation. But
although automation means removing the men, and therefore no accidents,
it would not automatically result in any increase in productivity (and
indeed if total productivity is considered then a reduction is almost
certain) and for this reason efforts should preferably be spent only
on removing the hazard present.
It has already been mentioned that one of the main causes of
accidents is the falls of ground, relating directly to the coal face.
Although this was realized in the 1950's and powered supports were
developed in 1960's still, as commented by the Health and Safety
Executivel68 in 1978, the 26 accidents in the prop-free-front area of
power loaded faces suggest that the desired objective of a man-free-
front area is far from being realized.
Regarding face safety, the picture of the European countries
is somewhat similar. In West Germany about half of the total
accidents occurred at the face. This proportion is similar for
France and Belgium and in the case of the rest, it is about one
third 169.
Figure 24 shows that, although the number of accidents at the
coal face has decreased, this has been due mainly to the reduction in
the number of men working at the face, so that the rates do not show
such an impressive improvement as the absolute numbers.
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Figure 24: Falls of Ground - Total Accidents
From Health and Safety Executive Re~ort 1977
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The graphs of Figure 25 do not compare with those of Figure
24, meaning that, despite claims by safety officials, the ra.te of
accidents shows a reduction far less than that for the number of
accidents (see Figure 26).
It has been said by some authors that fatal accidents have
actually been traded off for non-fatal ones in the coal industry.
They produce graphs (Figure 26) justifying their statement.
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5.6 SAFETY VERSUS PRODUCTIVITY
The management and study of health and safety cannot be
conducted in isolation, for it constitutes only one objective of the
industry. Coal must be produced more efficiently, and it is
appropriate and desirable to achieve these with a higher degree of
safety.
There has been widespread discussion about the relationship
between safety and productivity. Statistical evidence is such that
contradictory results can be deduced. Figure 27 shows productivity
(OMS) versus safety since 1947.
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PRODUCTIVITY AND FATAL ACCIDENT RATE 1947-1975
Figure 27: Source: Health and Safety Executive Reports
and N.C.B. ~eports.and accounts
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C 11· 145, 171 fo anson , or example, draws the conclusion that "a
safe pit is a productive pit" without any reliable justification.
other authors, particularly non-mining engineers, ha va concl uded that
safety and productivity move in opposite directions. Evans172, by
three examples, namely dust control, design of powered support, and
chain haulage tries to justify his thesis which is "the efficient
machine is also the safe one". Wood17J also by relatively little
statistics claims that safety and productivity move in the same
direction but fails to examine the case in depth. He takes fifteen
mines to be representative of all mines, and a major fault should
have been seen to have arisen from this procedure.
To find out which of these contradictory results is more
reliable, the factors which cause safety must be examined. If
improved safety is brought about by a piece of legislation, for
example, or colliery manager's safety instructions, productivity can
almost certainly be expected to decrease. When for instance, part
of a coal seam is left to provide better roof conditions merely for
safety reasons, or the cutter/loader attendant is by instructions
prohibited from moving freely along the face so as to maintain
continuity of production, or the manpower transport speed is
restricted, and so many others, how can one expect higher productivity
to be achieved directly as a result of the enforcement of these
restrictive practices, and indeed the opposite is more likelY to
happen? The only argument against this is that in the long run,
owing to the safer conditions that the practices produce, morale
tends to increase and simultaneously productivity. This idea is
subjective, and may be true in some cases. The view was shared by
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Tregelles174 when he implied that the main reason that productivity
did not increase substantially for eighty years prior to 1960,
despite technological developments, was that increasingly severe
constraints were imposed by law.
Also relevent and more surprising is that Christen~on &
Andrewsl;;, by the help of mathematical models and actual data from
the U.S.A., prove that the legislation imposed has been associated
with unchanged or possibly even higher injury rates. They imply
that legislation reduces safety, as well as productivity.
If, on the other hand, as is the case most of the time,
improved safety has been the result of technological development
and specially after nationalization, machines have been designed with
a view to increasing productivity and safety, then it can be expected
that these parameters will move in the same direction.
Furthermore, if Collinson had used the graph of total number
of accidents versus productivity, or alternatively any rate of
accidents versus total, as opposed to partial (labour), productivity,
he could not have deduced what he intended to.
166It has been suggested somewhere else by Collinson that
although productivity does not automatically result in safety, the
opposite is true Le. designing equipment with a view to safety
raises productivity. This may be the case when considering only a
partial measure of productivity, but would it still stand if total
productivity i.e. the ratio of output per input, which is indeed a
more realistic one, is considered? Take for instance a coal face
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fully equipped with automatic devices and no man is needed at the
face. In such a case the rate of accidents would approach zero, and
productivity (as defined by Collinson) would approach infinity. When
considering real productivity and taking into account the capital
investment involved, would productivity still look so impressively
improved?
Tregellesl74 examined the statistics and showed that the
opposite to Collinson'sl66 conclusion is true, that is, safety
improvements do not necessarily result in increasing productivity,
while improvements in productivity may well bring about a higher
safety.
Having discussed the matter of safety and productivity with
some mining engineers specialized in safety, I concluded that a
phrase "productive pit is a safe pit" is more reliable than the
reverse. The reason for this is apparently that highly productive
mines are usually those with good geological conditions allowing
better equipment to be installed and better methods to be practiced,
which in turn means the achievement of a higher safety record. These
two seem to be compatible, but there is no inherent correlation
between them.
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6. NEW METHODOLOOY
FOR QUANTIFYING PRODUCTIVITY IN COAL MINING
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
It has been concluded with sufficient justification, in
earlier chapters, that the present measure of productivity in the
coal industry, viz output per manshift (OMS), being a purely physical
measure, is of little value as a productivity measurement.
Many different methods currently used, most of them purely
financial measures, were described in Chapter 1.23. A serious short-
coming of financial measures is that they tend to measure
profitability only, and also they may lack practicability.
Physical measures on the other hand, tend to measure efficiency,
although in the short run, and with some qualifications, they may
well measure productivity.
It is concluded here that a realistic and practical measure
of productivity is most likely to be an empirical one, based on
physical/financial data.
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6.2 TECHNICAL PRODUCTIVITY
This could be called "efficiency" of production or even
"capacity utilization", a purely physical measure. It can be
argued to be a measure of efficiency rather than productivity, and
can, in principle, be measured wi tL rcsp;ct to any ono 0: trw
input components, ego labour or capital. ~his measure of labour
productivity would be particularly difficult to calculate. As in
the case of OMS, it would ignore all inputs except labour. It
would have little value as a measure of productivity. On the other
hand, technical productivity, where capital is the only innut
considered, is more easily calculated and of some interest, althou"m
it is deficient in other respects as a measure of productivity.
Similar measures to this have already been usen as
indicative of productivity. R· 86 flce , or example, takes the ratjo
of actual output to expected output as a measure of productivi ty.
Technical productivity is simply the ratio of "actual output" to
the "potential output" in IDF'.A.Lsituations.
Coal faces are equipped with different cutting/loading
machines. In 1980, 87% of the total output from 10ngwall faces was
extracted from faces equipped with shearer-loaders, and hence for
simplicity b~sed 00 uniformity, only these faces are considered.
It must be noted that, technical productivity is not claimed to be
a good measure of productivity for it measures that of capital only,
but tt is used here to reveal some facts and also be used in later
models and discussions.
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6.21 Actual Output
Values for actual output for the years 1958 - 1980 from
shearer-loader faces are derived as:
Actual Saleable Output under consideration • Total Deep Mined Output
x fraction of Mechanised
Output x fraction of
Output from Longwall
Faces x fraction of
Output from Shearer-
Loader Faces per
Longwall Face
These values are simply derived from N.e.B. publications and
adjusted for saleable tonnage and year definition.
To adjust for years 1958-1962, the following method is used:
Output for year ended March x = *[Output for year ended Dec (x - 1)]
+ t (Output fDr year ended Dec x)
To adjust for year duration for the values of the other
quantities in the above equation, similar methods have been applied.
Values are tabulated in Appendix 6.21(Pll1).
6.22 Potential Output
Potential output from longwall faces with shearer-loaders with
respect to capital is the tonnage of coal potentially possible to be
won by present capital equipment in use.
_1'2.5a-
--...--...-
...--_-_-
FL:Cllre27a A Simplified Coal Face ~~th Shearer Loader
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.r:_ is the number of faces equipped with shearer-loader, figures
for which.are obtained thus:
for some years directly derived from N.G.B. statistics.
for others: F' = F x (fraction of output from shearer-
loader faces per unit of output from
longwall faces) x 0.981
where F is the total number of longwall faces.
The adjustment factor 0.981 is to allow for the fact that shearer-
loader faces are more productive than others. It is derived from
figures for those years which are available.
~,_g.J. Y are the mean extracted seam thickness, specific gravity
of run of mine coal and vend respectively - all available in
N.G.B. publications. Values for B have been adjusted for
year.
This is the weighted average economic potential depth of
cut (web). The true average may therefore be slightly
lower.
Values of web were estimated by personal interviews with
those involved in the mining industry and manufacturers,
and by using N.G.B. publications, in particular the
"Producti on and Producti vity Bulletin".
~' is the average number of shearer-loaders on one face.
Some faces are equipped with more than one. Simultaneously
with the tendency to employ more than one shearer-loader on
a face, the innovation of ranging drum and Bi-Di has tended
to remove the need, and hence the average number shows a
slight increase. Figures for this have been derived from
N.G.B. publications.
~ is the average effective cutting speed of shearer-loaders.
Values have been obtained from various publications of the
Institution of Mining Engineers. It must be noted that l~ 2.li)
the increase in v over the years, is partly due to
elimination of the "flitting back" operation.
Let Sc be cutting speed
Sf be flitting speed
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i) When flitting is carried out,
v=
Sf x Se
Sf + Se
ii) When flitting is eliminated, Sf ___"oD
v= Sc
Values for the components of potential output are tabulated
in Appendix 6.22lP ~ll).
6.23 Measurement of Technical Productivity
From these appendices, values for technical productivity,
as a percentage, are calculated simply as the ratio of actual output
to potential output. These values, from which graph of Figure 28
is plotted, are tabulated in Appendix 6.23(p 219). The figures
are, perhaps, surprisingly low. This is discussed later (see
section 6.333).
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Figure 28 Technical Productivity 1958-1980
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6.3 TOTAL PRODUCTIVITY
This is defined in Section 1.25, simply as the ratio of total
outputs to total inputs, based on physical/financial parameters. It
is adopted here, to measure the "real" productivity of longwal1 coal
faces of the U.K. coal mining industry for the years 1958-1980.
. Total Output in Tonnes.Total ProductiV1ty = Total Inputs in Pounds Sterling
6.31 Total Output,
This is tne tonnage of saleable coal produced from longwall
faces. Allowance has been made for stock variations, and figures
include slurry and recovered coal from colliery tips where they were
saleable.
It is sometimes argued by economists that the money value of
output should be used. Since the interest here is more the
technical, engineering and practical points of view, rather that
economics and theoretical, using the money value of output which
allows for quality would be a departure from the aim of this work.
Also, as variations in price due to N.C.B. pricing and
marketing policies and the market conditions due to scarcity of
substitutes would add considerable irrelevaot complications to the
study, the tonnage of saleable coal is used as the output. Further-
more, in some areas or mines, the quality of seams being extracted,
through no fault or deficiency of management or labour force, is
lower than in others and allowing for this, the values obtained for
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Productivity would not be realistically indicative of the "real"
productivity of labour force, capital equipment, etc.
6.311 The Outyut Model
and
It is postulated that, 'f' o.nd c3eo.r
P = f (F, T, B, d, $, D)
PO«F~. Tr3. Bl(. ~.....,.del') - D
i3 ~. ,... ~
P = (K ~. T • B • d ", s' -) - D..
where P is the total output from longwall faces,
F is the number ~f longwall faces,
B is the mean seam thickness,
d is the mean number of days worked per year per face,
is the mean number of shifts worked per day per face,
T is the mean tonnage of coal produced per shift per face,
D is the dispute tonnage, and
K, Co( ,j?J , 'if, a;ulare constants.
After consultation with experts in coal ml~ng, the following
values for the constant and indices were tried, and found to
fit the collected data very well.
K= 0.84 x 10-6 0(=,1
13=1 "6=~
~=1 ~=1
The model thus becomes:
J..
S BZ _dl-{D2 ------------ 1
For full explanation of the mode~ling procedure see appendix 8.0 (p243).
F~& B have been discussed before (See Section 6.22-)
T it is essential to take into account the effect of improved
equipment on output. Tonnage of coal produced L~ any shift
(T) seems to be a good indicator of this. It incorporates
improvements in all areas of coal faces, i.e. cutter/loader,
supports and other ancillary equipment. T also has
another role here which is to allow for changes in machine
running time. In brief, T is to allow for everything but
F, B, s and d, that is the residual.
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Values fo~ this, although readily available in N.e.B.
pt:.bllcations,have been adjusted for saleable tonnage,
year and major longwa.ll faces.
Adjustment for years 1958 - 1980:
For year ended Ma.:rcht, T = ~ [value in Sell. (t - 1)J
+ t ~value in S~p. t)]
Adjustment for saleable tonnage:
Saleable T - Pithead T x Vend ~ Tp x V
S & D are average number of shifts worked per day and
the tonnage of coal lost due to disputes etc.
resllectively. Available in N.C.B. statistics -
adjusted for years.
d is the mean number of days worked per year per
face, va.lues for which are derived as fo11ows:-
d _ Total output oer year _
outllut per day x number of faces
P + D
Output per day x F
Values for F, T, d, s, B and D are tabulated in APllendix 6.)11,
Po~e 22.0·
N.B. Statistical analysis of this and other models will be done in
Section 6.))1. Values for expected outllut calculated by
substituting the real data in the model and the actual output
from longwall faces are also tabulated in Appendix 6.)11,
from which graph of Figure 29 is plotted.
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Figure 29 Coal Output 1958-1980
i) Choice of model type:
It is decided that non-linear models will be used throughout
this presentation for both output and input components.
Reviewing the literature, it seems that all the work carried
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out in the past has been centred on linear models. These,
advantageous for their simplicity, lack flexibility and accuracy, the
latter of which is of much significance here. Non-linear models, on
the other hand, although complicated, result in by far more accurate
formulae.
ii) Modelling procedure:
In each case, the variables affecting each component were
decided upon, and then appropriate powers for each of the variables
were found empirically by trial and error. For example, in the
case of the output model, it is reasonable to assume that output is
proportional to the number of faces, level of technology, seam
thickness, number of face days per year and number of face shifts
per day..and affected by the dispute tonnage.
• • output = fl • f2 • fJ •••
Output is expected to be linearly dependent on the number of
faces, represented directly by F; the state of technology, T (output
per shift); number of face shifts per day, s; and number of face
days per year, d. This leads to the expectation that the values of
0< ,/3 , ~ and o-'areunity. As regards seam thickness B, the value
of i6 is expected to be less than one, for it is expected that if
seam thickness is doubled, output will rise by less than twofold.
Also, trivially, the real output is the potential output less the
tonnage of coal lost through disputes CD). These values were tried
and each one changed, keeping others constant, to detect the
sensitivity of output to each variable, and the accuracy of initial
expectations. A value for the constant K which best fits the model
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was then adopted.
In this process, other mathematical techniques and also some
data from N.C.B. areas were used. The six models are therefore the
result of tedious, complicated and lengthy procedures, a full
description of which would add little to the value of this report.
For full explanation of the modelling procedure see
appendix 8.0 (which is inserted in the back cover pocket),
page 243.
Unlike traditional methods of taking only one input - viz
labour, in this study all input components are considered. Further-
more, the cost of inputs is taken to be the measure rather than the
physical quantities.
Pd;' .t _. Total Qunut (tOMes)Total ro uct~~ Y - Total Money Value of Inputs (£)
Total inputs cost is taken to be the sum of five different
costs: Labour, Capital, Safety, Power, and Materials and Supplies.
Total Inputs = Labour cost + Capital cost + Safety costs +
Power cost + Materials & Supplies cost
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A~~ro~riate values for the inflation rate have been used to
deflate the obtained values to 1958 prices.
Although overhead costs may affect calculation of total
productivity, it would be arguable how to allocate overheads to
mechanised longwall coal faces; but in any case, they are not, perhaps,
likely to be very dependent on changes of technology. Therefore.
consideration of overheads has been omitted from this work.
6.321 Labour cost
Labour cost is the money value of all direct and indirect
wages ~aid to coal face workers, at constant prices. It includes
benefits ~aid to those su~ervisory staff who directly contribute to
production but excludes those paid to face end workers.
6.3211 Labour cost model
It is postulated that:
W = f (F , T , L , ? , B )
where W is total labour cost at constant prices,
L is the average face length,
~ is the number of faces equip~ed with powered supports,
and plausible that:
Wc<.F T L, and
W~ _1_pB
J.-!¥-
1) -'It -
L B eor
where K, ec, , (3 , Cs"', ~ and e are constants.
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Substituting 4 -4K = 3.0 x 10 ,
-< = 0.8.5,
/5 = 1.2,
~= 0.12.5,
1>:: 2, and
e = 0.25,
would give the following formula for direct labour cost:
- p
W = 3.04 x 10-4, FO•85• Tl•2• ~'\'l~ B-2• e-1+r- ------ 2
The derivation of this model is fully described
in appendix 8.0 (which is inserted in the back cover
pocket), page 243.
6.3212 Actual Labour Cost
To derive the total labour cost of coal faces the following
method has been used:
Labour cost = Total number of manshifts worked x Total
wage per shift
= Mechanised longwall output x Total wage per shiftFace output per manshift
Once again many adjustments are required - for year, saleable
tonnage, wage differentials and the inflation rate.
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To adjust for inflation, the index of weekly wage rates for
all industries 'for each year have been taken from "The Monthly Digest
of Statistics" for years 19..58- 1969 and the "Main Economic Indicators"
for years 1970 - 1980, which themselves needed adjustments.
Values for wage per shift are the national average figures
which are readily available in N.C.B. publications for earlier years,
but can be derived for later years, and, however, they have been
adjusted for wage differentials between face workers and others.
Values for actual labour costs are tabulated in Appendix
6.3213 Testing the Model
Values obtained for F, T, L, B and p are now substituted in
model 2 to test the fit.
i) F, T and B have been discussed before.
ii) L & P are the average length of mechanised longwall faces
and the number of faces equipped with powered supports
respectively, available in N.C.B. statistics but
adjusted for year and major longwall faces.
Using model 2 and the real data obtained for the components
of the model, the values for the total face direct labour cost have
been calculated, and set against the actual valued derived in
Section 6.3212. It should be noted that the model is not expected to
hold true for the two strike years, 1972 and 1974. The actual and
expected values are tabulated in Appendix 6.3213 from which the graph
in Figure 30 has been plotted.
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6.)22 Capital Costs
Indeed the most important shortcoming of the present, or OMS
measure, is that it ignores capital costs. As a large component of ~he.
total inputs cost, and of an increasing trend, most effort has been
spent on this component of total productivity, both on its modelling
aspect and on derivation of the actual values.
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6.J221 Capital Cost Model
It is postulated that:
C = f r(Quantity, Physical Specifications, Quality, Capacity
L Utilization, stock) of Capital Equipment]
Cl = fl (F, L, p) For Quantity
C2 = f2 (B) For Physical Specifications
C
J
= fJ (T, R) For Quality
C4 = f4 (PI) For Capacity Utilization
C5 = f5 For Stock
Verified assumption: Capital Stock is assumed to have been
constant from 1958 to 1980, thus f5
is constant,
and where:
Cl + C2 = f6 (F, L, p, B)
CJ+C4 + C5 = f1 (T, R, Pl) xu
where u is constant
C + C = K F Cl(" L ,3 P ~ B e121
where Kl, tX.. , /3,>{ and 8 are constants.
Substituting for: 0<... = 1
(3=1
>(=. F
P loge p
=_..1..
C/ - a p
- 1
Cl + C2 = Kl F L eF Ba
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C3 = C4 = q = f (Q)x u
where QO= g (T, R, Pl)
•.• C3 + C4:o f{g (T, R, P1») xu when g = K2 ~ Rn P1b
(m n b)then C3 + C4 = f K2 T R PI xu
where K2, m, n and b are constants.
Substituting for: m = 1
n :0 1
b ,..-1
C3 + C4 = f (K2 ~ R~ xu1
T R ~
• '. C3 + C4 = K3 (K2P-- ) x u1
where K3 and ...,are constants •
• •• K4 = K2 x K3
Substi tuting for";) = 1.17 loge (Q - )8) - loge 23
Loge Q
Q - 38
23
Q - 38
23
wl\ere l<S:: KI4. X Lt
Q - 38
2)
x u = K5 x 1.17
Q - 38
where K = K1 x K5 and q = 1.17 23
Substituting for K = 5.414 x 10-5
........... 3
Q. - J8
where q = 1.17 23
T Rand where Q = -p-
1
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6.)222 Actual Capital Costs
There is much controversy amongst economists as to how to
measure capital costs of an organisation. Total productivity analysts
have generally taken depreciation values as a measure, due only to
the availability of data and the fact that high precision has not
been an important factor in their analyses.
Deprec iation values do not obviously represent the actual
consumption of capital equipment and even more serious than that,
when based on historic costs, as is most often the case, the nominal
consumption figures are further distorted. In fact if careful
examination of the method used to produce depreciation values, is
carried out and comparison between theory and practice is made, these
figures may well prove to be meaningless for total productivity
measurement. As capital costs in the U.K. coal mining industry
constitute a high percentage of the total input costs, and they are
increasing, so high precision is required here, since any inaccuracy
in the value obtained would distort the results proportionately.
For these reasons, depreciation values will not be used in this study
for capital costs determination.
Leasing and tilted annuity techniques are not feasible in
this case, due to the difficulty of obtaining meaningful data. Also,
they include some other costs, such as chargeable interest, which are
not of interest here. Furthermore, they measure the VALUE OF
SERVICES of capital equipment to ogranisations, while here, the COST
of capital equipment to the coal industry is of interest.
The ideal method would therefore be one which would measure
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the real replacement cost of all capital equipment, whether actually
involved in production or not.
The method devised here is theoretically simple, but the main
task would be the derivation of the data required.
Total Annual Face Capital Cost = Replacement Cost of Equipment on
an Average Face in Each Year
x Number of Faces x Constant
for Capital Stock -:-(Average
Economic Life of Face
Equipment) x Constant for
Price Changes.
Faces have been divided into two categories: those with and
those without powered supports.
•'. Total Annual Capital Cost = (Cost of each Face with Powered
Supports x p) +
(Cost of each Face without Powered
Supports) (F - p)
Constant for Capital Stock
x Average Life
x Constant for Price Changes
The factors in this expression are discussed below.
Cost of each Face With or Without Powered Supports
Three sources for obtaining these data have been used:
i) Manufacturers of face main machinary
ii) N.C.B. accounts, and
iii) Other publications, such as those of the Institution of
Mining Engineers
In 1980 the cost of equipment on a face with powered supports
wa& about seven times higher than that on a face without powered
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supports; also in 1958, 19 faces out of 774, as compared with 625
out of 649 faces in 1980, were equipped with powered supports. It
is therefore important to consider both types of faces.
In 1958 the cost of equipment on a face with powered supports
was only approximately twice as much as those on a face without
in 1980.
powered supports and as mentioned above this increased to seven times
(a)
(b)
(c)
The reason for this is judged to be:
As demand for powered supports as a result of the recognition
of their economic and production potential, was increasing,
and consequently that for "props and bars" and "hydraulic
chocks" was decreasing rapidly after 1958, there has been
little or no technological improvement in these equipments,
therefore little or no price changes for enhanced quality.
Pressures due to required high outputs, rationalization of
faces, replacement of low output/low capital cost faces by
high output/high capital cost ones and a need for reduced
labour cost on the face, stimulated the technological
improvement of powered supports, to the extent that a set
of powered supports today hardly resembles one in 19.58,
either in quality or price.
Faces with powered supports have been required to produce
high levels of output in order to justify the high fixed
capital costs, and therefore further spending on other-
enhanced equipment have not been hesitated, which in turn
further widens the gap between the cost of equipping the two
different types of faces.
Bearing these factors in mind, the three above sources have
been used to obtain the capital cost of a typical face. Attempts
have been made to obtain these data from as many of these sources as
possible, independently, to allow for comparison and correction of
possible errors. It was not, however, possible to derive values,
for most years, from all the three sources, but it was thought that
at least two sets of data would be required, for these to be of a
sufficiently high degree of accuracy. For example for years 1958 -
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1962, sources (ii) and (iii) only have been used, while for years
1976 - 1980 a set of data from each of the three sources was obtained.
Constant for Capital Stock (Kl)
For the values obtained for the total capital cost of faces
to be realistic, allowance should be made for the value of capital
equipment acquired by the coal industry, but not actually in use on
the faces. This adjustment is necessary since the values obtained in
the above subsection are only the cost of capital equipment in use on
the faces. It is conceivable that there is always some equipment
which is put out of production for reasons of maintenance, repair and
renewals. The coal industry copes with this problem by maintaining
a pool of equipment of constant volume, the level of which is slightly
higher than that anticipated for use.
The average mechanised face is now far more capital intensive
than in 19.58. Therefore, since any interruption in the production
process would be highly undesirable, the value of Kl has tended to
increase. On the other hand, since the tendency of equipment towards
higher reliability is undeniable, and the number of mechanised faces
shows a decrease over most of the period under consideration here,
the anticipated required volume of equipment (in terms of the money
value) in stock would have a decreasing trend.
To obtain the values of K1 for each year, an indication was
deduced from the total depreciation values from N.e.B. annual
accounts together with face data (number of faces, number of machines
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per face, average face length etc) from the Mechanisation Profile of
the N.C.B. However, since this method is too sophisticated for such
a small part of the capital cost determination and, as mentioned
above, gives only an indication, only a brief description is given
here.
Total Value of Capital Equipment (Cl) = Depreciation x
Average Life of
Machinary
Note that to convert the depreciation values for all mining
machinary given in N.C.B. accounts to those for face
operations only, large adjustments have been required.
When the effects of changes in F, p, T, L and B are included
in Cl' the values obtained for Kl remain nearly constant. For
example, when F increases, the total ~uantity of equipment would be
expected to increase. At the same time the quality of these,
reflected by increases in R and T values, also show improvements, it-
self implying two points: better reliability, hence a decrease in
the value of Kl; and higher price, hence an increase in the value
of Kl, the resultant of which would cancel to some extent the first
effect of increasing F. Also, even an increase in F is not
necessarily expected to indicate an increase in the quantity of
equipment proportionately, due to the gradual increase in the
concentration of mining activities on more major faces, indicated by
values of T.
Values for K1 obtained by this approximate method for the
years 1958 - 1980, were between 1.88 and 2.26, implying that 44% to
53% of the total face equipment acquired by the coal industry is
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actually employed on faces. However, this value is not considered
to be of sufficient accuracy; and also, since it is the general
policy of this study to produce data from more than one source, in
order to eliminate the risk of a major error, these values were
checked through several personal interviews and correspondence with
the N.C.B. mecahnisation officials and practical mining engineers, as
well as by consulting the limited available literature. Stainerl40,
for example, in his research, using different methods, arrived at
similar results. In this study, therefore, a constant value of 2
will be used for Kl for years 1958 - 1980.
An interesting fact is, therefore revealed here. It is
apparent that taking into account the effect of capital stock on
technical productivity, the values calculated in Section 6.23, would
become even less, although, for Kl to have been almost constant, the
trend would not be substantially different.
Average Life
By using the average life, the method would tend to
incorporate one of the deficiencies associated with using depreciation
values, namely the inaccuracy resulted by ignoring the error between
the actual and nominal consumption of capital. Since in this
Section, however, the past rather than the future is of interest, the
nominal values obtained from PAST data are expected to be closer to
the actual than in normal accounting procedure. An indication was
again derived from N.C.B. accounts using the depreciation values and
the money value of all capital equipment in use. These indications
were checked through personal interviews and correspondence with N.C.B.
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accounting officials and manufacturers as follows.
To summarise the procedure adopted here, values for the
average life were obtained from four distinct sources:
i) Accounts - These have generally used between 6 - 8 years for
the life of different equipment in different years.
ii) Approximate Theoretical Indicative Method - Mentioned above,
this was carried out in a similar way to the one
described in the above subsection. This method
indicates the average life to have been between
7.2 and 9.4 years.
iii) N.C.B. Mechanisation Personnel - To their judgment, the
average life is between 6 and 7.5 years.
iv) Manufacturers - Given the prescribed maintenance, for
continuous use, they argue that the average life
has always been 7 - 9 years.
For the purpose of this study, all the above figures, except
those of source (ii) need first be adjusted for capital stock. It
is obvious that, the economic life of machinery out of production
would be more than that in production. After adjustment we have:
i) 6.6 - 8.8 Average = 7.7
ii) 7.2 - 9.4 Average := 8.3
iii) 6.9 - 8.6 Average = 7.8
iv) 8.1 - 10.3 Average = 9.2
Given a weight of 0.35, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.15 respectively, the
average value would be 8.125. These weights reflect the reliability
and relevance of different data to this study.
The value of 8.125, obtained in this way will therefore be
used here as the average life of the acquired face equipment , whether
in use or not, for years 19~ - 1980.
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Constant for Price Changes
As before, a constant is required to allow for price changes.
In this case, the index of machinery prices from the Monthly Digest of
Statistics, values of which were adjusted for year duration, will be
taken to be the appropriate constant.
In this way, values for the total actual face capital cost are
calculated, and tabulated in Appendix 6.3222, POSe ~;2.3.
6.3223 Testing the Model
Model 3 of Section 6.3221 is tested here by using actual
values for the variables.
T, F, L, B, P have been discussed before.
li is the rate of advance per machine shift of longwall mechanised
faces. Its values obtained from the N.C.B. Mechanisation
Profile have been slightly adjusted for year definition.
PI is the technical productivity whose values were calculated in
Section 6.23.
Values of expected capital cost, given by the capital cost
model (model 3), together with the actual figures are tabulated in
Appendix 6.3223~ ~o..3e. l.l4o.
6.323 Safety Costs
This section is dealt with in detail in Chapter 7. The
model obtained there is:
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4 -9 0.8 0.8 FS = 3 7 x 10 • F • T • s • d . e • • • • • • • •• 4
where S is the total safety cost in £ Millions, and other
variables have their above meanings.
6.324 Materials and Su~~lies Cost
Associated with ca~ital equipment there are some additional
items necessary, for it to o~erate efficiently, or at all. Of
these, the obvious and most im~ortant is the cost of electrical
energy to drive cutting/loading machines, the A.F.C. and some other
ancillary equipment, which will be discussed in the next section.
other costs, named here Materials and Su~plies cost, include the
total, labour and material cost of repair and maintenance of face
equipment. For a t~ical longwall retreating coal face, 120 m long,
producing 900,000 tonnes of coal pa from a 2'.5m ,.thick seam, the
cost of Materials and Sup~lies in 1978 was £706,500.
6.3241 Materials and Supplies cost Model
It is ~ostulated that:
M = f (F, d , s , T)
where M is the total Materials and Sup~lies cost at
constant prices, in £ Millions.
M=KF"<d/~S~T~. .
Substituting for K = 4.495 x 10-5
0<.. = 1.3
/3=1
i= 1
....)=1
4.495 x 10-5 . ~.3 d.M = ....;...;;--4_ ....--=...;::...;;.___-=T_;;_-___;.-__;_...;_ . . . . . . . . . . .. 5
For full explanation of the modelling procedure see appendix
8.0 (which is inserted in the back cover pocket), page 243.
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6.3242 Actual cost of Materials and Supplies
Once again, N.C.B. accounts yield aggregate data for all
mining activities and therefore are of little use here. In this
case, even colliery records, which give values for faces, are of
limited use, since they include the Materials and Supplies cost of
face end operations. It is, for example, estimated that 93% of the
figure £706,500, mentioned earlier, is attributed to face end operations.
The following sources have been used to derive Materials and
Supplies costs for longwall faces:
i) Published data, including old articles of the Institution
of Mining Engineers,
ii) Colliery records, mostly of those situated in the Western
and Scottish areas of the N.C.B.
iii) N.C.B. Scottish area, mechanisation department.
The focus here has been on the determination of the cost of
Materials and Supplies per tonne, from which total cost can easily
be calculated. These values are tabulated in Appendix 6.3242.
6.3243 Testing the Model
The actual values of T, F, sand d, all explained in previous
sections, are substituted for, in the Materials and Supplies cost
model. The resulting values together with the actual costs, are
tabulated in Appendix 6.3243. A good fit is observed, but it
should be noted that the model is not expected to hold in years with
major strikes.
6.325 Power Cost
This is the cost of the electrical energy used to drive
machinery, and to provide lighting and communication at the coal faces.
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6.3251 Power Cost Model
Formulization of power cost is expected to be relatively
simple due to the fact that approximately 95% of the total power
consumption is used during actual coal production, i.e. by Shearer/
loader, A F C, etc. In other words, there is little fixed power
consumption and the amount consumed is to a large extent a function
of the output.
It is postulated that:
p' = f (r, F, s , d)
,where P is power cost at constant prices in £ Millions, and
other variables have their usual meanings.
Again let
P = K • TO(.. F I:' • S ~ • d-.,.)
Substituting for K = 2.5268 x 10-8
C>(, = 1.22
/3 = 0.74
>{ = 1
w=l
I 5 68 10-8 1.22 0.74 d 6P = 2. 2 x T . F . s. . .
6.3252 Actual Power Cost
The three following sources have been used to determine face
power cost.
i) Available literature, including old articles of the
Institution of Mining Engineers and data gathered by
Stainer140 and published in his thesis.
ii) Colliery records: a sample of eight collieries was
adopted, mostly in the Western area of the N.C.B. and
all producing coal from typical faces.
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iii) Accounts of the N.C.B., Scottish area.
Using the values obtained from the above sources, the mean
value of power cost per tonne for each year is calculated, from which
the total power cost is calculated simply by multiplying it by the
total mechanised longwall output.
Having applied normal adjustments, the actual, deflated, power
cost figures are tabulated in Appendix 6.3252, 'YC13e ?...1.
6.3253 Testing the Model
Model 6 incorporates T. F, s and d, all of which have been
defined, determined and adjusted before. Substituting for these
parameters in the model. the expected power cost at constant prices,
in £ Millions, is calculated. The values are tabulated in Appendix
6.3253, from which a remarkably good fit is observed. Once again,
the values for the two major strike years are not expected to be
accurate.
6.33 Total Productivity Model
The total productivity of longwall mechanised coal faces of
the U.K. is calculated, as follows: the model for this is:
Total productivity = ~tP~t =npu
Tonnage Output =
Total Inputs Cost
=
p ..... · . · .. · . (7)w + C + S + M + pi
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where: (fer ~(\d a eQ.' J
·6.1.
P = (0.84 x 10- F T S B2 d) - D
W = 3.04 x 10-4 FO.85 Tl•2 LO•125 B-2 e-nF
p Q.-38
C = 5.414 x 10-5 F L Bt q er where q = 1.17 23
T Rwhere Q.=-Pl
·..... (1)
• • • • •• (2)
· . • . .• (3)
s = 3.47 x 10-7 FO.8 TO.8 s d e
M = 4.495 x 10-5 r1.3 d s T-l
pl= 2.5268 x 10-8 F -0.74 Tl•22 s d
-1.2 P
F ·..... (4)
·..... (5)
·..... (6)
where F is the mean number of longwall mechanised faces,
T is the mean output per shift from longwal1 mechanised
faces in tonnes,
s is the mean number of shifts worked per day on longwall
mechanised faces,
B is the mean seam thickness of longwall mechanised faces
in met\'€'s ,
d is the mean number of days per year on longwall
mechanised faces,
D is the amount of coal lost by the N.C.B. through
disputes in millions of tonnes,
p is the mean number of faces equipped with powered
supports,
R is the mean rate of advance of longwa11 mechanised
faces in metl'cs,
L is the mean length of longwall mechanised faces in
met re. s, and
PI is the value of technical productivity in percentages,
The above forumla then gives the Total Productivity of
longwall mechanised faces for any year in tonnes per £100.
Values calculated for P, W, C, S, M and pI from models (1),
(2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) respectively are summarised in Appendix
6.33a, and from these values the total productivity is calculated.
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Actual values of P, e, W, S, M and pi derived in Sections
6.31 and 6.32 are tabulated in Appendix 6.33b, and from these figures
the actual total productivity is calculated.
The actual and model values for total productivity are
tabulated in Appendix 6.33c together with the percentage error between
the two.
6.331 Goodness of Fit
All the models derived in Sections 6.31 and 6.32 are tested
here for accuracy. The mean and standard deviation of the % error
are summarized in Table 15.
Mean % error = ;3
where At and Et are actual and expected values in year t
res]?ectively. For models 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 the two years 1972 and 1974
are excluded.
Model Mean% Error Standard Deviation
1 0.95 0.94
2 1..58 1.83
3 5.93 5.134 6.97 5.92
5 6.20 5.43
6 4.38 3.43
7 2.94 2.18
Table 15 Accuracy Indicators of },~odels1-7
The fre~uency distributions of the error~in all the models are
plotted in Figure 31. The differences between actual and calculated
values appear to be satisfactorily small, considering the wide
variety of data that are incorporated in tbe models (see pages 129 -
152). Clearly, there are insufficient points from which to make a
;l.meaningful )( test of goodness of fit.
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6.332 Forecasting
As observed the mean error between the two sets of values for
values for total productivity is 2.94%, which is a good fit. It it
therefore expected that model (7) will hold true for a limited number
of years beyond 1980. For this reason total productivity can be
forecast analytically for 1981 and 1982. The data show a gradual
but not constant trend with little seasonal variation and a method of
exponential smoothing should be appropriate. The method used is:
r =t
A
rt + 1 = IS' rt + (1 - () ~t
" 1\xt + 1 = mt + rt + 1
where x is the actual value
"x is the forecast value
co<. and ~ are constants
Different values for ""and~between and including 0 and 1 have
been tried and the best of these, being 0.9 and 0.7 respectively, have
been adopted. This method withe)(,=0.9 and ~= 0.7 gives a forecast
for 1960 - 1980, excluding 1972 and 1974, for which the % error between
the actual and forecast values has a mean of 3.48 and standard deviation
of 2.08.
Appendix 6.332 shows a work sheet for this method.
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6.333 General Analysis
Comparison of OMS and Total Productivity
The actual values for total productivity, derived in
Sections 6.31 and 6.32, and those for OMS available in N.C.B.
statistics are plotted against time in Figure 32.
To be more revealing, the ratio of the value for each year to
that of 1958 is plotted against time for both measures in Figure 33.
OMS Total TechnicalYear Index Productivity ProductivityIndex Index
58 100.0 100.0 314.S
59 102.2 99.S 264.1
60 106.3 102.6 215.2
61 112.4 107.2 219.4
62 119.2 113.0 159.4
63 129.7 127.4 lS0.2
64 138.2 136.0 191.7
65 144.5 137.4 lS2.0
66 153.0 137.6 lS5.7
67 158.S 143.6 158.5
68 166.5 149.6 161.3
69 lS4.3 161.6 lS9.4
70 192.0 159.4 168.2
71 198.1 158.0 166.4
72 193.7 149.4 133.6
73 207.7 148.3 1.56.2
74 200.5 133.1 120.7
75 216.S 142.5 120.7
76 216.S 137.7 117.1
77 212.9 134.6 103.2
78 217.3 128.1 98.6
79 234.3 127.6 99.5
80 244.0 130.9 100.0
Table 16 Comparison of Different Productivity Measures
Figure 33 shows that until only about 1964 total productivity
and OMS moved closely together, and since then there has been a
considerable difference between the values given by the two measures,
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supporting the earlier argument that OMS is becoming increasingly
misleading as a productivity measurement.
To draw some useful conclusions, the indexed values of
technical productivity (see Section 6.2) are also plotted in Figure
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Figure - 33 Index of Productivity Measures
Although values for technical productivity show much
fluctuation in the earlier years, from 1969 to 1980, excluding 1972
and 1974 values, the trend is largely decreasing, suggesting that the
gap between OMS and total productivity can be filled by using technical
producti vity values. In other words, the values of eMS produced by
the N.e.B. as productivity figures, can be converted to real (total)
productivity figures by somehow combining them with technical
productivity values, as calculated earlier, and which are relatively
simple to derive. 'The fact that this useful relation holds is not
coincidental and can be explained by remembering that technical
productivity is in fact indicative of capital productivity and OMS
that of labour, and that labour and capital costs together constitute
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a large part of the total inputs upon which the total productivity
measure is based.
It is observed from actual figures that total productivity of
longwall coal faces increased by 69.6% from 1958 to 1969, and that
from then it shows a gradual decrease, so that the figure for 1980
shows a 30.9% increase over that of 1958. The fact that since 1979
the total productivity of coal faces shows a tendency to increase is
undeniable. This is shown by all the three measures, but OMS,
expectedly, shows a sharp increase. Total productivity, on the
other hand, shows a gradual increase, and even technical productivity
seems to have developed. It can therefore be concluded, with a high
degree of confidence, that from the technological economics point of
view, the productivity of coal faces, after nine years of declining
started to increase in 1979. This was to a large extent expected, as
it was a declared goal of the 1979 government. OMS values, despite
all other indications of low productivity, show an increase every
year except 1977.
Comparison of Total Productivity at Different Places in the Mine,
Stainer140 calculated total productivity values for the whole
"'-mine for the period 1960 - 1976. His values, indexed here, are
plotted against time together with face total productivity values
calculated here,in Figure 34. Looking at the·two graphs, a good deal
of compatibility between the movements is observed. For example, in
both cases the total productivity increases until 1969 when the
highest value over the years under consideration is present and after
1969-they both decrease gradually.
* Stainer's years are identified thus: April 1960-~~arch1961 a 1960;
in this presentation: April 1960-}[arch 1961 ;: 1961•
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Year ended Mines total Face total
March. productivity productivityindex index
61 100.0 100.062 100.5 105.'+
63 105.3 118.8
64- 108.9 126.9
65 111.8 128.2
66 112.0 128.'+
67 109.1 13'+.0
68 113.6 139.6
69 117.2 150.8
70 11'+.5 1'+8.7
71 110.9 1'+7.'+
72 91.0 139.4
73 106.2 138.3
7'+ 83.0 124.2
75 92.'+ 132.9
76 89.6 128.5
77 85.0 125.6
78 - 119.5
79 - 119.080 - 122.1
Table 17 Productivity of Different Places in the Mines
It can be observed from the two graphs that the increase for
the total productivity of the coal faces has been higher than that
for the whole mines and at present coal face productivity stands at a
higher level than that for the whole mines, leading to the conclusion
that it is now more important to pay attention to other places under-
ground than to the coal face. It is further observed that until
1969, the rate of increase for coal face productivity was higher than
that for the whole mines from which can be deduc 3d that until then
there were either existing developed methods and techniques elsewhere
underground, or simultaneous with the coal faces other places were
attended to, since due to the interdependence .of the two, improve-
ments in one can always be constrained by the other. Since 1969, the
rate of change is more or less constant, meaning that, if there were a
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tendency for the coal face productivity to increase, it would be
constrained by elsewhere underground.
In practice, it is almost impossible for the whole mine total
productivity to increase while there is a reduction in face total
producti vity, due to the common nwnerator, 1.e • output. In other
words, productivity of all other places is axiomatically dependent on
the productivity of coal faces. This fact is well shown by the
graphs.
To be able to draw some explicit and quantitative conclusions,
the period is divided into two, 1961-1969 and 1969-1977 and for both,
lines ~, dz, ~ and d4 (see Figure 34) show the average movement of
total productivity.
1961-1969:
Slope of ~ = 0.46 therefore e 1 = 250
Slope of dz = 1.26 therefore eZ = 52°
1969-1977:
oSlope of d; -0.75 therefore eJ = 143
Slope of d4 = -0.63 thereforee4 ""148
0
e is the angle between line d and the horizontal line.
when 90°> e > 0°' total productivity is increasing.
when 900 <. e<:180o total productivity is decreasing.
when e = 00, 1800
when e= 900
total productivity is constant.
total productivity is unreal.
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It can be seen from Figure 3S that the higher the value of 9
excluding 900 the better the rate of change of total productivity.
It is observed from Figure 3S that during the whole period of 1961-
1977, total productivity for the coal face has been in a better
position than that for the whole mine i.e. a higher rate of increase.
Remembering that the whole mine category includes the coal faces, it
can be deduced that the increase in the former was largely if not
wholly due to the improvements in the latter until 1969, or until then
there was little or no improvement made in productivity of other
places in the mine than the coal faces. For the years after 1969,
the value of e3 is still less than that of 6-4, meaning that total
producti vity of other places in the mine is still lagging behind that
of coal faces, but since the value of (C>4.$3) is less than (S2 -81),
it is evident that after 1969, more attention has been given to other
places in the mine than in previous years. Further, the difference
(64 -83) has been small (So) for the second period which is an
encouraging point, for the best practical value for this would be
zero, in which case improvements in the level of coal face total
productivity would directly result in the level of whole mine total
productivity and all production constraints in other areas in coal
mines would have been removed.
Total Productivity Components
i) Aggregate Components (total input and total output)
The indexed actual values of total input and total output are
plotted against time in Figure 36.
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Year ended Total output Total inputs
March index index
:J3 100.0 100.0
59 114.9 115·260 127.7 124.6
61 150·0 140.0
62 188.0 166.4
63 237.8 186.7
64 264.9 194.9
65 284.9 207.4
66 289 •.5 210 •.5
67 291.4 203·0
68 303.8 203·2
69 291.0 180.3
70 267.6 168.0
71 2.5.5.9 162.1
72 209·2 140.1
73 24.5.2 16.5.4
74 188.9 142.0
75 222.7 1.56.476 219·.5 1.59.5
77 208.8 1.55·3
78 204.8 160.0
79 202.9 159·280 210.7 161.0
Table: 18 Total Productivity Aggregate Components
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Figure - 36 Total Productivity Aggregate Components
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These graphs show the reasons behind productivity movements
in slightly more detail, but for full detail a still further analysis
is required. However, the two periods of 1958-1969 and 1969-1980
are again noticeable. During the first period, total input rose but
the increase in total output was more rapid, which is expected due to
the fact that a part of the total input cost is actually fixed, and
for this reason total productivity improved. Analytically, in this
period, 9 for output was greater than for input. For the years after
1969 the decrease in output has been more rapid than input,
reflecting the fact that the N.C.B. failed to reduce costs in
parallel with the output. The two drops of 1972 and 1974 further
emphasize this point, for in both cases output dropped by a higher
amount than did input. A distinct period, after 1975, is observed,
from the graph of which a frightening fact is apparent, that
although output can vary by considerable amounts, total input changes
only slightly, and in either direction, reflecting cost inflexibility
of coal faces, for which reason coal faces are expected to do well
regarding productivity at times of boom and rather badly at times of
recessions.
ii) Input Components
Total input is broken here into its components and two sets of
ratios are discussed, being the ratio of each component to the total
input and that of total output to each component, the latter actually
measuring productivity of the corresponding component.
Labour
Values for the indexed ratios of labour cost to total inputs
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and output to labour cost (labour productivity) axe calcula.ted, from
which graph of Figure 37 is plotted.
The graph of labour cost per total inputs cost shows a.
continuous decline, proving the fact that the coal faces have
continuously become less labour intensive since 1958.
For the purpose of comparison the graph of OMS has been
plotted again, as well a.sthat of the real labour productivity.
Labour productivity gra.ph shows an almost oontinuous increase, like
that of OMS, although more recently it has been less rapid. It is
apparent from the two graphs that OMS did measure labour productivity
until about 1970 with little error, but since then has become
increasingly invalid. OMS shows an increase in recent years due to
the decrease in the number of men working on the coal faces,
while labour productivity reflects the effects of both the number of
men and that of wage increases.
Labour productivity, however, seems to have started to
increase again despite its drop in 1978 and this together with its
general trend should cause the N.C.B. "not to worry too much" about
labour productivity. Altogether labour productivity of British coal
faces in 1980 shows an increase of 107% over its 1958 level, 13% over
its 1969 level and 1.7% over its 1977 level.
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Labour cost Labour Labour cost
per total Productivity per total Labour
Year input (Output per input ProductivityLabour Cost)
% age tonnes/UOO Index Index
58 84.3 95.2 158.2 100.0
59 84.2 95.1 158.0 99.9
60 83.5 98.5 156.7 103.5
61 83.1 103.6 155.9 108.8
62 82.4 110.1 154.6 115.7
63 82.5 124.0 154.8 130.3
64 81.9 133.2 153.7 139.9
65 81.8 134.8 153.5 141.6
66 80.4 137.4 150.8 144.3
67 77.1 149.4 144.7 156.9
68 74.3 161.5 139.4 169.6
69 74.5 174.0 139.8 182.8
70 72.4 176.8 135.8 185.7
71 69.8 181.5 131.0 190.7
72 64.1 187.0 120.3 196.4
73 66.3 179.4 124.4 188.4
74 59.8 178.6 112.2 187.6
75 61.1 187.0 114.6 196.4
76 59.2 186.6 111.1 196.0
77 55.7 193.7 104.5 203.5
78 54.3 189.2 101.9 198.7
79 53.6 190.8 100.6 200.4
80 53.3 197.1 100.0 207.0
Table 19: Analysis of the Labour Cost
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Capital
Figure'38 shows the ratio of capital cost to total inputs and
that of output to capital cost (capital productivity). It is
apparent from the capital cost/total inputs graph that coal faces
are now much more capital intensive than in 1958. The graph has an
increasing trend over almost the whole of the period, showing that
every year a higher percentage of the total budget than that of
previous years was spent on capital equipment. This is not
necessarily either advantageous or d.isadvantageous,and to take
analysis further the capital productivity graph is considered. For
most of the period this shows a decrease which has been the main
limiting factor for total productivity improvements.
The decreasing trend of the capital productivity should warn
the N.C.B., and should cause some awareness of profitability of
capital investments. In order to improve this, more thorough
studies of the profitability of investments should be carried out,
and the cost factor should seriously be considered when making such
decisions. Capital equipment has mainly been acquired to bring
about savings in labour cost, but comparing the graphs of capital
productivity and labour productivity it is apparent that in the years
beyond 1969 additional expenditures have been greater than resultant
savings ( ~ i~u.reS .~') o..(\c1 ~'b).
Comparing capital productivity values with those of technical
productivity would serve as a check for both measures. In 1980
capital productivity was 66.95% higher than its level in 1958 while
the corresponding figure for technical productivity was 68.23%.
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Capital cost Capital Capital cost Capital
Year per tot!3-l Productivity
per total productivityinputs inputs
% age tonnes/£lOO index index
58 11.1 725.6 100.0 302.6
59 11.4 700.4 102.7 292.1
60 11.9 690.1 107.2 287.8
61 12.4 695.9 111.7 290.2
62 13.2 687.4 118.9 286.7
63 13.0 785.6 117.1 327.6
64 13.3 818.3 119.8 341.2
65 13.6 812.0 122.5 338.6
66 15.0 738.5 135.1 308.0
67 18.4 625.6 165.8 260.9
68 21.2 565.7 191.0 235.9
69 21.0 617.5 189.2 257.5
70 23.5 543.5 211.7 226.6
71 26.1 484.7 235.1 202.1
72 32.1 373.6 289.2 155.8
73 30.2 394.5 272.1 164.5
74 36.7 290.9 330.6 121.3
75 35.5 321.6 319.8 134.1
76 37.4 295.7 336.9 123.3
77 41.0 263.4 369.4 109.8
78 42.6 241.1 383.8 100.5
79 43.3 236.6 390.1 98.7
80 43.8 239.8 394.6 100.0
Table 20: Analysis of the Capi tal Cost
The only slight difference of decrease between the two
measures of productivity, which as noted in previous chapters started
with entirely different concepts, took different lines of approach
and were calculated by quite different methods, provides a check on
the calculations and data. (See table above and page 158)
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Figure 38 - Analysis of the Capital Cost
It can be concluded from the two above points, i.e. the compatibility
of the capital and technical productivity graphs and their decreasing
trend, that the latter is mainly due to the fact that capacity
utilization has become increasingly low, leading to the recommendation
being made to the N.e,B. that more emphasis should be put on higher
exploitation of the already acquired equipment, than on the purchase
of new machinery. Increasing the number of shifts worked per day,
number of days per year and both machines available time and machine
running time would be of great help to reverse the situation.
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Safety, Materials and Supplies, Power
Safety figures will be produced in Chapter 7 where it will be
done separately and in more detail.
Materials and Supplies Power.
&0 "Ij &0
~
&0 "Ij &0
~o 0 Ii o 0 o 0 Ii o 0&rn 0 &rn a &rn 8. &rn 0IU& ~ IUe+ 1Uc+ IU& s:;l.
Year ..... s ..... s ..... 5 ..... s"d "d "d '"d1-H(1) & .... (1) & .... (1) e+ .... (1) e+
~ Ii
....
~ Ii
.... iii .... .g Ii ....~. ~ ~. s:: ~.c+ ~ c+ ~ ~ & ~
% age tonnes/£ index index % age tonnes/£ index index
58 0.83 96.9 100.0 100.0 1.12 71·47 100.0 100.059 0.88 91.3 106.0 94.2 1.04 77·15 92.9 107.960 0.94 87.7 113.3 90.5 1.05 78.65 93 .8 110.061 1.02 84.5 122.9 87.2 1.14 75·72 101.8 105.962 1.04 87.1 125.3 89.9 1.23 73.72 109.8 103.163 1.06 96.5 127.7 99.6 1.36 75.47 121.4 105.664 1.04 105·0 125.3 108.4 1.49 73.02 133.0 102.265 1.02 108.6 122.9 112.1 1.53 72.17 136.6 101.066 0.98 113.0 118.1 116.6 1.56 71.00 139·3 99.367 0·91 126.8 109.6 130·9 1.58 73.12 141.1 102.368 0.87 137.7 104.8 142.1 1.75 68.66 156.3 96.169 0.77 168.7 92.8 174.1 1.97 65.64 175.9 91.870 0.61 209.9 73.5 216.6 1.93 66.42 172·3 92.971 0.60 211.5 72.3 218·3 1.91 66.20 170.5 92.672 0·52 230.0 62.7 237·4 1.83 65.61 163.4 91.8
73 0.45 266.4 54.2 274.9 1.82 65.41 162.5 91.574 0·39 273.3 47.0 282.0 1.69 63.27 150.9 88.5
75 0·45 253.6 54.2 261.7 1.75 65.31 156.3 91.476 0.46 241.9 55·4 249.6 1.72 64.07 153.6 89.6
77 0·45 238.9 54·2 246.5 1.71 63.15 152.7 88.478 0·39 261.4 47.0 269.8 1.66 61.79 148.2 86.5
79 0.36 283.3 43.4 292.4 1.68 60.91 150.0 85.280 0·32 324.6 38.6 335·0 1.72 61.01 153.6 85.4
Table 21 Analysis of Materials & Supplies and Power Costs
Figures 39 and 40 show the above information for'materials and
supplies and power respectively.
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It can be seen that materials and supplies cost c9~tituted
only between 0.32% and 1.06% of the total inputs cost, hence of little
significance regarding productivity movements. This ratio has
decreased by 61.4% from 1958 to 1980. Materials and supplies
productivity shows a good improvement too, being 335%, which is a
reflection of more reliable and hence more expensive machinery in use.
From these, it seems that the importance of materials and
supplies productivity has been overestimated to the extent that it
has been brought about at the expense of capital productivity.
Power cost also constitutes a small part of the total input,
although in 1980, 1.72% of the total cost was for this, which is over
five times more than that for materials and supplies.
The two graphs for power (Figure 40) do not reveal any
important point and they rather confirm some expected facts. The
increase in the ratio of power cost to total input until the early
1970's was due to the increase in output and intensity of
mechanisation, while the small decrease after that reflects the usage
of more efficient machinery and the decrease in output.
Power productivity, expectedly, does not show much
fluctuation or trend, due to the fact that, as mentioned before, a
large part of the power cost is directly proportional to the output.
Small fluctuations hence to a large extent indicate changes in cost
per unit while the general gradual downward trend confirms more
intense usage of ancillary equipment such as methane drainage, better
lighting and communications and dust supression techniques.
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7. QUANTIFYING SAFETY IN COAL MINING
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7.1 INTRODUCTI ON
The number of men affected by serious accidents on longwall
faces was approximately five times lower in 1980 than in 1958. Can
it be concluded that from the TECHNOLOGICAL ECONOMICS point of view,
safety on the faces is now five times better than it was in 19581
This is the question to be investigated in this chapter.
A great deal has been written about safety in coal mines since
the beginning of the century. Almost all of the available literature
centres on the following points:
(a) Social effects of accidents, both on those directly
affected, and on the community as a whole.
(b) Measuring the frequency of occurrence of accidents
and producing RAW statistics, although recently the
rate of accidents per manshift worked has also been
considered.
(c) Recommendations as how to manage and improve safety.
Only since 1976, a few authors, notably Collinson145 and
Beddoe97, have made attempts to estimate the cost of accidents, but
only to emphasize the importance of safety. The VERY BRIEF
articles they have produced, are far from being comprehensive.
In this chapter, social effects of the occurrence of
accidents are not considered. The aim is to quantify cost of
accidents to the coal industry, whilst not deriding attempts to assess
other effects.
Definition of Accidents
Accidents are defined here as those unplanned events, in which
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one or more persons are involved, leading to a sort of DIRECT
financial cost ·to the coal industry.
The word "direct" is added to imply that the indirect costs,
such as the loss of output due to an accident, are not included, but
wages paid to men temporarily unproductive as a result of an accident
are included.
Furthermore, the definition seems to include disease
infection cases, for they are unplanned and often lead to financial
cost. For simplicity, these will also be classed as accidents here,
although in the mining industry they are often referred to as
"incidents" •
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7.2 MEASUREMENT
7.21 Safety Cost Model
It is expected that safety cost is a function of output and
the state of technology. Output itself is a function of concentration
of workings and the total number of manhours worked on the face.
Therefore, S = f (F, T, s, d, p)
where S is the total safety cost per year
F is the number of longwal1 mechanised faces,
T is the output per shift from longwal1 mechanised faces,
s is the mean number of shifts worked per day,
d is the mean number of days worked per year, and
p is the number of faces equipped with powered supports.
Put
or
where K, 0(. ,p , 'If , ...,)and t. are constants.
Substituting for K = 347 x 10-6
(>(...= 0.8
fo = 0.8
~=l
w=l
~=-1.2P
F loge
then S = 347 x 10-6 FO.8 TO•8 s d e
- 1.2 P
F
• • • • • • • • • • •• 4
For full explanation of the modelling procedure see appendix
8.0 (which is inserted in the back cover pocket), page 243.
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7.22 Actual Safety Cost
As mentioned earlier, safety is measured here by the cost of
its reciprocol i.e. accidents.
Safety = Accidents Frequency
1
Cost of Accidents = Number of Accidents x Cost per One Accident
Accidents are divided into four categories: Fatal, Serious
Minor and Disease infections.
7.221 Fatal Accidents
Number of Fatal Accidents on LOngwall Faces
Available statistics mostly give the number of accidents for
all different places in mines. From these the number of accidents
occurring on the longwall faces is derived.
Face Fatal Accidents = Total Fatal Accidents x Constant
Statistics of the total number of fatal accidents are readily
available, although cases of inconsistency are observed between the
two main sources used, namely, Reports of the Chief Inspector of Mines
and Quarries, and, the annual Reports of the chief safety engineer of
the N.C.B., in which cases, the mean is taken to be the true value.
Accidents on the longwall faces have been subdivided into
those caused by:
(i) Falls of Ground - For this category, the number of fatal
accidents occurring on the longwall faces are available,
there is therefore no need for the constant to be used.
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(ii) Transport - For accidents caused by transport equipment
and in .handling devices, only the total is available and
the constant is required to convert these to those
actually happening on the longwall mechanised faces.
For this category, it is estimated that a constant of
0.2 for 1958, gradually decreasing to 0.15 in 1980, is
appropriate.
NOI'E - Adjustments have also been made to convert the
total number of accidents for all mines, to
the longwall mechanised faces only, as well as
for year definition. Figures given here are
therefore substantially different from those
in the above sources.
(iii) Machines - These are accidents caused by machines such
as the shearer loader on the longwall faces. The usual
adjustments have been carried out. Use of the constant
is necessary for most years, and is taken to be the mean
of the constant for years 1973-1978, for which it can be
calculated directly.
(iv) Miscellaneous - These are accidents caused by all sources
but the above three. The usual adjustments and the
constant are necessary.
The total number of fatalities on the longwall mechanised
faces, derived in this way, are tabulated in Appendix 7.22la.
Cost per case of Fatal Accidents
It is common knowledge amongst economists and cost benefit
analysts that evaluation of a man's life is a difficult task.
Different points of view can be taken,each of which can give very
different results. For the purpose of this study, however, only the
financial cost incurred by the industry, as a result of a man being
killed in an accident, is considered. It is admitted here that these
values may well be far from similar to any others, obtained as a
result of taking a different point of view and therefore being based
on different assumptions.
- 186 -
The direct financial losses to the coal industry due to a
fatal accident on the longwall face, are divided into three categories:
(i) Common Law damages and compensation - This is the amount of
noney paid directly to the victim's family. The amount
paid depends on many factors, such as the age of the victim
number of children, salary before the accident etc. The
mean of the amount paid in each year, which was obtained
from N.C.B. safety officials reports and accounts and the
National Union of Mineworkers records, is taken to be the
required value.
(ii) Replacement Cost - For a man to be considered competant to
work on the coal face, a certain number of shifts are
necessary to have been done elsewhere underground.
Normally when a new worker is employed, after 120 shifts
(six months) he could be classed as a face worker.
During these 120 shifts, he receives his full wages while
his time is spent on training and working. For example,
the first week of employment is spent only on visiting
different places in the mine, both underground and on
the surface (during which time his productivity is almost
zero) • Assuming that during this period his productivity
is 50%, implies that £ (60 x wage per shift) is spent on
a man for him to become skilled enough to work on the face.
As a result of any fatal accident, a man should be
trained for replacement, the cost of which is taken into
account here. Although this is not carried out in the
above manner by the N.C.B., by considering the cost of
maintaining a constant pool of skilled men to replace
possible fatalities, the above simplification seems
reasonable. The number of shifts carried out
unproductively shows a slight increase over the period.
(iii) other Costs - These are all costs but the above two such
as clerical costs etc. The value of these, being
relatively small, has been estimated through personal
interviews and consulting the limited available
literature.
Values obtained for these three categories are tabulated in
Appendix 7.221b, p(lcte "~j.
G 4~ .....
Total Cost of Fatal Accidents
In this way, the total cost of fatal accidents to the coal
industry is calculated by simply multiplying the number of accidents
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by the cost per case, and tabulated in Appendix 7.22le, ~o~e ~3~.
7.222 Serious Accidents
Serious accidents are defined here as those major accidents
which are likely to endanger life, cause permanent incapacity for work
or substantially impair efficiency, for example, fractures of skull,
spine, arm or leg; dislocation of shoulder or knee; amputation of
hand or foot; or loss of sight of an eye.
Number of Serious Accidents
derive the number of serious accidents directly from published
As in the case of fatal accidents, attempts are made to
statistics where possible. Otherwise, the constant is used again,
as in the case of fatal accidents. Serious accidents are also
divided into four categories.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Falls of Ground - numbers in this category are available
from N.e.B. statistics and the Health and Safety
Executive reports.
Transport - Values can be directly taken from N.e.B.
statistics for years 1973 - 1978, and for other years,
and for other years, the constant has been used with
its value as found from years 1973 - 1978.
Machines - As for (ii).
Miscellaneous - The number of all other serious
accidents has been derived by the use of the constant
(the same as those in 7.221(iv) and the total number
of accidents, available in Health and Safety Executive
reports.
All the above figures, which have been adjusted for year
definition and longwall mechanised faces, are tabulated is Appendix
7.222a, r~e 43b.
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Cost per case of Serious Accidents
(i) Serious accidents often lead to physical disabilities,
for which compensation and common law damages have to
be paid by the coal industry. Table 22 shows
compensation and common law damage values163 payable
in 1979.
Accidents resulting in
Paraplegia
Loss of an eye
Leg amputation above the knee
Leg amputation below the knee
Arm loss
Hand loss
Thumb loss
Index finger loss
Little finger loss
e/L Dam. & Camp. (£)
30,000
6,000
16,000
10,000
12,000
9,000
2,500
2,000
1,000
Table 22: Source: Reference number 163.
Common Law Damages and Compensation in 1979
The mean of different amounts paid, per case, for
compensation and common law damages in each year has
been estimated, using the limited available literature
and the N.D.M. records.
(ii) There are some other costs, although small, associated
with serious accidents. The victims of this type of
accident, almost in every case, leave the coal face,
therefore replacement costs are as described in the
case of fatal accidents. Wage charges in some cases,
medical attention costs, additional clerical effort
costs, etc. are all examples of these minor direct
costs. For simplicity, the sum of all these is
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tabulated in Appendix 7.222b under "other costs".
Also, it is assumed that these costs are the same
as those for fatal accidents.
Total Cost of Serious Accidents
- - -In this way the total cost of serious accidents to the coal
industry, at current prices, can be calculated as simply the product
of number of accidents and the cost per case. Values for these are
tabulated in Appendix 7.222c , vag e ~31.
7.223 Minor Accidents
These are all accidents which result in more than three days
absence from work and are neither serious nor fatal.
Number of Minor Accidents
Exactly the same method as that used for the two other
categories, has been adopted here to derive the number of minor
accidents on the longwa11 mechanised faces. The constant of
conversion has been used for accidents caused by Transport and
Miscellaneous sources. Constant for transport accidents, assumed to
be similar to that of other accidents, i.e. from 0.2 in 1958 to 0.15
in 1980 and that for miscellaneous accidents is taken to be 0.3,
which is the mean of constants of conversion of the components of
miscellaneous accidents i.e. falling objects, machinery, stumbling,
falling and slipping and handling supplies.
Appendix 7.223a shows these values, which have been derived
by also using the Health & Safety Executive reports.
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Cost per case of Minor Accidents
These accidents may be minor from suffering point of view,
but the total cost to the coal industry is far from being negligible.
When a man is away from work, the industry effectively has to pay his
basic wages, as well as some other costs such as medical attention
costs. The injured man, on average, is absent from work 4 - 10 days.
The mean for this in 1958 was approximately 5, while in 1980 it was 7.
Total cost per case of minor accidents, the product of which
and the total number of these is the total cost of minor accidents,
for each year, is tabulated in Appendix 7.223b, ~)C\~e ~3q.
7.224 Disease Infections
Different mining diseases were described in Section 5.3.
Under the Social Security Act claims are allowed to be made for
pneumoconiosis, dermatitis, beat hand, knee and elbow, inflammation of
wrist and nystagmus. For claims for pneumocorniosis are substantially
higher than for other diseases: the financial cost of all other
diseases is ignored. To emphasize this point, the coal industry
incurred a cost of £13.5 M for pneumocomiosis in 1966.
Number of Pneumoconiosis cases
Statistics only give the number of recognized cases for the
whole of the industry. These figures need to be reduced to those
attributable to face operations. This is a difficult task, and there
can be no entirely satisfactory method. A healthy man, as a result
of working in moderately dusty conditions for thirty years, is highly
likely to develop pneumocomiosis. A detailed study would have to
examine the records of all infected men, which would be too detailed
- 191 -
for the purpose of this study and estimation is, once again, resorted
to. The proportion of the number of men deployed on the faces to the
total number of men working underground can be detived and it is
assumed that:
number of pneumocomiosis on the face cx... number of men working on the
face. Further, since it is thought that the risk of developing
pneumoconiosis is higher for face workers than for others, estimated
by approximately 15%, number of pneumoconiosis cases on the face =
1.15 x total number of pneumoconiosis
manshifts worked on the faces
cases x total underground manshifts worked
Let number of face manshifts worked be FMS
number of underground manshifts worked be OMS
face output per manshift be FOMS
underground output per manshift be UOMS
FOMS = output
FMS FMS
= output
FOMS
UOMS = output
UMS
UMS ..output
UOMS
number of pneumocomiosis cases on the face =
1.15 X total number of FMScases x-OMS
1.15 x total number of UOMS= cases x FCMS
The two variables UOMS and FOMS are also available in N.C.B.
statistics. Normal adjustments i.e. for year definitions and
mechanisedlongwall faces, have been carried out. Values obtained
in this way are tabulated in Appendix 7. 224a, \'o.~e ~4-O.
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Cost per case of Pneumoconiosis
The following sources have been used to deti ve data for the
cost per case of pneumoconiosis:
(i) Accounts of the N.C.B., Scottish area
(ii) Accounts of the N.U .M., Durham area
(iii) Publications of the Institution of Mining Engineers
Values obtained from different sources were vastly different.
Official records only show the direct payments made b,y the Board,
while other sources give substantially higher values, suggesting that
compensation is not the only major cost associated with pneumoconiosis.
Every attempt, however, has been made to arrive at an estimate, based
on the data gathered, which would be of sufficient accuracy. These
values are tabulated in Appendix 7.224b, P~e. :l.40.
Multiplying the two sets of figures calculated in this way,
would give the total cost of pneumoconiosis - see Appendix 7.224b.
In this way the total actual cost of accidents is calculated
for each year, values of which are tabulated in Appendix 7.225. Using
an appropriate price index, viz the general inflation rate, converts
the calculated figures to constant prices.
7.23 Testing the Model
Substituting for F, T, s, d and p their actual values obtained
in previous chapters, sufficiently good fit is observed. Appendix
7.23 shows the actual and expected safety costs.
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7.3 ANALYSIS
7.31 Safety Indicators
Three measures, viz the cost of accidents, output per cost of
accidents '~(sa£ety cost productivity) and safety costs as a percentage
of total inputs cost are examined. Values for these indica.tors are
tabulated in Table 23 and plotted against time in Figure 41.
Sa.fety Safety
Total Safety Sa.fety cost cost
Year Cost of Cost Cost per per
Accidents Productivity Productivity total total
tonnes/£
input input
index index ~e index
58 100.0 29.0 100.0 2.77 100.0
59 103.0 32.3 111.4 2.48 89.560 116.1 31.9 110.0 2.60 93.9
61 125·1 34.8 120.0 2.47 89.2
62 130.1 41.9 144.5 2.16 78.0
63 143·0 48.2 166.2 2.12 76.5
64 158.3 48.5 167.2 2.25 81.2
65 158.2 52.2 180.0 2.11 76.2
66 163·5 51.3 176.9 2.15 77.6
67 148.1 57.0 196.6 2.02 72.9
68 137.3 64.2 221.4 1.87 67.5
69 116.0 72.7 250.7 1.78 64.3
70 89.4 78.8 271.7 1.62 58.5
71 87.1 85.2 293.8 1.49 53.8
72 76.7 79.1 272.8 1.51 54·5
73 75·1 95.4 329.0 1.26 45·5
74 74.4 73.6 253.8 1.45 52.3
75 63.3 101.9 351.4 1.12 40.4
76 71.4 89.2 307.6 1.24 44.8
77 61.9 97.7 336.9 1.10 39.7
78 57.6 103.2 355·9 1.00 36.1
79 61.9 95.1 327.9 1.08 39.080 53.6 114 0 393·1 0.92 33.2
Table 23: Analysis of Safety Cost
.. "output per cost of accidents" = Total saleable outputTotal cost of accidents
at longwall faces
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The values of total safety cost and its graph do not reveal
much apart from showing that the general trend is downwards and
safety costs have decreased by 46.4% from 1958 to 1980.
Safety cost per total input ratio also shows a decline over
most of the period and its level in 1980 was 76.8% less than that of
1958. In 1980 the cost of accidents constituted 0.92% of the total
input cost as compared with 2.77% in 1958.
Safety cost productivity values, by showing a 293.1% increase,
agree with the above results, leading to the conclusion that from the
technological economics point of view coal faces show improvements in
safety. The rate of improvement for all the three graphs seems to
have slowed down, supporting the earlier argument that safety is now
near saturation point and further improvements can be brought about
only by a revolutionary technique, method or equipment.
Regarding total productivity, it can be seen that the safety
cost component shows the best improvement. Although this constitutes
a small percentage of the total input, its effect on improving total
productivity is undeniable.
7.32 Safety Cost Components
The actual cost of different categories of accidents were
calculated in Section 7.22.
From 1958 - 1980 the following are observed:
Fatal accidents cost 71.1% decrease
Serious accidents cost 2.5% increase
Minor accidents cost 45.0% increase
Pneumoconiosis cost 89.7% decrease
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Table 24 gives the ratio of output to the cost of different
categories of accidents. Values in this table actually show the
productivity of each category, from which it can be seen that
productivity of fatal accidents cost- has risen by seven-fold and
that of pneumoconiosis by twenty-fold. Values for the two other
categories, on the other hand, do not show much improvement over the
years under consideration. Serious accidents productivity, despite
a fall in earlier years, shows a gradual increase and in 1980 stands
at a level of 106% higher than that in 1958. The mean improvement
over the period is 44.8%. Minor accidents productivity, also, does
not show much improvement and the mean change is near zero (0.6%
increase) . However, it shows an increasing trend since the late
1960's and its value in 1980 was 45% higher than in 1958.
The overall conclusion is that safety figures during the
period 1958 to 1980 show good improvements but more attempts are
required now, in order to reduce the cost of serious reportable and
minor accidents •
..."producti vity of fatal accidents cost" = Total saleable outputTotal cost of fatal accidents
at longwall faces.
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Output/serious Output/fatal Output/minor Output/
Year accidents accidents accidents pneumoconiosiscost cost cost cost
index index index index.
:;3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
59 92.0 109.4 88.6 133.660 89.2 103.6 85.6 137.2
61 92.6 115·9 76.8 177.0
62 90.6 136.9 85.2 267.0
63 96.8 148.5 87.4 411.6
64 105.5 140.5 80.6 490.1
65 107.8 172.7 72.3 946.6
66 120.7 160.0 67.3 1086.4
67 121.2 210.4 73.8 1218.5
68 132.2 225.0 84.7 1416.2
69 163.8 2:;3.9 93.5 1507.8
70 184.9 285.6 99·9 1591.0
71 182.5 312.2 115.3 1380.0
72 175·9 307.6 102.6 1389.8
73 183.4 416.6 124.9 1712.1
74 157.6 304.9 92.9 1525.6
75 207.4 551.8 132.7 1453.2
76 164.3 437.6 119.8 1454.3
77 193.5 432.2 129.4 1650.478 177.8 775·0 130.9 1885.5
79 185.3 370.4 124.5 2049.080 205.6 728.6 145.1 2043.6
Table 24 Analysis of Safety Cost Components
Table 25 gives the percentage of total safety cost for each
category.
Fatal Serious Minor
accidents accidents accidents Pneumoconiosis
Year cost/total cost/total cost/total cost/total
Safety cost Safety cost Safety cost Safety cost
% age % age % age % age
:J3 15.4 12.6 21.4 50.6
59 15·7 15·2 26.9 42.360 16.4 15·5 27.5 40.6
61 16.0 ,16.3 33.4 34.3
62 16.3 20.1 36.3 27.4
63 17.3 21.6 40.7 20.5
64- 18.4 19·9 44.4 17.3
65 16.1 21.0 53·3 9.6
66 17.1 18.4 .56.3 8.3
67 14.4 20.4 57·0 8.2
68 15.2 21.0 55·9 7·9
69 14.9 19·3 57.4 8.4
70 14.7 18.5 .58.2 8.7
71 14.5 20.2 54.5 10.8
72 13.7 19.5 56.9 9·9
73 12.1 22.4 55·9 9.774 12.8 20.3 58.5 8.4
75 9.8 21.3 56.6 12.276 10.8 23.5 54.9 10.7
77 12.0 21.9 55.7 10·378 7.1 25·2 .58.2 9.6
79 13.7 22.3 56.4 8.180 8.3 24.0 57·9 9.7
Table 25 Analysis of Safety Cost Components
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To reduce fluctuations, the mean value of each four year period is
taken and summBxized in Table 26.
Period Fatal Serious Minor PneumoconiosisAccidents Accidents Accidents
.58 - 60 15.8 14.4 25.) 44.5
61 - 64- 17.0 19·5 )8.7 24.9
65 - 68 15.7 20.2 55.6 8.5
69 - 72 14.5 19.4 56.8 9.5
7) - 76 11.4 21.9 56.5 10.)
77 - 80 10.) 2).4 57 .1 9.4
Table 26 Safety Cost Components
Table 26 together with Figure 42 show clearly how total
safety cost has been allocated to different categories during the
period. The picture is now completely different from that of late
1950's. In 1980 minor and serious accidents costs together
constituted 82% of the total safety costs, further emphasizing that
any attempt to reduce the cost of safety and consequently to improve
safety productivity should be directed towards these.
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Figure 42 Safety Cost Components
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8. RELATIONSHIPS WITH TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
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8.1 Introduction
From the discussion of technological change earlier (see pages 5
- 15), it seems clear that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
define technological change in a general way that is applicable to all
industries ~ productive systems. The best one can hope to do is to
select major components of technological change, and investigate how
productivity and safety depend on one or more of these components.
For the purposes of the present work, i.e. in relation to mechanised
longwall coal faces, the relevent components are considered to be:
T Output per shift (tonnes)
R Mean rate of advance (metres per shift)
~ Fraction of longwall faces equipped with powered supports
F
(It is convenient in the model to use as one component exp
During a time of reduction of the labour force at the face, it
seems reasonable to assume that a change in anyone ofthese represents
a change in technology of some sort. Although Rand T are related,
the capital cost model incorporates the product TR.
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8.2 TarAL PRODUCTIVITY
The rate of change of total productivity (T.P.) with respect
to technology, or the effect of technological change on total
productivity, can be found by partially differentiating model (7)
with respect to technology, the indicatives of which in model (7)
being T, R and (exp i).
P
T.P. = w + C + S + M + p. Model (7)
Rate of change of total productivity with respect to
technology is then:
"b (T .P.)
=
~CT.P.) "bJ (T .P.)= _';::'''''';'-'';'''''--EO:-
'bCeF )
Let 'bm = ),(Tech)
~(Tech) lm
~
~ (w + C + S + M + p") _ p (V..~C +~ + liP + 0H )..m "m ~m \m \m ,»",
(w + C + S + M + p')2•
Differentiating models 1 - 6 partially with respect to T, R
d -i uld gi ,.~, b W, '\C, '\S, ~M and \P~
an e wo ve ~ iIi! " ~ m ..m ~ m
In this way model (8), which gives the rate of change of total
productivity with respect to technology, is constructed.
'l.(T.P.) ~ (w + C + S + M + p') - P (\~ + ~S + ~~ + ~~ + \_~~) 8
'lI m 'lim lim IIm 'bm \ m • • ••
= __ __,, __,,--__,,------------__,,----__,,__,,----__,,----
~(Technology) (w + C + S + M + pl)2
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Where P, W, C, S, M and pI are models 1 - 6 of Section 6.33
respectively, and
b P= 0 84 x 10-6 F s Bt d~m . • ....• (8.1)
••••••(8.2)
TR
~~ = (25.23 x 10-10 FLBt RPl-2 T) (1.172jPl) ••••.• (8.3)
~
ll= 3 33 x 10-7 FO.8 T-O.2 s d e F) m • • •.••• (8.4)
· •.... (8.5)
· ....• (8.6)
The function Total Productivity = f (technology) is a four
dimensional one, and therefore cannot be plotted easily, but rate of
change of productivity with respect to technology, model (8), for which
a distinct real number can be calculated in each year, can be plotted.
Positive partial d~rivatives show that the function is increasing
while negative ones reflect the fact that the function has a decreasing
trend in that particular year.
It must be noted that models 8.1 - 8.6 as well as being
components of model 8, are important individually, since they measure
the influence of technological change on input components. For
example, model 8.2 measures the effects of technological change on
the labour cost.
- 205 -
For 1980
p = 100.5 "'bp~m = +0.323
w = 50.49 "'b W 8 4 -3- = -1 • 2 x 10~m
c = 41.45 ~ = +59.92 x 10-3~m
s =
M = 0.315
~s-='bm
"bM_=~m
~ pI -4biii= +63.88 x 10
8 -4-10.01 x 10
;
P' = 1.644
~ T. P = +2.89 x 10-3~m
hJ.~)
Models 8 - 8.6 indicate that technological changej\always tended
to increase output, capital cost and power cost, while it tends to
decrease labour cost, safety costs and materials and supplies costs.
Numerical calculations for year 1980 show that in that year
technology had these effects:
on the positive side: increased output
decreased labour cost (index of the effect = 100)
decreased safety cost (index = 59)
decreased materials and supplies cost (index = 5)
on the negative side: increased capital cost (index = 100)
increased power cost (index = 11).
On the whole the influence of technological change on
productivity in the year 1980 was a benefitial one i.e. technological
change tended to improve total productivity in 1980.
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8.3 SAFEI'Y
The same line of approach, i.e. partial differentiation of
the safety cost'model, is taken here to analyse the effect of
technological change on safety.
~2S would give the rate of change of safety costs with
respect to technology.
= 3.33 x 10-7
- 2.2P-r-s de..... (8.4)
The negative sign shows that improvements in technology have
always resulted in reductions in safety costs. The rate of this
reduction is indicated by the value of ~; for each yeax during the
period 19..58- 1980, which axe tabulated in Table 27.
Since '\; is always negative, the higher ~; I the better, as
regards both productivity and safety. This shows an increase from
1958 to 1964 and since then shows a decrease to the extent that in
1980 it was reduced to one eleventh of its level in 1964. This proves
analytically the earlier claim about the influence of technological
change on safety for it shows that technological change is no longer
playing a major part in safety improvements and in order to do so,
some radical change is required.
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Year ~2S 2!; lQ3
Ended
p
March ~T ~(e1l")
.58 8.90
59 9.2260 9.62
61 10.00
62 11.42
63 12.37
64 12.67
65 12.5366 10.68
67 8.34
68 5.90
69 3.25
70 2.32
71 1.91
72 1.87
73 1.74
74 1.53
75 1.37
76 1.40
77 1.2578 1.21
79 1.1580 1.09
Table 27 Effect of Technological Change on Safety
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9. CONCLUSIONS
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9.1 INFERENCES
Technological change is inevitable in the competitive modern
world, as well as being deliberate and continuous. It cannot be
measured directly and for this reason, the analyst should concentrate
on its effects. Further, no one effect can be claimed to be the
most reliable basis for measurement and empirical methods are there-
fore mo.st appropriate. These should be devised to suit individual
situations •
The concept of productivity is often misunderstood and mis-
applied. Any analysis of productivity must encompass all cost
elements, and extreme care must be taken not to fall into the trap
of implicitly assuming that input components are separable. When
measuring productivity, the important questions should be asked as to
why measure it. The most realistic measure of productivity would be
one which takes all (monetary) costs into consideration (i.e. total
producti vity), and is defined and measured according to the
particular case in question and particular objectives of quantification.
In the coal mining industry of the U.K., many technological
improvements, i.e. mechanization, have .taken place, but with respect
to management techniques and methods a limited number of improvements
can be observed over the period 19..58- 1980. Output per manshift
(OMS) has always been used to measure productivity in the U.K. coal
mining industry. The innovation of a new method is needed more than
at any time in the past. Output per manshift cannot in any way be
related to profitability.
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Technical productivity concept, being the ratio of actual
output to the expected output from available machinery, as well as
being revealing itself, can be used to convert OMS values to total
productivity values. Technical productivity of longwall coal faces
*equipped with shearer loaders , decreased from the value of 6.8J~ in
1958 to 2.17% in 1980, meaning that as more machinery was acquired,
the rate of utilization decreased to the extent that in 1980, the
N.C.B. used only 2.17% of the capacity of its longwall faces
machinery.
The total productivity model, the percentage of error for
which has a mean of 2.94 and standard deviation of 2.18, together
with the forecasting technique suggested, can be used to predict the
total productivity of longwall mechanized faces for future years.
It is expected that it will produce fairly accurate results for 5 -
10 years. The actual values show that total productivity of longwall
coal faces increased from 80.22 tonnes per £100 in 1958 to 129.60
tonnes per £100 in 1969, from when it decreased to 104.98 tonnes per
£100 in 1980.
During the period 1969 - 1980 the N.C.E. paid more attention
to the productivity of elsewhere underground, than they did during
the period 1958 - 1969, but still the productivity of this category
lags behind that of coal faces. It is therefore equally important
now to spend efforts in increasing total productivity of other places
underground than the coal faces.
~ In 1980, 87.8% of the output of longwall faces was won from
faces equipped with shearer loaders.
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The figures for total output and total input suggest cost
inflexibility of the N.C.B. This is presumably due to the high
level of fixed costs.
The analysis of labour cost figures show that the OMS method
is becoming increasingly invalid for measuring labour productivity;
and that labour cost as a fraction of total cost shows a 58.~
decrease. Labour cost constituted 84.3% of the total cost in 1958
and this decreased to 53.3% in 1980.
Capital cost constituted 11.1% of the total input cost in
1958, but increased to 43.8% in 1980. Capital productivity shows a
sharp decrease of 67% over the period 1958 - 1980. This is the main
cause for the decrease in the total productivity. Since 1969, the
additional expenditure on capital equipment has been more than the
resultant savings in the labour cost.
Materials and supplies (cost) productivity shows a sharp
increase of 235% and the proportion of this as total input cost shows
a decrease of 61.4%. Power cost, on the other hand, show a decrease
in productivity by 14.6% and its ratio to the total input cost shows
an increase of 53.6%. Materials and supplies cost and power cost
together constituted 2.04% of the total input cost in 1980.
The safety cost model is expected to give values of the per-
centage error which have the mean of 6.97 and standard deviation of
5.92. The forecasting method can again be used to predict future
safety costs, although in the case of safety only slight reliability
can be expected from any model. Actual safety cost at constant
prices decreased by 46.4% over the period 1958 - 1980. Over the
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same period, safety cost productivity increased by 293.1% and the
ratio of safety cost to total input cost decreased by 66.8%. In
1980, longwall faces accidents cost the N.e.B. £~,3l0,875 which was
0.92% of the total input cost.
Over the period under consideration, fatal accidents ,cost
shows a 71.1% decrease, pneumoconiosis cost shows a 89.7% decrease,
while serious accidents cost and minor accidents cost show 2.5% and
~j% increase respectively.
In the period 1977 - 1980, 57.1% of the total safety cost was
attributed to minor accidents, 23.4% to serious accidents, 10.3% to
fatal accidents and 9.4% to pneumoconiosis.
During the period 19.58- 1980, technological change tended to
increase output, capital cost and power cost, while it tended to
decrease labour cost, safety cost and materials and supplies cost.
Technological change tended to decrease safety cost, though
with different rates during the period. This rate increased by
42.4% from 1958 to 1964 and from then decreased dramatically so that
its value was 91.4% lower in 1980 than in 1964. Technological change
hence has ceased to have a great influence on improving safety.
Despite all the above results, it is noticeable that the
N.e.B.'s measure of productivity (OMS) shows an improvement in twenty
out of twenty-three years considered here. This makes the author
believe that there are political reasons for using OMS.
The analysis in the presentation shows that the productivity of
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coal faces has been in a poor shape since 1969 and remedial action is
required. Any such action must incorporate an increase in the
capital productivity (pp 173 - 175).
Further, the total productivity model provides the management
with a useful tool for sensitivity analysis and highlights the areas
in which more attention is needed. Thetotal productivity model can
be used to measure the real productivity of coal faces and the
empirical method applied can be used to determine the actual
productivity values. Using the actual values calculated and the
forecasting method suggested, the total productivity of'longwall coal
faces can be forecast. On the other hand, using the total
productivity model and anticipated values for the variables, a
forecast can again be produced for the future values of total
productivity.
The analysis of technological change provides management with an
idea of the degree of effectiveness of past innovations and helps
appraisal of future developments.
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9.2 FUTURE WORK
One of the main functions of research is that it opens other
roads, and that it lays the foundation, for future research. By
reading through this report, the research interest would notioe
numerous lines along which future research can be carried out.
It was shown earlier that the influence of the technical
productivity concept, introduced here, on total productivity has
always been great. A sensitivity analysis on the technical
productivity model is therefore expected to highlight some important
points. Further, the relationship between technical productivity,
output per manshift and total productivity was only mentioned here.
The exact relationship is to be found and in this context the use of
linear formulae is recommended to the future researcher.
Sensitivity analysis of the total productivity model 1s also
another possible future line of research.
Although the total productivity model was tested for
individual mines, this was done only superficially as the emphasis
was on its application at the national and regional levels. The
model is basically applicable to individual mines, but it is expected
that with slight modification it will result in values as accurate as
those in the case of the whole industry.
This report makes cost/bebefit analysis of safety, believed
to be the only reasonable way to ~uantify safety in the mining industry,
an easier task.
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The total productivity model was subjected to marginal analysis
here with respect to technology only. Differentiating the model with
respect to any of the variables would provide the analyst with an
indication of the influence of that factor on productivity. Fuxther,
sensitivity analysis of the derivatives should give hints as to
possible actions in order to manage the effects of various factors.
As regards the relationship between technological change,
productivity and safety, the foundation is well laid in this report,
but there is enormous potential for future research in this area.
Attempts should be made to continue the same line of approach, and to
measure technological change by other means in order to allow
comparison. In this context using output per manshift values in
conjunction with technical productivity is particularly recommended.
Sensitivity analysis of the safety cost model would highlight
areas on which more attention is required, and the effect of
partially differentiating the model would be similar.
This presentation is mainly concerned with longwall faces.
The prospective analyst could modify the models to allow for overhead
cost, and further, take the same line of approach to devise models for
all mines. Using partial differentiation, he can then measure the
influence of overhead cost on productivity and also compare the
productivity and safety of different places in coal mines.
Finally, the total productivity model and its components would
prove useful tools in any future study of the U.K. coal mining manage-
ment.
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Appendix 6.0 - Notation
B mean seam thickness of longwall mechanised faces
c annual face capital cost at constant prices
D Tonnage of coal lost through disputes
d mean number of face days worked per year
e the Napierian number
F number of longwall mechanised faces
F' number of longwall mechanised faces equipped with powered supports
g mean density of coal won from longwall mechanised faces
L mean length of longwall mechanised faces
M annual materials and supplies costs at constant prices
p annual output from longwall mechanised faces
p' annual power cost at constant prices
Technical productivity - The ratio of actual output from longwall
mechanised faces equipped with shearer loaders to potential
output.
p number of faces equipped with powered supports
T R
=P1Q is a variable used in modelling process
q
R
Q - 38
= 1.17 23 is a variable used in the modelling process
mean rate of advance of longwall mechanised faces per shift
s annual safety cost at constant prices
s mean number of face shifts worked per day
s' mean number of shearer loaders employed at each face
T mean tonnage of coal extracted per shift per face
v vend (the ratio of saleable tonnage to pit head tonnage)
v mean effective speed of shearer loaders
w annual face labour cost at constant prices
mean web (depth of cut for shearer loaders)w
- 217 -
APl'endix 6.21
% of Out-
% of % of Long- put from Actual Out-
Year Total Deep Mechanised wall Out-
Shearer- put from
Ended Mined Output as put as per
loader Shearer-
March Saleable Total
Faces as Loader
Output per Mechanised per TotalTotal Output Output Mechanised Faces
(M tonnes) Output (M tonnes)
1958 208.5 24.2 94-3 39.0 18.6
1959 200.4 28.7 95·1 38.5 21.1
1960 193.4 32.9 95.6 38.6 23.5
1961 185.7 40.1 95·9 37·1 26.5
1962 184.5 50·5 96.1 39.1 35.0
1963 191.5 61.2 96.6 46.6 52.8
1964 190.2 68.4 96.9 47.9 60.4
1965 186.6 75·0 96.9 50·3 68.2
1966 176.9 80.7 96.5 50.9 70.1
1967 167.2 85.7 96.8 53.6 74·3
1968 165·3 89.7 97.5 56.5 81.7
1969 155.5 91.8 97.0 63.2 87.5
1970 142.0 92·3 97.2 64.6 82.3
1971 135·4 92.2 97.6 68.3 83.2
1972 111.0 92.2 97.3 72.0 71. 7
1973 129.0 93.0 97.3 76.3 89.1
1974 98.7 93·5 97.4 77 .3 69.5
1975 116.8 93·5 97.1 77.7 82.4
1976 114·4 93.6 97.6 80.3 83.9
1977 108.4 93.8 97.8 81.5 81.0
1978 106.2 93.6 98.1 83.0 80.9
1979 105·4 93.5 98.0 84.7 81.8
1980 109·3 93.6 98.0 86.7 86.7
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Appendix 5.22
% ~ at'
Output from
Year Shearers ,
~ Potent1&l3:nded F Faces per F B V 1M oS IF
March I Cutput from I(~)
Out'Put
Longwall I I (m Tonn.s)Faces (m) Cm) I Cm! a)
." - mJ I I
1958 76) )6.1 270 1.2.5 I 1.48 1.82 0·52 11.246 0.029 272.!j.
1959 895 36.6 )21 1.29 1.!j.8 0.82 0·.59 1.2)0 0.OJ2 368.0
:'960 988 36.9 );8 1.27 1.!j.8 0.82 0.61 1.281 0.0')7 5oJ3.1
-
1
0•621961 1,090 35.6 381 1.27 1.~ 0.81 1.319 0.0')7 557.2
1962 1.J12 )7.6 484- 1.28 1,49 0.81
1
0•62 1.332 0.052 1.012.6
1963 1.388
I
45·0 613 1.30 1.~ 0.81 1.)30 0.054- 1,350.6
I
10•62
1964- 1,427 46.4 650 1.)0 1.~ 0.81 0.62 1.350 0.0;4- 1,45).6
I
I
1965 1,462 !j.8.7 696 1.28 I 1.~ 0.81 0.68 1.378 0.055 1,725·5
1966 1,441 49.1 694- 1.25 I 1.49 0.81 0.69 1.)64- 0.056 1,740.2
1967 1,407 5l.il 716 1.)0 1.49 I 0.81 0.69 1.379 0.064 2,l57·4-
Ir1968 1,)69 55.1 740 1.)1 1.49 0.81 0.71 1.393 0.064 2.J3.5.4
1969 1,025 61.3 616 1.J3 I l,!j.8 0.S2
I ::~
1:)87 0.068 2.129.)
r
1970 898 62.8 55J 1.35 1.48 - 0.82 1.407 0.078 2,25'/.7
I 849 66.7 .556 1.36 1.48 0.82 1.418 O.J78 2.304.61971
I
0.72
1972 840 70.1 578 1.37 1.48 0.82 0.72 1,,416 0.080 2,471.8
1973 831 74.2 605 1.)8 1.48 0.82 0.73 1.410 0.080 2,6)1.1
1974 778 1.41 1.47 0.8) 0.72 1,,4)8 0.082 2,648.; I75·) 575
I1975 745 75·4 56) 1.42 1.47 0.83 0.74 1.452 0.095 ).139.9
i1976 7:Pr 78.4 575 1.4) 1.47 0.3) , 0.76 1.444- 0.095 ),298.5
I
1977 no 79.4- 563 1.45 1.48 0.82 0.76 1,506 0.101 ! 3,611.8
1978 709 81.4 566 1.46 1.48 0.S2 0.77 1.5)4 0.101 13.773.0
1979 67') 83.0 .548 1.!j.8 1.48 0.82 0.79 1.532 0.101 3.794.3
1980 649 85·0 539 1.49 l.~ 0.32 0.82 1.559 0.102 4,007.9
See Appendix 6.0 for notation
Appendix 6.23
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Year
P1
Ended Technical
March Productivity
(%)
1958 6.83
1959 5·73
1960 4.67
1961 4.76
1962 3.46
1963 3·91
1964 4.16
1965 3.95
1966 4.03
1967 3.44
1968 3·50
1969 4.11
1970 3·65
1971 3.61
1972 2.90
1973 3·39
1974 2.62
1975 2.62
1976 2.54
1977 2.24
1978 2.14
1979 2.16
1980 2.17
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ADpendix 6. 3ll
Modal (l)
Year I Output Tota.lPl:'e- Tota.l~d.ed F' T B D s Per ray d dieted Out Actual % ageI put frOlll Error~h ~.r Face
Model 1 Output
- (Tonne.) (m) (m Tonne.) (Tonne.) (ll! Tonne.) (m Tonne.)-
19;8 747 I 173 1.28 1.7 l.'"'l 2J6 274 47.5 47.6 0.211959- 895
I
177 1.29 1.4 1.42 244 257 53.S ~.7 1.67
1960 988 ISl 1.27 1.2 1.45 256 251 60.4 60.8 0.66
1961 1,090 i 182 1.27 1.7 l.51 268 250 69.2 71.4 J.18
1962 1,312
I
187 1.28 1.8 1.62 J01 241 89.2 89.5 0.J4
1963 1.J88 \ 199 1.30 1.1 1.75 345 242 UO.9 U3.2 2.07
1964 1,427 205 1.)0 1.4 l.81 J66 244 l22.J 126.1 3.11
1965 1,462 207 1.28
1
1.3 l.89 381 246 132.4 135.6 2.42
i 1966 1,441 208 1.25 1.2 2.02 40) 24J 137.0 137.8 0•.58
I 1967 1.407 210 1.30 1.7 2.0S 435 239 139.0 1)8.7 .o.zz
1968 1.J69 222 1.31 0.4 2.19 477 227 144.9 144.6 -0.21
1969 1,025 264 1.3J 0.3 2.17 .562 241 136.8 138.5 1.24
1970
I
098 282 1·35 2.9 2.16 602 242 126.3 127.4- 0.87
I
1971 8109 293 1.36 J.l 2.08 608 244 120.6 121.8 1.00 I
1972 640 292 1.)7 26.7 2.09 605 249 98.8 99.6 0.81
1973 8J1 287 1.38 0.6 2.06 587 24) nz.a ns.z -0.43
1974 778 292 1.41 2l.3 2.03 591 242 90.0 89.9 -O.ll
1975 745 290 1.42 0.4 2.04 590 241 105.9 106.0 0.09
1976 754
I
287 1.43 I 0.5 2.05 i ;88 23.5 104.2 104.5 0.29
I
1977 720 283 1.45 1.1 2.04 578 239 99.4 99.4 0
1978 709 291 1.46 0.8 2.04- 591 2JJ 98.7 97.5 -1.22
1979 673 J02 1.48 1..5 2.08 637 229 97.4 96.6 -0.82
1980 649 314 1.49 0.9 2.11 673 230 100·5 lOa.) -2.20
See Appendix 6.0 for notation
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Appendix 6. 3212
Year Mechanised Wage per Actual Face
Ended Longwall Face OMS Shift of Price Labour Cost
March Output Face Index At ConstantWorkers Prices
(M Tonnes) (Tonnes) (£) (£m)
1958 47.6 3.64 3.8220 100.0 49.98
1959 54.7 3.72 4.0108 103.4 57.50
1960 60.8 3.87 4.1667 106.1 61.70
1961 71.4 4.09 4.3125 109.2 68.94
1962 89·5 4.34 4.4833 113.7 81.31
1963 113.2 4.72 4.5222 118.8 91.29
1964 126.1 5.03 4.6600 123.4 94.67
1965 135.6 5.26 4.9958 128.0 100.62
1966 137.8 5·57 5.3577 132.2 100.3
1967 138.2 5.78 5.4127 139.9 92.84
1968 144.6 6.06 5.5112 146.9 89.52
1969 138.5 6.71 5.9042 153.1 79.60
1970 127.4 6.99 6.4892 164.1 72.07
1971 121.8 7.21 7.1971 181.2 67.10
1972 99.6 7.05 7.8532 208.3 53.26
1973 116.7 7.56 9.6916 230.1 65.04
1974 89.9 7.30 10.9388 267.6 50.34
1975 106.0 7.89 13·5139 320.3 56.68
1976 104·5 7.89 16.7144 395.3 56.00
1977 99.4 7.75 18.1570 453.9 51.31
1978 97·5 7.91 21.1510 506.0 51.52
1979 96.6 8.53 25.9810 581.3 50.62
1980 100·3 8.88 30.4220 675.2 50.89
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Appendix 6.3213
Model (2)
W
Year Predicted
Ended F T L B P Labour
i ActUal % ~e
March
Cost from Labour Error
Model 2 Cost
I)
(Tonnes) Cm) (m) (£M) (£M)
1958 774 I 173 146 1.28 19 47.58 49.98 5.04I
1959 895 177 149 1.29 30 'P.49 57·50 5·52
1960 988 181 153 1.27 46 62.81 61.70 - 1.77
1961 1,090 182 157 1.27 87 68.39 68.94 0.80
1962 1,312 187 159 1.28 132 81.13 81.31 0.22
1963 1,388 199 171 1.30 '161 89.37 91.29 2.15
1964 1,427 I 205 178 1.30
1188 94.92 94.67 - 0.26
1965 1,462 207 180 1.28 246 100.34 100.62 0.28
1966 1,441 208 175 1.25 !374 101.81 100.30 - 1.48
1967 1,407 210 167 1.30 1518 90.27 92.84 2.85
1968 1,369 222 167 1.31 699 89.60 89.52 - 0.09
1969 1,025 264 167 1.33 701 80.13 79.60 - 0.66
1970 898 '282 170 1.35 703 73.55 72.07 - 2.01
1971 849 293 170 1.36 708 71.43 67.10 - 6.06
1972 840 292 171 1.37 714 69.24 53.26 -23.08
1973 831 287 172 1.38 718 66.05 65.04 - 1.53
1974 778 292 175 1.41 692 60.82 50.34 -17.23
1975 745 290 177 1.42 688 56·92 56·68 - 0.42
1976 7:fi 287 178 1.43 687 56.21 .56.00 - 0.37
1977 720 283 180 1.45 686 .51.22 51·31 0.18
1978 709 291 181 1.46 672 .51.66 .51.52 - 0.27
1979 673 302 185 1.48 638 50.42 50.62 0.40
1980 649 314 189 1.49 625 50.49 50.89 0.79
See Appendix 6.0 for notation
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Appendix 6.3222
Cost of Cost of
Machinery' 1".a.ch1ner,r
year on E:a.ch on ~h rotal Actual ActUAl ?ace
- ~ded Face ..nth p Face '.i1th- (F - p) Ca.pita.l Cost ?rice Capital Cost- Powend out Powered. a.t Current Index lot ConstantMarch Supports Supports Prices 1'=1oe.
a.t Current lot Current I IPrices Prtoas I(t) (t) Cl:) I (£m) I
19.58 42,726 19 )4,200 755 6.56 100.0 1 6.56I
1959 50,258 )0 )5,721 865 7.98 102.2 i 7.81I
1960 62,5.5J
,
46 )6,124 942 9.08 10).1 I 8.81
1961 81,027 I 87
! )6,6)2 1,003 10.78 105·1 10.26I
1962 82,912
I.1)2 38,791 1,180 , 1).96 107.2 1).02,
196) 8),929 161 40,';'84 1,227 15.64 108.5 I l4.41I
1964- 89,873 ll88 41,826 I 16.91 109.8 !I 1,239 15.41
1965 98,263 246 42,592 I 1,216 18.70 I112.0 16.70
I I
1966 107,500 )74- 4),814 ! 1,067 21.40 114.7 18.66
I
1967 12),420 .518 46,829
, 889 25.98 :
I
117.2 : 22.17
I I
1968 1)1,730 699 47,64) I 670 )0.52 119.4 I 25·.56
1969 1:38,223
1
701 49,08) I )24- 27.77 12).8 I 22.43
I
I
I
1970 159.830
1
703 52,745 195 )0.19 128.8 I 23.44
I i
1971 189,)2) 708 55,599 i 141 ! )).18 139.0 25.1J
61,)2) 1 126 I 40.41 1 51•6 26.661972 219,096 714 I, 1
1973 260,200 718 6),269
I
113 47.75 i 161.4 29 ..58 I,
I 36 56.05 ! 181.4 i1974 320,500 692 68,722 )0.90 I
I I I
1975 432,871 688 80,280 57 74•4J 225.8 )2.96
-
1976 565,000 687 101,778 67 97.22 27.5.1 35.34
1977 715,2)8 686 ll),)26 J4 121.72 322 •.5 )7.74
1978 904,118 672 1)6,889 37 150.30 372.9 40.44-
1979 1,063,)00 6)8 146,300 )5 168.25 412.1 40.8)
1980 1,280,200 625 166,900 24
f
197.94- 47).) 41.32
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Apll8ndix 6.3223
Modal (»
Year Pndioted Aotual.
Ended T a 1\ Q ~ F r. l' "3
CapitaJ. Fa.c. jC~
March
Cost froll! Capital Er.ror
,MocI.e1 J CQat
(Tonnes) Cm} U") (Tonne lIl) (m) (!ll) (£M) (£M)
- i-
1
14619.58 113 0.82 6.83 20.770 0.889 774 19 1.Z8 6.31 6.56 3.96
1959 177 0.81 5-'1'3 25·021 0.915 895 149 30 1.29 7.76 7.81 0.64
1960
, 181 r 31.3910 0.956 988 15.3 46 1.27 9.24 6.81 - 4.65I 081 14.67,
1961 , 182 0.80 :4-.76 30.;88 i 0.9Sl 1,090 1.57' 87 1.27 10.75 10.26 - 4.56I
I
I
3.46 I ~J2 1.281962 187 0.79 3).123 i 0.967 1,312 159 14.1) IJ.02 - 7.86
1963 199 O.SO J.91 40.716 l.019 1,J88 171 161 1.JO 16.77 14.4.1 -14.07
1964-
,
205 0.79 4.16 ]8.930 l.006 1,427 178
1
188 1.)0 17.99 15.41 -14.34I
1965 i 0.78 40.876 1,462 180 246 1.28 19.45i 207 ).95 l.020 16.70 -14.14
I 175 b741966 ! 208 0.79 4.0J 4.0.774 1.019 1,441 1.25 20.16 18.66 - 7.44
1967 i 210 0.77 3.!14 47.006 1.06) 1,407 167 )Sl8 1.JO 22.28 22.17 I - 0.49
1968
! 0.83 52.646 1,)69 167 !699 Ii 222 3 •.50 1.105 1.31 26.08 25.56 I - 1.99
I I
1969 I 264 : 0.95 4..11 61.0ZZ 1.170 1,025 167 /701 1.JJ 24.78 22.43 I - 9.~II
1970 I 282 LOO ).65 77.260 1.307 899 170 !703 1.35 27.46 23.44 -14.64I I
1971 I 293 1.02 ).61 82.787 1.3.58 849 170 !708 1.)6 28.49 25.13 -11.79
I I
1972 292 1.01 2.90 101.692 1.545 .840 171 :714 1.37 )2.90 26.66 -18.97
1973 287 0.99 3.)9 9J.814 1.367 631 172 1?l8 1.36 29.48 29.56 0.J4I
2.62 1.626 I 1.411974 292 0.98 109.ZZ1 778 175 1692 34.64 30.90 -10.80
1975 290 0.95 2.62 105.15.) 1.582 745 177 '688 1.42 3J.89 32.96 - 2.74
1976 282 0.95 2.54 107.)4) 1.605 754 178 f:J37 1.4) )4.69 35.)4 1.87
1977 283 0.89 2.24 112.442 1.662 720 180 686 1.'-5 36.41 37.74 J.65 I
I I
I 1978 291 0.92 2.14 125·103 LS12 709
181 672 1.46 39.25 40.44- J.O)
1979 )02 0.94 2.16 1)1.426 1.892 673 185 638 1.48 40.04 40.8) 1.97
1980 314 0.94- 2.17 1)6.018 1.952 649 189 625 1.49 41.45 41.82 0.89
3ee Appendix 6.0 for notation
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Appendix 6.3242
Materials & Total Actual ActualSupplies Materials & Materia.ls&Year Cost per Actual Supplies Price SuppliesEnded Tonne of
March Coal at Output Cost at Index Cost at
Current Current Constant
Prices Prices Prices
(£) (M Tonnes) (£M) (£M)
19.93 0.0103 47.6 0.4918 100.0 0.491
1959 0.0110 :J+.7 0.6007 100.3 0.599
1960 0.0116 60.8 0.7082 102.2 0.693
1961 0.0125 71.4 0.8957 106.0 0.845
1962 0.0127 89.5 1.1366 110.6 1.028
1963 0.0117 113.2 1.3290 113.3 1.173
1964 0.0111 126.1 1.4028 116.8 1.201
1965 0.0113 135.6 1.5325 122.7 1.249
1966 0.0113 137.8 1.5592 127.8 1.220
1967 0.0104 138.7 1.4397 131.6 1.094
1968 0.0099 144.6 1.4417 137.3 1.050
1969 0.0086 138.5 1.1855 144.4 0.821
1970 0.0073 127.4 0.9275 152.8 0.607
1971 0.0078 121.8 0.9533 165.5 0.576
1972 0.0077 99.6 0.7669 177.1 0.433
1973 0.0071 116.7 0.8309 189.7 0.438
1974 0.0079 89.9 0.7077 215.1 0.329
1975 0.0103 106.0 1.0918 261.3 0.418
1976 0.0127 104.5 1.3272 307.5 0.432
1977 0.0148 99.4 1.4714 353.7 0.416
1978 0.0149 97.5 1.4521 389.3 0.373
1979 0.0155 96.6 1.4956 438.6 0.341
1980 0.0160 100.3 1.6028 518.7 0.309
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Appendix 6.3243
Model (5)
Predicted ActualMaterials &
Year Supplies
Materials &
Ended F T d s Cost at
Supplies % age
March Constant
Cost at Error
Prices from Constant
Model Prices
(Tonnes) (£M) (£M)
19.58 774 173 274 1.41 0.572 0.491 -14.16
1959 895 177 257 1.42 0.637 0·599 - 5·97
1960 988 181 251 1.45 0.707 0.693 -1.98
1961 1,090 182 250 1.51 0.828 0.845 2.05
1962 1,312 187 241 1.62 1.061 1.028 - 3.11
1963 1,388 199 242 1.75 1.164- 1.173 0.77
1964 1,427 295 244 1.81 1.221 1.201 - 1.64
1965 1,462 .207 246 1.89 1.314 1.248 - 4.95
1966 1,441 208 243 2.02 1.355 1.220 - 9.96
1967 1,407 210 239 2.08 1.318 1.094 -17.00
1968 1,369 222 227 2.19 1.203 1.050 -12.72
1969 1,02.5 264- 241 2.17 0.730 0.821 12.47
1970 898 282 242 2.16 0.57.5 0.607 5.57
1971 849 293 244 2.08 0·500 0.576 15.2
1972 840 292 249 2.09 0.507 0.433 -14.60
1973 831 287 243 2.06 0.490 0.438 -10.61
1974 778 292 242 2.03 0.433 0.329 -24.02
1975 745 290 241 2.04 0.413 0.418 1.21
1976 754 287 235 2.05 0.415 0.432 4.10
1977 720 283 239 2.04 0.401 0.416 3.74
1978 709 291 233 2.04 0.373 0.373 0
1979 673 302 229 2.08 0.337 0.341 1.19
1980 64-9 314 230 2.11 0.315 0.309 - 1.90
See Appendix 6 for notation
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Appendix 6.3252
Cost of E1ec Face Actual ActualYear Energy/Tonne Longwa11 Power Cost Price PowerEnded of Coal at Mechanised at Index Cost atMarch Current Output Current ConstantPrices Prices Prices
(£) (M Tonnes) (£M) (£M)
19~ 0.014 47.6 0.666 100.0 0.666
1959 0.013 ;/+.7 0.711 100.3 0·709
1960 0.013 60.8 0.790 102.2 0·773
1961 0.014 71.4 1.000 106.0 0.943
1962 0.015 89.5 1.343 110.6 1.214
1963 0.015 113.2 1.698 113·3 1.500
1964 0.016 126.1 2.018 116.8 1.727
1965 0.017 135.6 2.305 122.7 1.879
1966 0.018 137.8 2.480 127.8 1.941
1967 0.018 138.7 2.500 131.6 1.897
1968 0.020 144.6 2.892 137.3 2.106
1969 0.022 138.5 3.047 144.4 2.110
1970 0.023 127.4 2.930 152.8 1.918
1971 0.025 121.8 3.045 165.5 1.840
1972 0.027 99.6 2.690 177.1 1.518
1973 0.029 116.7 3.384 189.7 1.784
1974 0.034 89.9 3.057 215.1 1.421
1975 0.040 106.0 4.240 261.3 1.623
1976 0.048 104.5 5.016 307.5 1.631
1977 0.056 99.4 5.566 353.7 1.574
1978 0.063 97·5 6.143 389.3 1.578
1979 0.072 96.6 6.955 438.6 1..586
1980 0.085 100.3 8.526 518.7 1.644
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Appendix 6.3253 Model (6)
IP
Year
Predicted Actual
Ended T F s d
Power Cost Power % age
March
From M9del Cost Error6
(Tonnes) (£M) (£M)
19.93 173 774 1.41 274 0.720 0.666 - 7..50
1959 177 895 1.42 257 0.779 0.709 - 8.99
1960 181' 988 1.45 251 0.859 0.77'3 -10.01
1961 182 1,090 1.51 250 0.965 0.943 - 2.28
1962 187 1,312 1.62 241 1.183 1.214 2.62
1963 199 1,388 1.75 242 1.443 1.500 3.95
1964 205 1,427 1.81 244 1.593 1.727 8.41
1965 207 1,462 1.89 246 1.728 1.879 8.74
1966 208 1,441 2.02 243 1.815 1.941 6.94
1967 210 1,407 2.08 239 1.828 1.897 3.77
1968 222 1,369 2.19 227 1.917 2.106 9.86
1969 264 1,025 2.17 241 2.011 2.110 4.92
1970 282 898 2.16 242 1.975 1.918 - 2.89
1971 293 849 2.08 244 1.927 1.840 - 4.51
1972 292 840 2.09 249 1.953 1.518 -22.27
1973 287 831 2.06 243 1.825 1.784 - 2.25
1974 292 778 2.03 242 1.742 1.421 -18.43
1975 290 745 2.04 241 1.674 1.623 - 3.05
1976 287 754 2.05 235 1.634 1.631 - 0.18
1977 283 720 2.04 239 1.571 1.574 0.19
1978 291 709 2.04 233 1.567 1.578 0.70
1979 302 673 2.08 229 1..931 1.586 0.32'
1980 314 649 2.11 230 1.644 1.644 0
See Appendix 6 for notation
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Appendix 6.33a
TarAL PRODUCTIVITY COMPONENTS FROM MODELS
TotalYear ProductivityEnded P IW C S M P (Tonnes perMarch £100)
From Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19~ 47.5 47.~ 6.31 1.644 0.572 0.720 83.59
1959 53.8 54.49 7.76 1.7~ 0.637 0.779 82.23
1960 60.4 62.81 9.24 1.902 0.707 0.859 79.98
1961 69.2 68.39 10.75 2.057 0.828 0.965 83.38
1962 89.2 81.13 14.13 2.461 1.061 1.183 89.23
1963 110.9 89.57 16.77 2.879 1.164 1.443 99.35
1964 122.3 94.92 17.99 3.089 1.221 1.593 102.93
1965 132.4 100.34 19.45 3.197 1.314 1.728 105.06
1966 137.0 101.81 20.16 3.000 1.355 1.815 106.91
1967 139.0 90.27 22.28 2.639 1.318 1.828 117.46
1968 144.9 89.60 26.08 2.275 1.203 1.917 119.68
1969 136.8 80.13 24.78 1.775 0.730 2.011 125.02
1970 127.3 73.55 27.46 1.491 0.575 1.975 120.23
1971 120.6 71.43 29.48 1.340 0.500 1.927 116.31
1972 98.8 69.24 32.90 1.333 0.507 1.953 93.27
1973 117.2 66.05 29.48 1.233 0.490 1.825 118.29
1974 90.0 60.82 34.64 1.130 0.433 1.742 91.13
1975 105.9 56.92 33.89 1.043 0.413 1.674 112.73
1976 104.2 56.21 34.69 1.038 0.415 1.634 110.87
1977 99.4 51.22 36.41 0.954 00401 1.571 109.77
1978 98.7 51.66 39.25 0.945 0.373 1.567 105.23
1979 97.4 50.42 40.04 0.936 0.337 1.581 104.38
1980 100.5 50.49 41.45 0.938 0.315 1.644 105.97
See Appendix 6.0 for notation
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Appendix 6.33b
TOTAL PRODUCTIVITY ACTUAL COMPONENTS
Actual
Year Labour Capital Safety Materials Power TotalEnded Output Cost Cost Cost & Supplies Cost Productivity
March Cost (Tonnes per
£100)
CM Tonnes) C£M) C£11) C£M) (£M) Cm)
19~ 47.6 49.98 6.56 1.642 0.491 0.666 80.22
1959 54.7 52.50 7.81 1.692 0.599 0.709 80.oS
1960 60.8 61.70 8.81 1.906 0.693 0.773 82.29
1961 71.4 68.94- 10.26 2.052 0.845 0.943 85.98
1962 89.5 81.31 13.02 2.137 1.028 1.214 90.67
1963 113.2 91.29 14.41 2.348 1.173 1.500 102.24
1964 126.1 94.67 15.41 2.599 1.201 1.727 109.08
1965 135.6 100.62 16.70 2.598 1.249 1.879 110.20
1966 137.8 100.30 18.66 2.684 1.220 1.941 110.41
1967 138.2 92.S4 22.17 2.432 1.094 1.897 115.17
1968 144.6 89·52 25·56 2.254 1.050 2.106 120.01
1969 138.5 79.60 22.43 1.904 0.821 2.110 129.60
1970 127.4 72.07 23.44 1.616 0.607 1.918 127.85
1971 121.8 67.10 25·13 1.430 0.576 1.840 126.77
1972 99.6 53.26 26.66 1.259 0.433 1.518 119.81
1973 116.7 65·04 29.58 1.233 0.43S 1.784 11S.99
1974 89.9 50.34 30.90 1.221 0.329 1.421 106.76
1975 106.0 56.68 32.96 1.040 0.418 1.623 114.32
1976 104.5 56.00 35.34 1.172 0.432 1.631 110.49
1977 99.4 51.31 37.74 1.017 0.416 1.574 107.98
1978 97·5 51.52 40.44 0.945 0.373 1.578 102.79
1979 96.6 50.62 40.83 1.016 0.341 1.586 102.34
1980 100.3 50.89 41.82 0.880 0.309 1.644 104.98
- 231 -
Appendix 6.33c
Year Actual Predicted
Ended Total Total
%age
March Productivity Productivity
Error
From Model
(7)
1958 80.22 83.59 - 4·03
1959 80.08 82.23 - 2.61
1960 82.29 79.78 2.89
1961 85.98 83.38 3.12
1962 90.67 89.23 1.61
1963 102.24 99.35 2.91
1964 109.08 102.93 5.97
1965 110.20 105.06 4.89
1966 110.41 106.91 3·27
1967 115·17 117.46 - 1.95
1968 120.01 119.68 0.28
1969 129.60 125.02 3.66
1970 127.85 120.23 6.34
1971 126.77 116.31 8.99
1972 119.81 93.27 28.46
1973 118.99 118.29 0.59
1974 106.76 91.13 17.15
1975 114·32 112.73 1.41
1976 110.49 110.87 - 0.34
1977 107.98 109.77 - 1.63
1978 102.79 105.23 - 2.32
1979 102.34 104.38 - 1.95
1980 104.98 105.97 - 0.93
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Appendix 7.221b
C_ommon Law Replace-'feax Danage & No. of Un- Wage Other Total Cost
Ended Compensation Productive Per ment Costs of Fatal
March Costs Shifts Shift Cost per Per Case Accidents
Per Case Case Per Case-.
(i) (ii) (ii) (H) (iii)
(£) (£) (£) (£) (£)
1958 5,346 59 3.4-398 202.95 203 5,751.95
1959 5,4-96 59 3.6097 212.97 204 5,912.97
1960 5,630 61 3.7500 228.75 210 6,068.75
1961 5,794 60 3.8813 232.88 212 6,238.88
1962 6,045 60 4-.0350 242.10 215 6,502.10
1963 6,239 61 4.0700 248.27 219 6,706.27
1964 6,391 61 4.1940 255.83 224 6,870.83
1965 6,721 62 4.4-962 278.76 223 7,222.76
1966 7,088 62 4.8219 298.96 234 7,620.96
1967 7,404 63 4-.8714 306.90 241 7,951.90
1968 7,725 62 4.9601 307.53 243 8,275.53
1969 8,233 64 5.3138 340.08 2.58 8,831.08
1970 8,834 63 5.8403 367.94 265 9,4-66.94
1971 9,568 64 6.4774 4-14.55 279 10,261.55
1972 10,659 63 7.0679 445.28 297 11,401.28
1973 11,615 64 8.7224 558 ,23 325 12,4-98.23
1974 12,915 64 9.84-50 630.08 348 13,893.08
1975 15,265 63 12.1652 .766.24 380 16,411.24
1976 19,300 63 15.0430 947.71 441 20,688.71
1977 22,889 62 16.3413 1013.16 548 24,450.16
1978 26,983 62 19.0360 1180.23 638 28,801.23
1979 29,748 62 23.3829 1449.74 739 31,936.74
1980 33,343 62 27.3798 1697·55 800 35,840.55
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Appendix 7.221c
Total TotalYear Cost Cost
Ended Number per of
March of Fatality FatalFatalities Accidents
(£) (£)
1958 44 5,751.95 253,086
1959 46 5,912.97 271,997
1960 53 6,068.75 321,644
1961 55 6,238.88 343,138
1962 58 6,502.10 377,122
1963 68 6,706.77 456,026
1964 80 6,870.83 549,666
1965 69 7,222.76 498,370
1966 75 7,620.96 571,572
1967 57 7,951.90 453,258
1968 55 8,275.53 455,154
1969 45 8,831.08 387,399
1970 37 9,466.94 350,277
1971 32 10,261.55 328,370
1972 26 11,401.28 296,433
1973 22 12,498.23 274,961
1974 23 13,893.08 319,541
1975 15 16,411.24 246,169
1976 18 20,688.71 372,297
1977 17 24,450.16 415,653
1978 9 28,801.23 259,211
1979 18 31,936.74 574,861
1980 10 35,840.55 358,406
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Appendix 7.222a
Percentage Total
of Number ofYear Number of Number of Number of Number of Mechanised SeriousEnded Serious Serious Serious Serious Longwall Accidents
March Accidents Accidents Accidents Accidents Output Per on Longwal1Total Mechanised
Output Faces
(L) (ii) (iii) (Lv)
Falls of Transport Machines Misc.
Ground
1958 586 94 .54 101 22.8 190
1959 640 99 67 .56 27·3 235
1960 631 94- 63 46 31.5 263
1961 576 83 50 50 38.5 292
1962 538 83 45 49 48.5 374
1963 553 82 61 .54 59.1 443
1964 475 78 62 51 66.3 442
1965 464 68 62 43 72·7 463
1966 375 60 62 45 77·9 422
1967 347 55 51 49 83.0 417
1968 299 56 66 41 87.0 402
1969 200 45 60 40 89.0 307
1970 155 36 52 31 89.7 246
1971 143 33 55 27 90.0 232
1972 112 27 30 44 89.7 191
1973 126 31 31 34 90·5 201
1974 81 31 40 31 91.1 167
1975 81 28 31 30 90.8 1.54-
1976 111 34 31 35 91.4 193
1977 84 35 29 25 91.7 159
1978 101 24 23 37 91.8 170
1979 76 20 37 32 91.6 151
1980 73 16 28 36 91.7 140
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Appendix 7.222b Appendix 7.222c
Compensation Total Total TotalYear and COMon other Cost per
Ended Law J;l9.mages Costs per Case of Number of Cost of
March Cost per Case Serious Serious ~erious
Qase Accidents Accidents Accidents
(£) (£) (£) (£)
19.58 680 405.95 1,085.95 190 206,331
1959 705 416.97 1,121.97 235 263,663
1960 720 4)8.75 1,1,58.75 263 304,751
1961 755 444.88 1,199.88 292 350,365
1962 785 457.10 1,242.10 374 464,545
1963 820 467.27 1,287.27 443 570,261
1964 870 479.83 1,349.83 442 596,625
1965 905 501.76 1,406.76 463 651,330
1966 930 532.96 1,462.96 422 617,369
1967 990 :1+7.90 1,537·90 417 641,304
1968 1,020 550.53 1,570·53 402 631,353
1969 1,070 598.08 1,668.08 307 512,101
1970 1,160 632.94 1,792.94- 246 441,063
1971 1,280 693.55 1,973.55 232 457,864
1972 1,470 742.28 2,212.28 191 422,545
1973 1,650 883.23 2,533·23 201 509,179
1974 2,040 978.08 3,018.08 167 504,019
1975 2,320 1,146.24 3,466.24 154 533,801
1976 2,800 1,388.71 4,188.71 193 808,421
1977 3,200 1,.561.16 4,761.16 159 757,024
1978 3,600 1,818.23 5,418.23 170 921,099
1979 4,200 2,188.74 6,)88.74 151 964,700
1980 4,900 2,497.55 7,392.55 140 1.035,657
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Appendix 7.223a
Percentage Total Number
Year Face Face Face of Longwal1 of Minor
Ended Minor Minor Minor Mechanised Accidents on
March Accidents Accidents Accidents Output per Longwal1Total Output Mechanised
(L) (ii) (iii) Faces
Falls of Haulage & Misc.Ground Transport
19~ 42,476 5,296 32,332 22.8 18,264
1959 43,447 5,325 )4,050 27.3 22,610
1960 42,352 5,013 34,250 31.5 25,709
1961 38,294- 4,290 32,485 )8.5 28,902
1962 37,100 4,102 32,855 48.5 35,918
1963 37,842 4,124 35,081 59.1 45,535
1964 37,000 3,740 36,229 66.3 51,030
1965 35,751 3,518 36,6(f1 72.7 55,162
1966 34,523 3,365 37,369 77.9 .58,625
1967 29,824 2,727 33,968 83.0 55,211
1968 25,663 2,267 30,408 87.0 50,75+
1969 20,361 1,774 26,279 89.0 43,088
1970 1.5,795 1,289 21,695 89.7 34,785
1971 12,241 1,039 17,071 90.0 27,316
1972 9,790 928 14,288 89.7 22,430
1973 7,876 720 12,126 90.5 18,753
1974 7,563 721 12,567 91.1 18,995
1975 5,638 553 10,345 90.8 15,015
1976 6,077 477 11,102 91.4 16,138
1977 5,512 400 10,611 91.7 1.5,152
1978 5,152 370 10,151 91.8 14,)88
1979 4,722 334 9,615 91.6 13,439
1980 3,938 312 8,537 91.7 11,726
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Ap:pendix 7.2238
~ear 1'otal Cost Total Number Total Cost
Ended Per Case of of
March of Minor Minor MinorAccidents Accidents Accidents
(£) (£)
1958 19.23 18,264 351,217
1959 20.52 22,610 463,957
1960 21.02 25,709 540,403
1961 24.88 28,902 719,082
1962 23.42 35,918 841,200
1963 23.61 45,535 1,075,081
1964 26.06 51,030 1,329,842
1965 29.97 55,162 1,653,205
1966 32.15 58,625 1,884,794
1967 32.48 55,211 1,793,253
1968 33·07 50,754 1,678,435
1969 35·43 43,088 1,526,608
1970 39.94 34,785 1,389,313
1971 45.18 27,316 1,234,137
1972 54.97 22,430 1,232,977
1973 67.84 18,753 1,272,204
1974 76.57 18,995 1,454,447
1975 94.60 15,015 1,420,419
1976 117.00 16,138 1,888,146
1977 127,10 15,152 1,952,819
1978 148.06 14,388 2,130,287
1979 18l.87 13,439 2,444,151
1980 212.95 11,726 2,497,052
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Appendix 7.224a Appendix 7224b
Output Total No TotalTotal No of CasesYear of New per Man- Face of Cost per Cost ofEnded Cases of shift Output K Pnetuno- Case of Pnetuno-March Pnetuno- for all Per Man- coniosis Pneumc-- coniosis
coniosis Under- Shift at the coniosis Cases atground Face Face
(UOMS) (FOMS) (£) (£)
19.58 3,543 1.76 3.64 0.556 1,970 422 831,340
1959 3,057 l.82 3.72 0•.563 1,721 425 731,425
1960 3,462 l.80 3.87 0.535 1,852 431 798,212
1961 3,151 1.86 4.09 0.523 1,648 448 738,304
1962 2,619 1.98 4.34 0.525 1,375 462 635,250
1963 2,195 2.11 4.72 0.514 1.128 479 540,312
1964- 2,004 2.29 5.03 0.524 1,050 493 517,650
1965 1,162 2.24 5.26 0.490 569 525 298,725
1966 990 2.35 5.57 0.485 480 576 276,480
1967 888 2.42 5.78 0.481 427 602 257,054
1968 752 2.59 6.06 0.492 370 642 237,540
1969 744 2.64 6.71 0.452 336 667 224,112
1970 661 2.78 6.99 0.457 302 684 206,568
1971 736 2.92 7.21 0.466 343 711 243,873
1972 624 2.76 7.05 0.450 281 767 215,527
1973 598 3.00 7•.56 0.456 273 805 219,765
1974 521 2.77 7.30 0.436 227 924 209,748
1975 575 2.94 7.89 0.429 247 1,243 307,021
1976 656 2.91 7.89 0.424 278 1,324 368,072
1977 569 2.83 7.75 0.420 239 1,496 357 ,544
1978 524 2.79 7.91 0.406 213 1,643 349,959
1979 492 2.86 8.53 0.386 190 1,850 351,500
1980 530 2.89 8.88 0.374 198 2,120 419,760
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Appendix 7.225
Year Total Safety Price Total ActualEnded Costs ~t Index Safety Costs AtMarch Current Prices Constant Prices
e£) e£)
19~ 1,641,974 100.0 1,641,974
1959 1,731,042 102.3 1,692,123
1960 1,965,010 103.1 1,905,926
1961 2,150,889 104.8 2,052,375
1962 2,318,117 108.5 2,136,.513
1963 2,641,680 112.5 2,348,160
1964- 2,993,783 115·2 2,598,770
1965 3,101,630 119.4 2,597 ,680
1966 3,350,215 124.8 2,684,467
1967 3,144,869 129.3 2,432,227
1968 3,002,482 133.2 2,2.54,116
1969 2,660,220 139·7 1,904,2)8
1970 2,)87,221 147.7 1,616,263
1971 2,264~,244 1~.3 1,430,350
1972 2,167,482 172.2 1,2~,700
1973 2,276,109 184.6 1,232,995
1974 2,487,755 203.8 1,220,684
1975 2,507,410 241.0 1,040,419
1976 3,437,036 293·3 1,171,8.50
1977 3,456,037 339.9 1,016,781
1978 3,660,556 )87.5 944,660
1979 4,335,212 426.9 1,015,510
1980 4,310,875 489·7 880,309
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Appendix 7.23
Model (4)
Year Predicted Actual % ageEnded F T s d p Safety $afety
~ch Qost from Costs Error
- (4) .£000 £000
19.58 774 173 1.41 274 19 1,644 1,642 - 0.12
1959 895 177 1.42 257 30 1,7.58 1,692 - 3.75
1960 988 181 1.45 251 46 1,902 1,906 0.21
1961 1,090 182 1.51 250 87 2,057 2,052 - 0.24
1962 1,312 187 1.62 241 132 2,461 2,137 -13.17
1963 1,388 199 1.75 242 161 2,879 2,348 -18.44
1964 1,427 205 l.81 244 188 3,089 2,599 -15.86
1965 1,462 207 1.89 246 246 3,197 2,598 -18.74
1966 1.441 208 2.02 243 374 3,000 2,684 -10.53
1967 1,407 210 2.08 239 518 2,639 2,432 - 7.84
1968 1,369 222 2.19 227 699 2,275 2,254 - 0.92
1969 1.025 264 2.17 241 701 1,775 1,904 7.27
1970 898 282 2.16 242 703 1,491 1,616 8.38
1971 849 293 2.08 244 708 1,340 1,430 6,72
1972 840 292 2.09 249 714 1,333 1,259 - 5.55
1973 831 287 2.06 243 718 1,233 1,233 0
1974 778 292 2.03 242 692 1,130 1,221 8.05
1975 745 290 2.04 241 688 1,043 1,040 - 0.29
1976 754 287 2.05 235 687 1,038 1,172 12.91
1977 720 283 2.04 239 686 954 1,017 6.60
1978 709 291 2.04 233 672 945 945 0
1979 673 302 2.08- 229 638 936 1,016 8.55
1980 649 314 2.11 230 625 938 880 - 6.18
See Appendix 6.0 for notation.
* Pages 243 - 273 (Appendix 8.0) are inserted in the back cover pocket.
- 243 -
Appendix 8.0
Modelling Process
It is intended here to clarify for the rea,der exactly how the
"
models introduced earlier, and particula~ly ,the indices used, were
" '."
devised, as well as showing that the models are to a large extent
.' .~ .
representative of the system, as well as tested by the aetual data •
, "
. i ,.
Als~a simple analysis is carried out to give an indication of the
';~' ..
sensitivity of the models to the values of the indices used. All the
• ·f'
models are considered here, but to help the reader qnderstand and
follow the discussion, the order of appearance will be different from
, ., .
that of sections 3.31 and 3.32 (pp 129-152).
1. Labour Cost Mo~el (page 136)
The first question to be asked is: what factors determine the
cost of labour at the coal face? A long list was compiled for these
parameters, containing both major and minor ones. From these, those
parameters which were either too minor to be considered separately or
too difficult to evaluate, such as psychological state of workers,
conditions of mines, age of miners and the effect of the state of
technology elsewhere underground. were either ignored, assuming them
constant over the period under consideration, or included in other
variables. For example the,effect of tecnnot.ogt car change elsewhere
in the mine can be included in the variable showing the state of
technology at the face i.e. tonnage of coal extracted per unit of
time, i.e. per shift, T. The pruned list contains these variables:
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mean number of faces worked per year (F), mean tonnage of coal
extracted pe: face per shift(T), mean length of face in each year (L)
and mean seam thickness of face in each year (B). The equation
showing these would be:
where W is the total face labour cost in each year,
K I'OJ ~ Y and A are constants.,-,/";" Q 'IJ
The next stage would be to evaluate the constants. The cons tant
K can be left until the end where it can be evaluated using the accual
data.
(a) Evaluation of ~
The question asked here is: how does the actual face labour cost
vary when the number of faces changes? In other words, for e~mple,
if the number of faces increases, what happens to the total cost of
labour at the faces? Does it increase of decrease? Taking the
number of faces in isolation, i.e. other things being equal, the
question becomes an abvious one, for the labour cost of 200 faces, all
other things being equal, will be higher than that for 100 faces.
Hence 0(. is pos itive .
~ > 0
The aim is to narrow the scope of the value of oI...untilit is fairly
close to its actual value. ~e pivot now is unity. All other
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things being equal, then a change in the number of faces is
proportional to a change inthe number of men working on the faces.
Therefore a positive change in the number of men causes a positive
change in the value of Wand vice versa. The question noW is: if
the number of men is doubled, will the total face labour cost double,
more than double or less than double? Or, if the number of men is
halved, will the total labour cost half, less than half or more than
half? Total labour cost is composed of two categories of costs,
direct and indirect. When the number of men changes (within a
reasonable scope), the direct cost of labour (direct wages) changes by
exactly the same proportion. But the indirect or fi~d cost of
labour does not change proportionately. In other words, if the
number of men increases by 10%, the total cost of labour increases by
less than 10%. Or, if the number of men decreases by 10%, the total
cost of labour decreases by less than 10%, since there are some costs
which are constant, and do not depend on the number of men, for
example, cost of colliery health centre or the canteen, clerical
costs, supervision costs, etc.
Raving checked the validity of these statements both through
personal interviews with experienced mining engineers and NCB
accountants, the conclusion is that 0( must be less than un1 ty.
Therefore:
0< 0<..<.1
Now that the above inequalities have been established, let us take the
number of faces which is of real interest instead of the number of
men, in order to evaluate a more precise value for ~. Consulting
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the NCB accouunts it was deduced that 21 - 30% of the total labour
cost, during the period under consideration, has been allocated to the
fixed cost of labour. At the same time, as years pass, the mean
number of men on each mechanized face tends to decrease, meaning that
the total labour cost has been even less responsive to the number of
coal faces in operation. This degree of responsiveness can be
calculated from figures given in appendices 6.3212 (page 221), 6.321
(page 222) and 6.3243 (page 226) as follows:
mean number of men working per shift per coal face in each year •
total number of manshifts worked per year
number of days worked per year X number of shifts worked per day X
number of faces
- Total output • face OMS
d x sx F
Table Al shows the calculation. This table shows the tendency of the
number of men employed at the face to have been decreasing. The
amount of reduction during the period (excluding years 1972 andol974)
is between (44 - 36) and (45 - 35) i.e. 18-22%. This reduction added
to the range already obtained (i.e. 21 - 30%) makes a total of 39 _
52%. Taking the actual values of F, being between 649 and 1462,
gives the limits within which the value of ~lies.
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Year Mechanised Face No. of men
ended 10ngwall o .M.S. d s F per shift
March output per face.
(m tonnes) (Tonnes)
1958 47.6 3.64 274 1.41 774 44
1959 54.7 3.72 257 1.42 895 45
1960 60.8 3.87 251 1.45 988 44
1961 71.4 4.09 250 1.51 1,090 42
1962 89.5 4.34 241 1.62 1,312 40
1963 113.2 4.72 242 1.75 1,388 41
1964 126.1 5.03 244 1.81 1,427 40
1965 135.6 5.26 246 1.89 1,462 38
1966 137.8 5.57 243 2.02 1,441 35
1967 128.2 5.78 239 2.08 1,407 34
1968 144.6 6.06 227 2.19 1,369 35
1969 138.5 6.71 241 2.17 1,025 39
1970 127.4 6.99 242 2.16 898 39
1971 121.8 7.21 244 2.08 849 39
1972 99.6 7.05 249 2.09 840 32
1973 116.7 7.56 243 2.06 831 37
1974 89.9 7.30 242 .~.03 778 32
1975 106.0 7.89 241 2.04 745 37
1976 104.5 7.89 235 2.05 754 36
1977 99.4 7.75 239 2.04 720 37
1978 97.5 7.91 233 2.04 709 37
1979 96.6 8.53 229 2.08 673 35
1980 100.3 8.88 230 2.11 649 36
Table Al: Calculation of
649sc, • 649 x 0.39
649~ 2. 649 x 0.52
1,462-<-3 • 1,462 x 0.39
1 ,462-<'4 • 1,462 x 0.52
the number of men per shift
hence ~1· 0.85
hence 0(2 - 0.90
hence 0( J - 0 •87
hence 0(.4 - 0.91
per face
The largest space is made by taking the values of ex. 1 and 0(.4'
therefore:
0.85 ~ 0.91
The gap is now small enough to allow trial and error. The
procedure for evaluating 0< should stop here and the exact value of 0<.
which is likely to be 0.85 - 0.91 should be found when similar
inequalities are found for other constants.
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(b) Evaluation of,3
It should be noted here that the parameter T is not taken as
representative of the output. It is rather included in the model in
order to account for technological change at the coal face and some
15other minor parameters, i.e. it is in fact, in Abramowitz's term
"the residual". It is therefore a parameter representing all other
factors but those specifically included in the model. Also, when the
modelling process was being carried out, it was noted that a model
with only the variables listed earlier would not, in any way, fit the
actual data and it was decided that (as will be explained later in sub
section (e) of this section) the number of faces equipped with powered
supports should also be included in the labour cost model. T is
still "the residual", but it now excludes the effects of the
introduction and expansion of powered supports.
Evaluation of f3 is a rather complex procedure. The
increase in the value of T over the period has been brought about by
both better design and improved equipment, and concentration of
workings. The latter would tend to increase labour cost per face
while the former is expected to decrease the face labour cost. The
situation becomes more complex when it is noticed that better design
and improved equipment were brought about not only for productivity
improvement, but improved safety was also an aim. A quick look at
the statistics of total face labour cost per tonne of coal extracted
shows an increase in almost every year leading to the conclusion
that fi is positive, therefore:
> o
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If the value of T increased (say) from 200 to 300 in one year and as a
result of this change the value of W changed from 100 to 150, the
value of fo would be uni ty. If W increased by an amount less than 50
then 0 <.. ~ <1 and if W increased by an amount more than 50 then
It was found that the latter is the case, as it is explained
here. The mean number of men working on each face is available (see
subsection (a». Wages paid to each man for each shift is also
available. From these, the total labour cost for each face is
calculated. The aim is to estimate how the price of labour has
changed for a tonne of coal to be extracted. The effects of changes
in the "machine available time" is therefore necessary to be taken
into consideration. For convenience, the variable om from
Ul'
Stanier140 is used here. It i. simply output from longwall
mechanised faces in .tllion tonnes per machine available time in
minutes. The product of these three values would give an indication
of how the real unit price of labour at the coal face has changed.
These data are tabulated in Table A2. The mean change of the
percentage values is +63%. Now using different values for T during
the period the value of f3 can be calculated.
changes within the liaits 173 and 314.
T during the period
For T • 173: 173 t3. 173 x 1.63 - 282
314 j"!). 314 x 1.63 - 512
hence f,J • 1.09
For T • 314: hence ~. 1.09
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Year No of men Wages per Output per Real Unit % change
Ended per shift shift machine price of of unit
March per face (constant available labour price of
prices) { time labour
1958 44 3.820 0.608 102
1959 45 3.880 0.623 109 + 7
1960 44 3.93 0.617 107 - 2
1961 42 3.95 0.586 97 - 9
1962 40 3.94 0.640 101 + 4
1963 41 3.81 0.651 102 + 1
1964 40 3.78 0.635 96 - 6
1965 38 3.90 0.631 94 - 2
1966 35 4.05 0.653 93 - 1
1967 34 3.87 0.628 83 -11
1968 35 3.75 0.723 95 +14
1969 39 3.86 0.794 120 +26
1970 39 3.95 0.867 136 +13
1971 39 3.97 0.900 139 + 2
1972 32 3.77 0.870 105 -24
1973 37 4.21 0.915 143 +36
1974 32 4.09 0.946 124 -13
1975 37 4.22 0.962 150 +21
1976 36 4.23 0.968 147 - 2
1977 37 4.00 0.977 145 - 1
1978 37 4.18 0.976 151 + 4
1979 35 4.47 0.988 155 + 3
1980 36 4.51 0.986 160 + 3
Table A2 - Changes in the Unit price of labour
For all other values of T during the period the value of!3 is
calculated to be similar. So far the value of /3 is expected to be
around 1.1. f'\But, as indicated above, mach~s have been designed to
result in better conditions of work and higher standards of safety as
well as for productivity purposes. This parameter is, however,
difficult to be evaluated. The fact that this parameter would tend
to increase the value of f3 was deduced through personal interviews
and correspondence with experienced mining engineers and particularly
those especialisi~ in the field of safety. It is therefore expected
that ~ will be greater than 1.1, but (remember) by a small amount.
Therefore:
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f3 > 1.1
The exact value of ~ can now be calculated by trial and error.
(c) Evaluation of ~
This index, being a relatively minor one, was estimated through
discussions with mining engineers, with reference to a few articles in
the publications of The Institution of Mining Engineers, that tried to
find an optimum face length. The first question, again, is: how
will total labour cost change with changes of face length? or, all
other things being equal, if, for example, a face becomes longer (by a
reasonable amount, say 20%), will the number of men working at the
face (note that all other things, e.g. tonnage of coal extracted per
shift, are being kept equal) tend to increase or decrease? The
answer to this being expected to be that of increasing was checked to
be true. Therefore:
The question is now: if a face becomes (say) 50% longer, will the
number of men working there increase by the same amount i.e. 50% in
order to, using the same equipment (but a higher number of powered
supports etc. of course), extract the same tonnage of coal per
shift? The answer to this was found, through consulting the limited
amount of literature available and personal interviews, to be
negative. Therefore:
o "-
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During the whole period 1958-1980, the mean face length has increased
by 29% i.e. from 146 to 189. Unfortunately, it was found to be
impossible to arrive at an accurate value for ~, using the available
statistics. Consultation was therefore once again resorted to.
Mining engineers involved in practice, suggest that for 100% (gradual)
increase in the length of faces, the total face labour cost is likely
to increase by 10-30%. The few available articles, on the other
hand, give these limits to be 5-25%. The outer limits are taken
here, meaning that when face length increases by 29%, the increase in
the total labour cost is likely to be 1.5-8.7%. There is one more
fact to be included and that is the tendency to concentrate mining
operations on fewer faces which, in turn, may decrease the limits.
This is, however, difficult to be estimated. It is, therefore,
concluded that the increase in W is between 1.5 and 8.7%, but likely
to be in the lower half of the gap.
146'Sl.146 x 0.015 • 2.19 hence ~l • 0.16
146lt'\,146 x 0.087 • 12.70 hence ~2 • 0.51
It was stated earlier that due to other factors influencing the value
of '>.(, the two limits ~ 1 and ¥ 2 should not be taken to be
absolutely accurate, and further, it was indicated that the tendency
for ~would be towards the lower side of the limits. To be safe, it
is concluded that:
1.
2
and the exact evaluation of ~ is left for the later section where all
indices will be found by trial and error.
(d) Evaluation of cP
This is the index for B, mean seam thickness. For the sa
tonnage of coal to be won per shift, assuming all other things b
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equal, hence the volume of coal per shift won is constant, the thicker
the seam the shorter the face need be and therefore the number of men
employed would tend to be lower, meaning that the total face labour
cost would tend to be lower. That is, if seam thickness increases by
(say) 20%, the required face length in order to extract the same
volume of coal would be less by approximately 20%. This being an
obvious fact, was checked through personal discussions to be true.
It is, therefore, established that:
Since the two parameters, namely seam thickness and face
length, as described above, can be taken to be inversely proportional,
the same argument as given for the evaluation of ~ would essentially
apply. Due to the inverse proportionality, "other factors" would now
tend to increase the change in the value of total labour cost due to a
change in the value of seam thickness. The limits obtained in the
case of" would now be, for $, 1-6%, since the value of seam thickness
B, has increased by 19% (from 1.25 to 1.49) during the period
1958-1980. Thus:
when B increases
1.25' • X
1.49~ - X x 0.94
hence: ~ log 1.25 • log X •••••••••• (1)
~ log 1.49 • log X + log 0.94 ••••(2)
substituting for log X in (2) gives:
~ log 1.49 • ~ log 1.25 + log 0.94
hence ~ - 0.35
Considering other factors discussed earlier, the value of 0 is most
likely to be:
~4 -0.5
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(e) The Model
W. K FO(. Tf.> L)f B~
Actual values of F, T, Land B were substituted in the model.
Different values for ec , ~ , '6, and ~ within the limits obtained
above were tried. The values for W calculated in this way were
compared with the actual values of W calculated in section 6.3212
pages 136-137. A value of K was adopted so that the two values of W
would be equal in 1958. ~hen comparing the two graphs, an
insufficiently good fit was observed. After the first few years the
graph for the model values of W changed with different rates from that
of the actual values graph. Other values for the indices, outside
the limits derived, were used which only showed to make the fit worse,
implying that the fault had to be in the variables chosen rather than
in the values obtained for the indices. Revision of the model was
considered to be necessary. The pruned list of parameters must be
lacking something. Any such variable would be likely to be related
in some way to technology, since this factor was subject to great
change during the period. It was then noticed that the effect of
introduction and increased use of powered supports was not represented
in the original model. However, the number of faces equipped with
powered supports grew rapidly in the 1960's after when it slowed
down. Different types of functions representing p (number of faces
equipped with powered supports) were considered. The rate of
increase of p is too sharp for it to be included in the model as it
stands and a sort of slower rate of change and hence better behaved
would be preferred. Exponential functions are usually well behaved
and tend to damp down seasonal and other short term fluctuations. On
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the other hand and since the values of p are large, it was decided to
use the ratio of ~ i IlItead, which is virtually the same but smaller
and hence more manageable. The last parameter to be included is
f.therefore e The model would now look like:
W • F
~
Fe
(f) Evaluation of e
The first question would again be: when the number of faces
equipped with powered supports changes, what happens to the total face
labour cost? In other words, when a face changes its support system
from props and bars to powered supports, does the number of men needed
at the face tend to increase or decrease? Note that all other things
are being kept equal. This, being an obvious question itself, was
discussed and the answer was verified to be that the more the value of
p the less the total face labour cost is expected to be. This means
that e Is negative. Therefore:
e < 0
It was further established through articles published by The
Institution of Mining Engineers and personal interviews that although
faces with powered supports tend to be less labour intensive, in
practice, the difference between the two types of faces is small,
meaning that the modulus of e is small. When attempting to estimate
a value for e, the question was: If the ratio ~ doubles, by how
much will the mean number of men working at each face decrease?
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Widely different estimates were arrived at, ranging from 5% to 20%,
implying that the value of e can be found only approximately. For
the reader to follow the argument, the calculation procedure is given
here in reverse order. The intention is to find a lower limit for e .
Let: e·-1 and F • 800 for years t and (t + 1), and
p • 300 in year t
p • 600 in year (t + 1).
Then ~ = J/8
¥ = J/4
• 0.375 in year t
• 0.75 in year (t + 1) i.e. an increase of 100%
~
Hence F • 0.687 for year te
~
F • 0.472 for year (t + 1)e
~
The value of eFshows a reduction of 31.3% which is outs ide the lim! ts
obtained earlier. Therefore
- 1 <. e <. 0
Now let: ~ --0.5, F • 800 for years t and (t + 1),
p • 350 for year t, and
p - 700 for year (t + 1).
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Then :e.F - 0.438 for year t
:e.
F
• 700
800
• 0.875 for year (t + 1), ie an increase
of 100%
Hence e
~
F • 0.804 for year t
~
Fe • 0.646 for year (t + 1), ie a reduction of 19.7%.
This reduction is approximately equal to the upper limit
mentioned earlier i.e. 20%. It is therefore expected that the value
of e will be at least 0.5, or:
-0.5 ~ a <, 0
The exact evaluation is left for the next section.
(g) The Final Model
The model is now established and approximate values for the
indices found. The remaining task is now that of mere calculations
to find the best values of these in order that the model values would
fit the actual total labour cost values best. Having done this, it
was found that the following values for the indices together with the
actual values for F, T, L, Band p in each year shows a good fit.
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K • 3.04 x 10-
4
cx_. 0.85
{3- 1.20
~- 0.125
cp- -2.0
e· -0.25
Using the above gives model values the percentage error
between which and the actual labour cost values has a mean of 1.58 and
standard deviation of 1.83.
(h) Sensitivity Analysis
A simple exercise will provide the reader with an idea of
the accuracy of, and thus add credibility to1the indices used.
The labour cost model obtained in section 6.3211, page 136
was:
The values of the indices and the constant are changed, one
at a time, keeping others constant, to detect the change in the
accuracy of the model.
-4 -4(1) Change K by +10%, i.e. from 3.04 x 10 to 3.344 x 10 •
Values for W, with both values of K together with percentage error 1n
both cases are tabulated in table A3.
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The percentage error in the labour cost model values with the
old value of K have mean of 1.58 and standard deviation of 1.83, while
those with the new value of K (i.e. increased by 10%) have mean of
8.95 and standard deviation of 2.22, which reflects the superiority of
the adopted value of K.
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Year W W Actual % Error %Error
Ended Model Values Model Values Labour with with
March with with Cost
K = 3.04x 10-4 K = 3.344x 10-4 K = 3.()4xlO-4KP3~'344x10-4
1958 47.58 52.34 49.98 5.04 - 4.51
1959 54.49 59.94 57.50 5.52 - 4.07
1960 62.81 69.09 61.70 - 1.77 -10.70
1961 68.39 75.23 68.94 0.80 - 8.36
1962 81.13 89.24 81.31 0.22 - 8.89
1963 89.37 98.31 91.29 2.15 - 7.14
1964 94.92 104.41 94.67 - 0.26 - 9.33
1965 101.81 110.37 100.62 0.28 - 8.82
1966 101.81 111.99 100.30 - 1.48 -10.44
1967 90.27 99.30 92.84 2.85 - 6.51
1968 89.60 98.56 89.52 - 0.09 - 9.17
1969 80.13 88.14 79.60 - 0.66 - 9.69
1970 73.55 80.91 72.07 - 2.01 -10.93
1971 71.43 78.57 67.10 - 6.06 -14.60
1972 69.24 76.16 53.26 -23.08 -30.07
1973 66.05 72.66 65.04 - 1.53 -10.49
1974 60.82 66.90 50.34 -17. 23 -24.75
1975 56.21 62.61 56.68 - 0.42 - 9.47
1976 56.21 61.83 56.00 - 0.37 - 9.43
1977 51.22 56.34 51.31 0.18 - 8.93
1978 51.66 56.83 51.52 - 0.27 - 9.34
1979 50.42 55.46 50.62 0.40 - 8.73
1980 50.49 55.54 50.89 0.79 - 8.37
Table A3: Effect of 10% increase in K on the labour cost model values
(2) Change O(by + 5%, i.e. from 0.85 to 0.89. Values for W with both
values for ~together with the percentage error in each case are
tabulated in table A4.
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Year W W Actual % Error %Error
Ended Model Values Model Values Labour with with
March with with Cost
0(.;:: 0.85 0<..= 0.89 0<..= 0.85 ex. = 0.89
1958 47.58 62.08 49.98 5.04 -19.49
1959 54.49 71.51 57.50 5.52 -19.59
1960 62.81 82.76 61.70 - 1.77 -25.45
1961 68.39 90.47 68.94 0.80 -23.80
1962 81.13 108.12 81.31 0.22 -24.80
1963 89.37 119.37 91.29 2.15 -23.52
1964 94.92 126.92 94.67 - 0.26 -25.41
1965 101.81 134.30 100.62 0.28 -25.08
1966 101.81 136.19 100.30 - 1.48 -26.35
1967 90.27 120.64 92.84 2.85 -23.04
1968 89.60 119.61 89.52 - 0.09 -25.16
1969 80.13 105.74 79.60 - 0.66 -24.72
1970 73.55 96.54 72.07 - 2.01 -25.35
1971 71.43 93.55 67.10 - 6.06 -28.27
1972 69.24 90.64 53.26 -23.08 -41.24
1973 66.05 86.43 65.04 - 1.53 -24.75
1974 60.82 79.38 50.34 -17.23 -36.58
1975 56.21 74.16 56.68 - 0.42 -23.57
1976 56.21 73.27 56.00 - 0.37 -23.57
1977 51.22 66.64 51.31 0.18 -23.00
1978 51.66 67.17 51.52 - 0.27 -23.30
1979 50.42 65.42 50.62 0.40 -22.62
1980 50.49 65.42 50.89 0.79 -22.21
Table A4: Effect of 5% increase in 0<. on the labour cost model values.
Labour cost model predicts the labour cost values, the percentage error
for which would have mean of 1.58 and standard deviation of 1.83.
When ~is increased by 5% to 0.89, the mean and standard deviation of
the percentage error become 23.95 and 2.02 respectively. It is
therefore expected that the accuracy of the model is impaired sharply
by any change in the adopted value of 0<.,. 0.85.
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(3) change f3 by + 5%, i.e. from 1.2 to 1.26. Values of W for both
values of ~ together with the percentage error in each case are
tabulated in table AS.
Year W W Actual % Error %Error
Ended Model Values Model Values Labour with with
March with with Cost
I~ = 1.2 ~ = 1.26 /3 = 1.2 ~ = 1.26
1958 47.58 64.82 49.98 5.04 -22.89
1959 54.49 74.34 57.50 5.52 -22.65
1960 62.81 85.80 61.70 - 1.77 -28.09
1961 68.39 93.45 68.94 0.80 -26.23
1962 81.13 111.04 81.31 0.22 -26.77
1963 89.37 122.78 91.29 2.15 -25.65
1964 94.92 130.64 94.67 - 0.26 -27.53
1965 101.81 138.18 100.62 0.28 -27.18
1966 101.81 140.24 100.30 - 1.48 -28.48
1967 90.27 124.42 92.84 2.85 -25.38
1968 89.60 123.91 89.52 - 0.09 -27.75
1969 80.13 111.97 79.60 - 0.66 -28.91
1970 73.55 103.18 72.07 - 2.01 -30.15
1971 71.43 100.44 67.10 - 6.06 -33.19
1972 69.24 97.34 53.26 -23.08 -45.28
1973 66.05 92.76 65.04 - 1.53 -29.88
1974 60.82 85.50 50.34 -17.23 -41.12
1975 56.21 80.00 56.68 - 0.42 -29.15
1976 56.21 78.94 56.00 - 0.37 -29.06
1977 51.22 71.87 51.31 0.18 -28.61
1978 51.66 72.61 51.52 - 0.27 -29.05
1979 50.42 71.02 50.62 0.40 -28.72
1980 50.49 71.29 50.89 0.79 -28.62
Table AS: Effect of 5% increase in ~ on the labour cost model values
Again it can be seen that 5% change in the value of ,3 had decreased
accuracy of the model sharply, i.e. mean an standard deviation of the
percentage error for ~. 1.2 which are 1.58 and 1.83 respectively,
have increased to 27.81 and 2.38 respectively.
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(4) Change ~ by + 10%, Le. from 0.125 to 0.138. Values for the
predicted labour cost using both values of ~ , together with the
expected percentage error in each case are tabulated in table A6.
Year W W Actual % Error %Error
Ended Model Values Model Values Labour with with
March with with Cost
¥ = 0.125 ~:; 0.138 ~ = 0.125 ?! :: 0.138
1958 47.58 50.76 49.98 5.04 - 1.54
1959 54.49 58.15 57.50 5.52 - 1.12
1960 62.81 67.05 61.70 - 1.77 - 7.98
1961 68.39 73.04 68.94 0.80 - 5.61
1962 81.13 86.66 81.31 0.22 - 6.17
1963 89.37 95.55 91.29 2.15 - 4.46
1964 94.92 101.53 94.67 - 0.26 - 6.76
1965 101.81 105.14 100.62 0.28 - 4.30
1966 101.81 108.88 100.30 - 1.48 - 7.88
1967 90.27 96.48 92.84 2.85 - 3.77
1968 89.60 95.76 89.52 - 0.09 - 6.52
1969 80.13 85.64 79.60 - 0.66 - 7.05
1970 73.55 78.63 72.07 - 2.01 - 8.34
1971 71.43 76.36 67.10 - 6.06 -12.13
1972 69.24 74.03 53.26 -23.08 -28.06
1973 66.05 70.62 65.04 - 1.53 - 7.90
1974 60.82 65.04 50.34 -17.23 -22.60
1975 56.21 60.88 56.68 - 0.42 - 6.90
1976 56.21 60.13 56.00 - 0.37 - 6.87
1977 51.22 54.80 51.31 0.18 - 6.37
1978 51.66 55.27 51.52 - 0.27 - 6.78
1979 50.42 53.96 50.62 0.40 - 6.19
1980 50.49 54.05 50.89 0.79 - 5.85
Table A6: Effect of 10% change in ~ on the labour cost model values
The accuracy. of the model has again been impaired by changing o.
The new mean (when ~ - 0.138) is 6.21 and the standard deviation is
2.36, which are considerably higher than those expected when ¥ - 0.125
(mean and standard deviation when ~ - 0.125 are 1.58 and 1.83
respectively).
Year W W Actual % Error %Error
Ended Model Values Model Values Labour with with
March with with Cost
¢ ;-2 ¢ = -1.' ¢= -2 4> -1.8
1958 47.58 49.99 49.98 5.04 - 0.02
1959 54.49 56.45 57.50 5.52 - 1.86
1960 62.81 65.89 61.70 - 1.77 - 6.36
1961 68.39 71.74 68.94 0.80 - 3.90
1962 81.13 85.24 81.31 0.22 - 4.61
1963 89.37 94.18 91.29 2.15 - 3.07
1964 94.92 100.03 94.67 - 0.26 - 5.36
1965 101.81 105.42 100.62 0.28 - 4.55
1966 101.81 106.46 100.30 - 1.48 - 5.79
1967 90.27 95.13 92.84 2.85 - 2.41
1968 89.60 94.57 89.52 - 0.09 - 5.34
1969 80.13 84.83 79.60 - 0.66 - 6.17
1970 73.55 78.10 72.07 - 2.01 - 7.72
1971 71.43 75.96 67.10 - 6.06 -11.66
1972 69.24 73.74 53.26 -23.08 -27.77
1973 66.05 70.44 65.04 - 1.53 - 7.67
1974 60.82 65.15 50.34 -17.23 -22. 73
1975 56.21 61.06 56.68 - 0.42 - 7.17
1976 56.21 60.38 56.00 - 0.37 - 7.25
1977 51.22 55.17 51.31 0.18 - 7.00
1978 51.66 55.72 51.52 - 0.27 - 7.54
1979 50.42 54.53 50.62 0.40 - 6.17
1980 50.49 54.68 50.89 0.79 - 6.93
Table A7: Effect of 10% increase in ~ on the labour cost model values
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(5) Change Cl> by +10%, i.e. from -2 to -1.8. Values for the
expected labour cost choosing both -2 and -0.18 for <b, together with
the percentage error in both cases are tabulated in table A7.
The new mean and standard deviation are 5.69 and 2.53
respectively, reflecting the fact that changing the value of ~ by 10%
decreases the accuracy of the labour cost model. The mean percentage
error increases from 1.58 to 5.69 and the percentage error standard
deviation from 1.83 to 2.53.
(6) Change e by +10%, i.e. from -0.25 to -0.225. Values for the
predicted labour cost choosing both values of ~, together with
percentage error in each case are tabulated in table A8.
It can be seen that a change in the value of e has also impaired
the accuracy of the model, although by lesser amount than in the case
of other indices. In this case, 10% increase in the value of ~
increases the mean percentage error from 1.58 to 2.50 and standard
deviation of the percentage error from 1.83 to 1.88.
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Year W W Actual % Error %Error
Ended Model Values Model Values Labour with with
March with with Cost
e = -0.25 e ""0.225 e = -.25 e = .225
1958 47.58 47.61 49.98 5.04 - 4.98
1959 54.49 54.54 57.50 5.52 - 5.43
1960 62.81 62.88 61.70 - 1.77 - 1.88
1961 68.39 68.53 68.94 0.80 - 0.60
1962 81.13 81.33 81.31 0.22 - 0.02
1963 89.37 89.63 91.29 2.15 - 1.85
1964 94.92 95.23 94.67 - 0.26 - 0.59
1965 101.81 100.76 100.62 0.28 - 0.14
1966 101.81 102.47 100.30 - 1.48 - 2.12
1967 90.27 91.10 92.84 2.85 - 1.91
1968 89.60 90.75 89.52 - 0.09 - 1.36
1969 80.13 81.51 79.60 - 0.66 - 2.34
1970 73.55 75.00 72.07 - 2.01 - 3.91
1971 71.43 72.92 67.10 - 6.06 - 7.99
1972 69.24 70.73 53.26 -23.08 -24.70
1973 66.05 67.49 65.04 - 1.53 - 3.63
1974 60.82 62.19 50.34 -17.23 -19.05
1975 56.21 58.25 56.68 - 0.42 - 2.70
1976 56.21 57.51 56.00 - 0.37 - 2.63
1977 51.22 52.45 51.31 0.18 - 2.17
1978 51.66 52.90 51.52 - 0.27 - 2.61
1979 50.42 51.63 50.62 0.40 - 1.96
1980 50.49 51.72 50.89 0.79 - 1.60
Table A8: Effect of 10% increase in e on the labour cost model values
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The above results are summarised in table A9.
Change of indices mean standard deviation
no change 1.58 1.83
k by +10% 8.95 2.22
at. by +5% 23.95 2.02
13 by +5% 27.81 2.38
'6 by +10% 6.21 2.36
<tJ by +10% 5.69 2.53
e by +10% 2.50 1.88
Table A9: The effect of change of indices on accuracy of the labour
cost model
It is observed from Table A9 that any change in the values of the
indices and the constant will impair the accuracy of the labour cost
model. In two cases, namelyQC..and f', the model is highly sensitive
to any change in the indices.
2. The Output Model (Page 130)
Having gone through the exact procedure by which the labour cost
model was devised, and remembering the fact that similar tech~i~ue~
have been used in the case of other models, it is considered that a
summary only will suffice in the case of the other five models.
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i\The list of variables in this case co~ists of the mean number of
faces in operation F, the mean tonnage of coal extracted per shift per
face T, the mean seam thickness B, the mean number of shifts worked
5
per day~and the mean number of days worked per year d. 1rhe model,
however, had to be revised, as in the case of the labour cost model,
when another variable namely the tonnage of coal lost through
stoppages (strikes etc) per year,D, was found necessary to be included.
P - (K po(, T ~ B¥ d a- SW) -D
where P is the total output, and
K, 0<..., (3 , ~ , 0-, and \".)are cons tants.
The evaluation of the indices for this model, being a
"semi-plausible" one, was simpler than for some of the others.
Applying similar techniques, the values of 0<., {3, wand O'were all
found to be around unity. This is explained briefly here. The by
now familiar question to be asked is: If the number of faces doubles,
all other things being equal, what happens to the total output? In
another words, assuming that the coal mining industry is composed of
100 coal faces, all of which are exactly the same in every aspect and
they all produce the same tonnage of coal per shift, then if suddenly
the number of faces increases to 200, would it not be justifiable to
expect the output to double? This assumption is not an impractical
one since mean values for all variables are being used. With exactly
the same argument the evaluation process of the other indices was
initiated. All theoretical work and assumptions made were verified
thickness increases? Does it increase of decrease? It was
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through personal interviews and correspondence. The evaluations of ~
was, however, slightly more complicated. Assuming all other things
being equal, what happens to the total output when the mean seam
established that the former Is the case meaning that:
~> 0
The next step would be to quantify the amount of change in the
total output as a result of (say) 100% increase in the value of mean
seam thickness. Using the same techniques as in the previous
section, a range of 30 - 55% for change of output was obtained.
Using the actual change in the period reduces the range to 5 - 9%.
1.28~I • X ~, log 1.28 • log X ••••••••••••••(1)
or;
1.49b', • X x 1.05 ~I log 1.49 - log X + log 1.05 •••(2)
substituting for log X in (2) gives:
hence
~ 1 log 1.49 • ~llog 1.28 + log 1.05
'61 • 0.32
This shows that the lower limit for ~ is 0.32.
upper limit, the figure 9% should be used.
Now to obtain an
1.28 ~2 :II Y 'i2 log 1.28 - log Y •••••••••••••••• (1)
or:
1.49 ~2 '"Y x 1.09 ~2 log 1.49 • log Y + log 1.09 ••••••• (2)
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Substituting for log Y in (2) gives:
¥2 log 1.49 - ~2 log 1.28 + log 1.09
hence ~2. - 0.57
Therefore 0.32 ~ 0.57
Raving established the above inequalities, the exact value of
¥, in order that it would best fit the data, was found by trial and
error. The following are the conclusions of these calculations.
K - 0.84 x 10-6
0<.- 1
f3 - 1
'l{ - 0.50
rr- 1
w. 1
Sensitivity analysis of the model gave. similar results to those
obtained in the case of the labour cost model. That is, the accuracy
of the model would be impaired as a result of any change in the value
of the indices or the constant K.
(3) Capital Cost Model (page 139)
The procedure by which the variables were adopted is outlined on
page 139. In this case it was necessary to break the model into
smaller functions. Or, the right way round, it was considered that
the combination of five smaller functionswould result in the c~~ital
cost model. The cost of capital is dependent upon the number
(quantity) of machines purchased, for the cost of (say) 200 shearer 'o~d~r~
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should be more than the cost of 100 shearer loaders of the same type
and size. Capital cost also depends on the quality of the machinery
in use. These are the technological improvements applied to the coal
140face equipment. Stainer concludes that from 1960 to 1976 the
deflated price of mining machinery increased by 6% per year which Is
in fact "the residual". The cost of machinery also depends on the
physical specification of the equipment, e.g. size, for a set of
powered supports suitable for a 2 metre thick seam is more expensive
than that of the same type but suitable for a 1.5 metre thick seam.
Since the actual cost incurred by the NCB for c~pttal equipment is
determined by the number and type of machines purchased rather than
those actually in use, and since there are always times when machines
are temporarily out of use, for example the time elapsed when men of
C)
the one shift leave the f~e and those of the next shift arrive at the
face, allowance should also be made for capacity utilization of the
machinery available. In addition to this, the NCB always maintain a
pool of equipment as stock to cater for the times when machines need
to be repaired etc. and hence leave the face. ibis factor should
140therefore be considered too. Stainer found that approximately
half of the face machines purchased by the NCB are actually installed
at the faces. Each of these factors depends upon a number of
variables. The exact variables used (or the pruned list) are
outlined on pages 139 and 140. The indices were calculated in much
the same way asthose in the case of the labour cost model, although in
this case considerably more calculations were required. For example
the model was subject to major revision four times in this case.
Sensitivity analysis of the model confirmed its accuracy, for as a
result of changing any of the indices or the constant, the accuracy of
the model was impaired.
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(4) Safety Cost Model (pages 148 and 183)
The argument for choosing the variables is as follows.
Basically, the more the number of men working at a face. the higher
the probability that one of them would have an accident. For
example, it is axiomatic that, all other things being equal, the
probability of an accident occurring during any shift at a face with
40 people working is higher than that where 10 people work.
Therefore the number of faces needs to be considered, together with a
variable representing concentration of workings, here T. Further, if
a man works two shifts per day, he is more succeptible to having an
accident in any day than if he works one shift per day. Therefore
the mean number of shifts worked per day s, is taken into account.
Also, the probability of having an accident in any year is higher for
the man who works 300 day per year (note that all other things are
being kept equal and the man is the average man) than for the one who
works 100 days per year, therefore the mean number of days worked per
year foreach worker d, needs to be included. The only factor
remaining is a variable representing the fact that faces equipped with
powered supports are much safer than those without, due to the reduced
area of exposed roof at faces using powered supports. For the same
reason as before (see Section 1) an exponential function
incorporating p, the number of faces equipped with powered supports,
is used. Apart from all these, as was mentioned several times
before. there is a strong psychological element attached to the
occurrence of accidents. -rh1s is assumed constant, mainly because it
is difficult, if not impossible, to be evaluated. For this reason a
lower degree of accuracy from this model will be accepted. The
indices have been calculated in the same way as described for previous
models and those best fitting the model have been adopted, but the
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mean and standard deviation of the errors are, expectedly, higher for
this model than for most of the others. Sensitivity analysis
confirms the superiority of the indices used.
5. Materials and Supplies Cost Model (page 149)
M= 4.495 x 10-
5 d s
T
A brief argument is given here for the way in which this model
was devised. -rhe first step would be to compile a list .of
variables. The three main variables affecting materials and supplies
cost are: quantity of machines, rate of use and the state of
technology. The number of machines used is represented by F, the
mean number of coal faces in operation. -rbis variable also includes
the fact that faces have become longer and thicker over the period
under consideration. For the higher the number of faces in operation
the higher the number of machines in use and hence the higher the cost
of repair, maintenance etc should be, the index of F must be
positive. This combined with other parameters such as seam thickness
and face length established the value of this index to be 1.05 - 1.35,
which was the basis for trial and error procedure in order to find the
e~ct value of the index of F. The rate of use, the argument for
which is similar to that for the safety cost model, is represented in
the model by the inclusion of two variables d, the mean number of days
worked per year, and s, the mean number of shifts worked per day.
Technology, together with some other minor parameters, is again
represented by Tt the mean tonnage of coal extracted per shift. For,
- '1:13 -
the higher the level of technology, the higher the value of T (note
that all other things are being kept equal) and the lower the
materials and supplies cost would be, the index for T would be
negative. All these and o~ assumptions and estDnates have been
discussed and verified through personal interviews and correspondence
with mining engineers. Trial and error, as before, gives the precise
value of the indices and the sensitivity analysis applied to the model
confirms their superiority.
6. Power Cost Model (page 151)
It was mentioned on page 149 that power cost is in fact a part of
the materials and supplies cost and it is dealt with separately
because of possible interesting and useful conclusions that it may
provide. Forthis reason, the argument for the choice of varia.bles
is sbnilar to that in the case of the materials and supplies cost
model. 1ihe variable T here is to represent the rate of use of
electrically powered machines within any shift, concentration of
workings and the level of technology i.e. more sophisticated machinery
and the use of more ancillary equipment, e.g. methane drainage
equipment. F, on the other hand is to represent the number of
electrical machines used, which varies with the number of faces in
operation. The fact that the index for F is less than unity
indicates the fixed power consumption which is independent of the rate
of coal production. Having obtained limits for the indices, the
etrial and error procedure gave the prcise values of these and the
sensitivity analysis, which was applied to this model in the same way
as in the case of the labour cost model, confirmed the superiority of
the indices used.
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